



Averroes

on Plato's *Republic*

Translated, with an Introduction and Notes,
by Ralph Lerner

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ITHACA AND LONDON

Preface

You have here something close to what Abū'l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Rushd (known to the Latins as Averroes) wrote toward the end of the twelfth century in Córdoba. Little more can be asserted with confidence and candor because it may be three centuries since anyone last saw a copy of the Arabic text. What has come down to us is a Hebrew translation of the Arabic, composed by Samuel ben Judah in the early fourteenth century in Provence and preserved in eight manuscripts in varying states of completeness. Based on that Hebrew translation, there have been one Hebrew summary (by Joseph Caspi in 1331) and four translations—two in Latin (by Elia del Medigo¹ in 1491 and by Jacob Mantinus² in 1539) and two in English, of which this is the latest. Very much, then, turns on the capability and accuracy of the two translators who stand between you and the author. Samuel has already made his apologies (see Appendix I); it only remains for me to speak on my own behalf.

This new English translation is presented in the belief that it marks an improvement in accuracy and intelligibility over the pioneering critical edition and translation of E. I. J. Rosenthal.³ Some of the differences in approach may be mentioned here: (1) Rosenthal establishes his Hebrew text by using as his point of departure an early sixteenth-century manuscript, MS B.⁴ The present translation is based in large measure on MS A⁵ (dated 1457), the oldest of the extant manuscripts and one containing a number of unique and superior readings. The strengths of this manuscript⁶ and its age entitle it to serve as the foundation of a critical text and of its translation. But as MS A is not without its defects, I have borrowed readings from other Hebrew manuscripts (as given in Rosenthal's *apparatus criticus* to his Hebrew text) wherever the interests of clarity of thought and good grammar are served. (2) Any translator, confronted with a text as obscure, difficult, and strange as this one, is sorely tempted to try to reconstruct a hypothetical Arabic original text and correct the Hebrew on the basis of a presumed misreading of the Arabic by the Hebrew translator. I have borne in mind the dangers in such a procedure, adopting it rarely and then only with reluctance and caution. Samuel was acutely aware of his shortcomings as a translator of philosophic Arabic; but if his word is to be taken in this matter, he was tireless in his efforts to provide the reader with a translation that was faithful to Averroes and intelligible to one who knew Hebrew but no Arabic.

Moreover, he saw what none of us has seen—Averroes' Arabic text. (3) Rosenthal understands Averroes' intention in this work as the "identification of the Ideal State with the Islamic, i.e. *Sharī'a* State, and the conviction of the superiority of the religious law" (p. 299). This understanding informs his translation and his elaborate notes.⁷ The Introduction to the present translation addresses itself, among other things, to this assertion and offers an alternative interpretation.

It is a special pleasure to acknowledge publicly the help I have received from others. Every translator builds on the work of his predecessors. It is only common courtesy to acknowledge that their efforts (especially those of Rosenthal) have helped me through a tangled and by no means unambiguous text—sometimes by providing examples to follow, at other times by leading me to further reflection on Samuel's text and Averroes' intention.

I am indebted to Muhsin Mahdi for his incisive criticisms of the translation and for giving his counsel unstintingly, promptly, and with delicacy. I am also grateful to Shlomo Pines for helpful suggestions concerning some of the more obscure and intractable passages in this text.

In ways varied and many (as Averroes might say), I have drawn upon the insights and energies of my guide to the world of the *falāsifa*, Leo Strauss. This volume is dedicated to his memory.

R. L.

Chicago, Illinois

¹ "Expositio Comentatoris Averrois in librum Politicorum Platonis," MS Siena, Biblioteca Comunale degli Intronati, G VII 32, fols. 158r–188r. (I have used enlargements from microfilm.)

² "Averrois Cordubensis Paraphrasis in libros de Republica Platonis," in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis* (Venetia apud Juntas, 1562; reprint ed., Frankfurt am Main: Minerva G.m.b.H., 1962), III, 334v–372v.

³ *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic,"* University of Cambridge Oriental Publications, no. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956; reprinted with corrections, 1966, 1969); hereafter cited as Rosenthal.

⁴ MS Munich, Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Hebr. 308, fols. IV-43V.

⁵ MS Florence, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Conventi Soppressi 12, fols. 94r–129v. (I have used enlargements from microfilm.)

⁶ See the review of Rosenthal by J. L. Teicher, *Journal of Semitic Studies*, 5 (1960):176–195, especially pp. 193 f.

⁷ See the review of Rosenthal by Shlomo Pines, *Iyyun—Hebrew Philosophical Quarterly*, 8 (1957): 65-84.

Leo Strauss's Notes on Averroes's Commentary on Plato's Republic

Editorial remarks: This text is an edited version of an untitled transcript of fourteen pages found in the Leo Strauss Papers.¹ There are two sets of corrections by hand on the transcript: some are by pencil and some by a blue pen. It seems that Strauss has corrected the transcript at least twice and has been preparing it for an unspecified later use. Strauss used E. I. J. Rosenthal's edition of Averroes's work and refers to the page numbers of his edition.² However, all translated passages from Hebrew are Strauss's own, not Rosenthal's. It is therefore tempting to date the transcript sometime after 1956, although there are no dates indicated on the papers. Numbers in curly brackets, inserted by the editor, refer to the page numbers of the transcript; numbers in square brackets, also inserted by the editor, refer to the paragraph numbers of the transcript; numbers in parenthesis are in the original transcript and refer to the page and line numbers of Rosenthal's edition; all handwritten and typed underlinings have been converted to italics; crossed out words and handwritten insertions are mentioned in the footnotes; arrow symbol, used for showing the logical consequence of ideas, is everywhere inserted by hand; Strauss's corrections of typographical errors have not been noted; the abbreviated title of the books and names are everywhere replaced by their full forms. The errors are responsibility of the editor.

{1} [1] How to approach Islamic (political) philosophy? a. not from a modern point of view b. not from the point of view of Christian scholasticism (e.g., assuming that Averroes is Islamic Thomas Aquinas). Islam[ic] philosophy seems to be a combination of Aristotle and Neo-Platonism (emanation of everything including matter from the One). But 1. Farabi's *The Philosophy of Plato* shows no trace of Neo-Platonism and is much closer to Cicero than to Plotinus 2. connected with this is the great importance of political philosophy, Platonic

and not Aristotelian: obvious difference from Christian scholasticism; furthermore, no Roman law and³ Cicero: no natural law tradition 3. connected with difference between Islam and Christianity? Avicenna on *Republic* and *Laws*: Plato's political science is the clue to the understanding of *sharia*, the prophet as philosopher-king (radically different from Aristotle's *Politics*) cf. Farabi, *Ihsa' al-'ulum* on *fiqh* and *Kalam* as appendages to political science.

[2] Sketch of the prophetology of the Falasifa according to Maimonides: a strictly natural process – intellect and imagination – *the* difficulty: how only one perfect *sharia* (given the eternity of the universe)?⁴

[3] Averroes on the *Republic*. How to read it? Not on the assumption that Averroes did not have access to the *Republic* but only to some summary. Averroes says that he paraphrased the *Republic* because he didn't have access to the *Politics*; this implies that he did have access to the *Republic*, of course only an Arabic translation. That translation is not accessible to us; we cannot know how good or bad it was; but we have no right to assume that it was bad or unintelligible. We can judge it to be unintelligible only with {2} a view to *our* understanding of the *Republic*; do *we* understand the *Republic*? cf. Farabi's *The Philosophy of Plato* on Thrasymachus.

[4] Besides, even if there can be no question that Averroes presents Plato in a manner which differs entirely from anything Plato says or suggests, this need not be due to incomprehension on his part or on the part of the translator of the *Republic*. The example of Farabi on *Laws* VII: the problem of *Islam* → Averroes too may *use* Plato, he may hide behind Plato, for presenting unorthodox views of the *sharia*.

[5] Summary: before we can make a comparison of the *Republic* and Averroes's paraphrase, one must have understood that paraphrase by itself.

[6] The problem: *Republic* → al-madīna al-fadīla – the perfect community – communism, equality of the sexes, rule of philosophers; the consequence: Islam is not the perfect community. But perhaps Averroes does not identify himself with Plato: why then did he paraphrase the *Republic*?

[7] In his introduction (21, 5 → 21, 3–25, 9) Averroes sets forth what he regards as the truth as to practical science. Practical science in contradistinction to theoretical science (natural science and divine science) (21, 8–13). Practical science consists of two parts: the

scientific and the practical part. Scientific part: the virtues (and vices) simply; practical part: how the virtues are to be established in the young, etc. – the latter requires understanding of the *political ends* of the virtues (21, 21–22, 2; 24, 12–32). (cf. Aristotle’s silence in his *Ethics* on the end which courage serves). Both parts of practical science are still theoretical as compared with that knowledge which is required for treating individual cases; for this requires {3} power of judgment which arises from long experience (25, 2–8).

[8] First part of practical sciences: *Nicomachean Ethics* Second part: *Politics* and Plato’s *Republic* Averroes will explain Plato’s *Republic* because the *Politics* “has not yet come to us.” (22, 3–5).

[9] Averroes uses then the *Republic* only for the second part of the theoretic part of practical science. But before he turns to this subject, he gives a summary of the first part of practical science; in that survey he uses, and even explicitly refers to (22, 27 and 23, 31), Plato’s *Republic* → the *Republic* contains the two parts of practical science, but Averroes uses it chiefly for the second part. Averroes identifies himself with the first part of practical science as developed within the *Republic* at least to the extent to which he summarizes it (cf. 65, 8–9 and context regarding the whole section up to 74, 14: the teaching of the first part of practical science is not based⁵ on Plato). By all this we are led to expect that he regards the practical science as developed in the *Republic* as the true teaching. This would imply a complete break with Islam.

[10] Averroes reassures us at the beginning of the discussion of the second part of political science, i.e., at the beginning of the theme of his work. “We say that the beginning with which Plato opened the speech about the emergence of those virtues (i.e., the citizen’s virtues) is the virtue of courage.” He makes clear immediately afterward that he will speak first in his own name before permitting Plato to speak: “as we have said, the way to the understanding of how it (the virtue of courage) is attained by the citizens and preserved with respect to them in the most perfect manner is that we should contemplate what is primarily intended by the actions of this virtue in the⁶ city. {4} We say then⁷ ...” (25, 10–19). He then goes on to present the true teaching regarding the function of courage without ever mentioning Plato. At the end of that presentation he says: “this is what Aristotle holds about the wars of the virtuous city according to the report of Farabi. But what we find about this

subject in Plato's book ..." It appears that Plato's teaching regarding the wars of the virtuous city and therewith about the function of the virtue of courage is not simply true (26, 26ff). Averroes does not simply agree with the teaching of the *Republic*.

[11] What is the issue? There are two ways in which the vulgar (\neq ⁸ the elite) can acquire speculative opinions, opinions about matters of speculation, i.e., about the first principle of the whole and the end (25, 24): 1. rhetorical and poetic speeches and, 2. compulsion. The first is applicable generally speaking to people who have been trained in these things from their youth on or to citizens of the virtuous city. The second is to be applied to "the rest of the nations," to the barbarians. The virtuous city – "the city which we describe in speech" (26, 12–13) – makes little use of the second way⁹, chiefly in regard to foreign nations. Compulsion → war → virtue of courage.

[12] That Averroes makes these remarks as a Moslem appears from the following statement: "this is the state of things in the *sharia* which go in the direction of the human shariai¹⁰ in this our divine *sharia*, for the ways in it (sc. in our divine law) which lead to God are two: one of them is by *speech* and the other is by war." (26, 16–18). To understand this remark, one has to consider that the true way to "speculative opinion" is demonstration (25, 17–18), demonstrative speech: by saying that our divine law leads to God "by speech" and both by rhetorical or poetic speech¹¹ Averroes leaves it open that {5} Islam leads the elite to the speculative truth by means of demonstration. Secondly, the quoted statement implies that there are laws within the law which radically differ from all human laws. This leads to the consequence that the specifically divine ways leading men to God are not speech and war but silence and peaceful action (say, justice, alms giving ...) ¹² and: practical science (i.e., philosophy)¹³ is perhaps not able to understand those parts of the divine law which have no analogy in human law: only the lower part of the divine law is covered by the *Republic*.

[13] In his exposition of the truth regarding speech and war as the ways leading to God, Averroes does not mention Plato – by name. But he seems to refer to him in the following passage (25, 19–23): "in teaching wisdom to the vulgar he used the rhetorical and poetic ways. For they (i.e., the vulgar) are in this respect exposed to this alternative: either they know them (i.e., the speculative opinions) by demonstrative speeches or they do not know them at all. The first is impossible. The second is possible. For it is proper for every

man to acquire the maximum of human perfection which his nature permits and for which he is prepared.” It is not certain that Averroes means here Plato – cf. 26, 1 ¹⁴השע which may be punctuated in different ways. Apart from this the statement is very strange:¹⁵ it is impossible for the vulgar to know the speculative truth by demonstrations, and it is possible for the vulgar not to know the speculative truth at all; the latter alternative is in perfect agreement with the nature of the vulgar. The conclusion: knowledge of the speculative truth by rhetorical and poetic argument is in fact ignorance of the speculative truth. It certainly is not knowledge but belief which is effected by {6} rhetorical and poetical arguments, and belief appears to be a moral virtue rather than an intellectual virtue (25, 24–26). No other conclusion could be drawn from the premise that the true ways to speculative science are a preserve of the elite (25, 17–18). The passage which contains an *allusion* to Plato, suggests that belief has no cognitive dignity whatever.

[14] Averroes questions in our context not what Plato says about speech – demonstrative or poetic – rhetorical – as a way of bringing men to God. *Averroes on Plato’s error* (26, 26–27, 23)¹⁶. According to Plato war and the art of war and hence courage are needed only because of necessity: Plato implicitly or explicitly rejects the war of civilization and the holy war. He apparently thought that only Greeks are by nature fit for wisdom (hence wisdom could not be spread to other nations by war). Yet, Averroes says, granting that the Greeks are most gifted, the men of Andalus, Syria, Iraq, Egypt are gifted too. (He does not speak of the inhabitants of Arabia – see Ibn Ḥaldūn). Furthermore, even if one accepts Plato’s premise (regarding the uniqueness of the Greeks) one could *perhaps* say that the nations other than the Greeks are particularly gifted for virtues other than the intellectual (and therefore that they may be subjected by conquest to discipline in those virtues). Yet here the important question arises as to whether the highest development of the other virtues does not depend on the corresponding development of wisdom. Still, many nations, especially in the two moderate climes, the 5th and the 4th, are fit for the other virtues. It seems that one could argue as follows: proficiency in those other virtues depends on education from early childhood on; hence coercion by war comes too late. But it does not come too late {7} for the small children of the nations concerned. Even the older generation of nations which have been brought up in a regime close to the virtuous regime can attain to the virtues *to some*

extent. If in a given case this is not possible, the people concerned must be killed or else enslaved, i.e., treated like irrational animals.

[15] I conclude: Averroes makes the war of civilization dependent on natural conditions (whilst the holy war may have to be waged against¹⁷ the reds and the blacks) – and: in many cases not *conversion* to the true religion but treating the conquered like irrational animals.

[16] Above all, Averroes argues on the premise that the purpose of the war of civilization is to spread wisdom.

[17] *Later discussion of compulsion and war*

[18] 1. Plato's guardians must punish such a guardian as is unwilling to accept the Law (41, 6–7; cf. also the reference to the *sharia* in Plato's perfect city: 44, 23). [i.e., Plato did not believe that *wisdom* could be brought about by compulsion but adherence to the *sharia* could; this means that for Plato wisdom is radically different from the *sharia* whereas Averroes maintains that wisdom and the *sharia* coincide and hence the holy war is legitimate, if qualified by the *natural* condition of wisdom].

[19] 2. Discussion of the size of the good city. That size, Averroes, holds depends on the circumstances (time, place, neighboring nations) and must be determined by political *judgment* which is distinguished from political science. Plato was satisfied {8} with 1000 warriors – rightly, given the circumstances of his time. Yet *we* who assume that the virtuous city must wage war against *all* men, cannot accept that figure, as Plato himself would readily admit (45, 29–46, 12). *Or*, one might say, that the virtuous community would consist of many communities each of which possesses a determinate size. In that case one would have to draw the line between the member societies properly, e.g., according to the natural climes as the¹⁸ Master of the *sharia* has said “I have been sent to the reds and to the blacks.” This is not indeed the opinion of Plato but that of Aristotle and it is undoubtedly the true opinion (46, 13–21). [Agreeing with Islam Averroes demands a *universal society* and therewith the war of civilization not limited to a part of mankind – i.e., he retracts the concession to Plato made before – on the other hand, he brings the *conflict* between Plato and Islam into the open – yet he prevents that conflict from becoming a conflict between Islam and *philosophy* by asserting that the view of the *sharia* is the view also of Aristotle.] He allegedly knows this

view only through Farabi (cf. 26, 26–27); *where* does Farabi say this? and if Farabi says it, to what Aristotelian work does he refer? A genuine work of Aristotle? (cf. Pines on 46, 20).¹⁹

[20] 3. Plato's suggestions regarding limitations of warfare. The citizens must not enslave men of their kind and language. They may call enemies of this kind (their fellows in race and language) men in error but not unbelievers. This opinion of Plato is at variance with what many bringers of *torot* say (59, 20–60, 5). [Here Averroes merely *notes* the disagreement between Plato and many prophets; he does not say here what he thinks to be the truth; nor does he refer *here* to Aristotle's agreeing {9} with many prophets and disagreeing with Plato: *should racial and linguistic unity override religious diversity?* Conclusion: one of the great issues between philosophy and law is religious war, and this is connected with the problematic character of a *universal* society.]

[21] Canon of interpretation: Averroes is aware of the conflict between the *Republic* and the *torot*²⁰; speaking of that conflict he takes the side of the *torot*²¹; but what about those cases in which the conflict between the *Republic* and the *torot*²² is obvious and Averroes does not polemicize against Plato? What does it mean when Averroes says regarding religious war and universal society that the Islamic view is undoubtedly the truth? Averroes sheds some light on this when he discusses his next great theme: the education of the guardians by music or rather by poetic and rhetorical speeches. The question concerns the use of untruth, of untrue fables. He teaches in his own name that for the education of the young imitative presentation of both speculative and practical matters is required but the imitation must be true. The first principle and the second principles [i.e., God and the angels] must be represented by their analogues in the political principles [i.e., as rulers issuing commands]. True happiness must be represented by imaginary happiness (29, 27–30, 12) but the vulgar cannot help taking the representations as the truth and hence the vulgar is in fact led²³ toward the untruth.

[22] Averroes turns then to Plato. Plato disapproved of untrue tales or untrue imitations. Tacitly imitating the ambiguity of Plato, Averroes presents Plato as disapproving of tales which are untrue and base (30, 20–21), thus leaving room for noble lies. He then explicitly replaces Plato's discussion of untrue and base {10} tales which were famous in Plato's time by a discussion of such tales which are famous "with us"; he explicitly *follows* Plato in doing so. God must not be represented as the cause of good and evil; evil must be

traced to a principle other than God, say, to demons; but this has other disadvantages; therefore, evil must be traced to a representation of matter such as darkness [i.e., no teaching of omnipotence] (30, 23–31, 6). Happiness must not be represented as *reward* for actions which are conducive to happiness nor misery as *punishment* but as health of the soul, survival of the soul and eternal life (31, 7–25). This is said by Averroes in his own name.

[23] Then he adds that *according to Plato* the guardians must not be afraid of anything which might happen to them after death. [i.e., there must not be presentations of hell as little as of demons and of the devil]. The he says *in his own name* that “songs of women” like those implying that evil befell a friend through death must be rejected, and that fear should not be ascribed to *prophets* (31, 26–32, 9). Then he reports these opinions of *Plato*: a. much laughter should not be ascribed to *blessed men* [there is no danger that prophets be presented as given to laughter as distinguished from fear, to say nothing of weeping] (32, 7–8) and b. that the guardians must be most eager for truth – for lying does not befit God’s rulership nor the angels [cf. opp. cit. ad 32, 14]²⁴ nor the vulgar whereas the kings may lie to the vulgar, for *untrue tales are necessary in teaching the citizens*, and there is no bringer of a *nomos* who does not use fictitious stories since they are necessary for the happiness of the vulgar [the vulgar not knowing true happiness] (32, 12–22). Averroes says in a disguised way in his own name what {11} he makes Plato say explicitly; for if the *sharia* represents true happiness by imaginary happiness and the first principles by political principles, the bringer of the *sharia* must use fictitious stories.

[24] (Averroes says “lying does not befit God’s rulership” – God is not a ruler; but let us assume that God is a ruler – human rulers must lie because their subjects do not understand the true reasons of the actions demanded by them; yet the distance between God and the most intelligent human beings is infinitely greater than the distance between the most intelligent human rulers and their human subjects; hence if God is a ruler, he *must* lie – or if he does not lie he is not a ruler – cf. the implication of *Republic II*). Above all, Averroes does not criticize Plato’s proposition regarding noble lies or untrue fables – he does not make an *explicit* reservation on behalf of the *sharia* (as distinguished from the *nomos*); furthermore, the rulers in the best regime are the philosophers; hence the philosophers may lie to the multitude – or is this superfluous in the inferior regimes? Either Islam is the best regime then

the philosophers must lie; or Islam is an inferior regime then the philosophers must lie for another reason – 64, 23–27: the dangerous situation of the philosophers.

[25] Plato's discussion of poetry: frequent application to the censure of Arabic poetry (32, 24; 33, 3; 34, 18) – cf. esp. 34, 13–14: the emphasis on *Averroes's* criticizing Arabic poets; next the demand for *paintings* of virtuous men: almost explicitly in Averroes's own name (34, 21–29); this leads to 35, 11–12 & 19–20: explicit criticism of “our time” by the standard of Plato's time (and not of early Islam) in regard to music.

[26] {12} Averroes *in his own name*: the virtuous city does not need the art of the judges, i.e., *fiqh*, at all; only bad cities need it; this is explicitly applied to “the cities of today” and allusively to “our time and the *past*” (37, 9–19). cf. 47, 4–28: particular or detailed laws are undesirable; many bringers of *nomoi* and *shariai* erred in this respect.

[27] Plato: the details regarding temples, prayers, etc. are to be determined by *prophecy*; this sort of things occur in all *nomoi* and *shariai*. [*This is the superhuman part of the sharia* (cf. 26, 16–18) – but not only of *this sharia* but of every *nomos* as well.]

[28] *Rule of philosophers* 81, 1–8 if “the first” is not available [and only then], obedience to his laws → *fiqh* → sep[eration] of political government and lawyers as it exists in many Muslim countries.

[29] *The problem of the exposure of infants and suicide*. People born with incurable defects which make them unfit for being useful to the city or people having become incurably unfit for the city: should they be killed (or kill themselves) as *Plato* says? Averroes knows that the issue is controversial; his decision is obscure (37, 20–38, 18).

[30] Averroes *in his own name* no private property for the guardians; “these cities” condemned with the view to this principle (41, 17–24; 42, 9 & 19–23) – no private property for *anyone* (43, 1–14) → 49, 1–7: manliness (and education in music and gymnastics) required of the *whole* vulgar – but: 49, 14 ff. – but: 60, 7–12.

[31] *Rule of philosophers* (48, 14–29).

[32] *Equality of the sexes*, esp. regarding war, government and {13} wisdom (52, 30–54, 20; esp. 53, 22–23) criticism of “some of the *torot*” and of²⁵ “these cities” with a²⁶ view to this principle (53, 24–26 & 54, 6–13).

[33] Difference between *the sharia* and the shariai or nomoi as well as Plato regarding intercourse or procreation is irrelevant (54, 21-26) – the women common to all men, this is different from “these cities” (55, 9-13).

[34] Incest between brothers and sisters, allusion to contrast to *sharia* (56, 11-12 & 16).

[35] *Absolute communism* is²⁷ Plato’s view (57, 4) (but no²⁸ criticism of it) but Plato *proves* this view (57, 5; 57, 23-58, 14) → Averroes²⁹ accepts it as evidently sound *in his own name*. In this context he accepts the perpetually fixed number of citizens of the virtuous city without any polemics (56, 23). cf. 57, 6: many virtuous cities side by side. cf. 79, 24-25.

[36] *Second Treatise*

[37] Averroes *in his own name*: philosopher =³⁰ bringer of *sharia* (60, 22 & 24; 61, 11), i.e., no excess of *sharia* beyond reason and nature. It is left open whether the bringer of *sharia* must be a prophet (61, 17-19). Since rhetoric and practical science is implied in philosophy (61, 1-4), “prophet” can refer only to knowledge of the future (cf. 41, 1) or to details regarding prayers, sacrifices, etc. (47, 26).

[38] The difficulty: is there no vicious circle? virtuous city *presupposes* perfect philosophers who have been brought up within the virtuous city! No, perfect philosophers may choose that common law which no nation can help choosing and the peculiar {14} torot of the philosophers may not differ greatly from the human torot under which they live; under these conditions wisdom can be completed within the lifetime of the philosophers in question; these conditions are fulfilled in our time and in our torot. If the philosophers would rule for an *infinite* time (cf. 78, 26-29), the best regime would emerge (62, 25-63, 5).

[39] [1. Islam is a human torah not greatly different from the private torah of the philosophers; at the very least there is no significant excess of Islam over merely human laws (cf. 47, 24-28).

[40] 2. Private torot of philosophers essentially³¹ different from the human torot.

[41] 3. “common law” =³² minimum conditions of society \neq ³³ human torot \neq ³⁴ private torah of the philosophers (cf. my essay on Cuzari).³⁵

[42] 4. best regime not in existence now nor was it ever in existence under Islam at any rate. cf. “now” ³⁶עתה in 63, 8 & 26.]

¹ Leo Strauss Papers, box 18, folder 17, Special Collections Research Center, University of Chicago Library.

² Averroes, *Commentary on Plato's "Republic."* The page numbers of Rosenthal's edition are also indicated in the margins of Ralph Lerner's translation: Averroes, *On Plato's "Republic."*

³ "in" is crossed out and "and" inserted by hand.

⁴ "?" inserted by hand.

⁵ "best" is crossed out and "based" inserted by hand.

⁶ "this" is crossed out and "the" inserted by hand.

⁷ "them" is crossed out and "then" inserted by hand.

⁸ "≠" is inserted by hand.

⁹ "way" is inserted by hand.

¹⁰ Strauss translates torot (the plural of torah) as "shariai" to remind us of the Arabic term Averroes presumably used in the original.

¹¹ "and both by rhetorical or poetic speech" is inserted by hand.

¹² ")" is inserted by hand.

¹³ Two parentheses inserted by hand.

¹⁴ "יעשה" is inserted by hand.

¹⁵ "and" is crossed out.

¹⁶ "27-28" is crossed out and "26-27" inserted by hand.

¹⁷ "between" crossed out and "against" inserted by hand.

18 “a” crossed out and “the” inserted by hand.

19 Shlomo Pines, “Notes on Averroes’ Political Philosophy,” *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 8 (1957): 75.

20 “Laws” is crossed out and “torot” inserted by hand.

21 “Laws” is crossed out and “torot” inserted by hand.

22 “Laws” is crossed out and “torot” inserted by hand.

23 “led” is inserted by hand.

24 “31” is crossed out and “32” inserted by hand.

25 “of” is inserted by hand.

26 “the” is crossed out and “a” is inserted by hand.

27 “in” is crossed out and “is” inserted by hand,

28 “no” is inserted by hand.

29 “Aristotle” is crossed out and “Averroes” inserted by hand.

30 “=” is inserted by hand.

31 “assertedly” is crossed out and “essentially” inserted by hand.

32 “=” is inserted by hand.

33 “≠” is inserted by hand.

34 “≠” is inserted by hand.

35 Strauss, “The Law of Reason in The Kuzari.”

36 “עתח” is inserted by hand.

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Introduction

Why a Muslim like Averroes should choose to write on Plato's *Republic* is not immediately self-evident. Of what use is this pagan closet philosophy to men who already hold what they believe to be the inestimable gift of a divinely revealed Law, a *sharī'a*? Can that Law, which presents itself as complete and sufficient and which addresses all men, the Red and the Black, be in need of supplement or correction? Further, what has the "lawyer, imām, judge, and unique scholar" (as Averroes chooses to describe himself elsewhere) to do with those matters that Plato makes the theme of the *Republic*? We know that this list of titles exhausts neither Averroes' interests nor his qualifications. Aquinas and Dante have in mind no one else when they speak of the Commentator on Aristotle's works. Marrākushī, in his *History of the Maghrib*, repeats a first-person account in which Averroes explains to a pupil how he was led to summarize Aristotle's works in response to the wish of the ruler Abū Ya'qūb and the urgings of the latter's chief physician and vizier, Ibn Ṭufayl. This epitome or paraphrase of the *Republic* is to be seen, then, as a part of that larger project, for as Averroes himself says at the beginning of this work, he has taken up Plato's book because Aristotle's *Politics* "has not yet fallen into our hands" (22.5). But all this, while it accounts for some things, leaves unanswered the earlier and more basic question: What is the standing of pagan philosophy in the Muslim community? We may say, with little exaggeration, that almost the first and last words of this work point to the utility, relevance, even necessity, of political science (21.7; 105.5-6). Again and again, Averroes quietly points out that this practical science, far from being superseded by the *sharī'a*, is no less needed in "these cities." Just how badly needed is, in a way, one of the larger lessons of the work. Their very lack of awareness of their sickness is itself a measure of how sick these cities truly are.

Even if we accept the notion that Plato has something to teach the adherents of religious Law about the ways of preserving or restoring political health, it can hardly be said that the Plato who appears in these pages is altogether familiar. Only a detailed, point-by-point comparison of this work with the text of the *Republic* can disclose the many differences between the two. Least to be wondered at is the Islamization of the *Republic*; Greek divinities and examples are replaced by examples better known to Averroes' readers. More remarkable are the substantive

discrepancies—elaborations where Plato is brief, omissions, changes in details, interpolations drawn from Aristotle or Farabi or others. How much weight ought to be given to these variations from our text of the *Republic* must remain a matter of controversy, complicated by the fact that not a single Arabic translation of a complete Platonic work is known to have come down to us. In the absence of the text that Averroes had before him when he sat down to compose this work, we can only hazard some guesses about the significance of the discrepancies. We cannot even be sure that they are departures from Plato. Judging from the Arabic translations of Greek texts that are extant, the translators did their work with intelligence and skill. Careful readers of this or of the Hebrew translation will have no difficulty in recognizing many passages that disclose great fidelity even to the nuances of Plato's text. In brief, we cannot know for a certainty whether whatever of Averroes' account strikes us as baffling or simply wrong in the light of our present-day understanding of Plato's text does so because of inadvertence or design. Averroes' thoughts may not be our thoughts.

In this age in which we are urged on all sides to flaunt whatever we believe we have, this restrained work of Averroes is triply strange. The *falāsifa* (as the medieval philosophers are called in Arabic) do not as a rule strut forth proclaiming their ingenuity, originality, and superiority over their predecessors. Quite the contrary: a good deal of their ingenuity and originality is devoted to concealing their singularities. The present text by Averroes is a fine case in point, for in truth it is no simple matter to tell in every instance whether Averroes is speaking in his own name. The gentle glidings from "he says" to "we say" and back again (with variations en route) lull the senses of the good-natured reader who nods along as Averroes repeats whatever Plato "says" or "asserts" or "holds" or "explains." Every once in a while, however, that good-natured reader is jolted by various devices into wondering where Averroes himself stands on these matters. Sometimes Averroes tells him directly ; sometimes he tells him indirectly. Sometimes Averroes merely plants the question. In all cases, however, Averroes moves with boldness and determination in setting before the attentive reader the problems that matter, the problems posed by the confrontation of classical political philosophy and the *sharī'a*. The more that attentive reader sees, the better trained he becomes in understanding those problems. Much of his training consists in discerning "what we ourselves had in mind to explain" (103.15). With a view to achieving that great good, a useful first step would be to consider some examples of the different modes in which Averroes chooses to speak in his own name.

Averroes most evidently speaks in his own name when he speaks emphatically. On rare occasions he uses the first person singular, as when he reports, "I have seen many among the poets and those who grow up in these cities" who prefer tyrannical rule (101.16) ; or when he asserts that, despite the fact that an inquiry of a certain

character would more fittingly be made in the first (i.e., scientific) part of political science, “I deem it appropriate that I mention some of it here” (65.8-9). Even rarer is Averroes’ use of oaths, as when he swears—“upon my life !”—that the argument Plato has produced showing the pleasure of the intellect is the greatest pleasure is a demonstrative argument (104.25); or when he swears that another argument of Plato’s is true although not demonstrative (104.29-30). The device Averroes most frequently uses for emphasis is his supplying the personal pronoun “we” to verbs whose suffixed pronominal particles already make unmistakably clear who the subject of the sentence is. The redundant pronoun may thus be understood as performing the function of italics: “We ourselves follow after him” (30.23) is tantamount to Averroes’ insisting that the reader note his emphatic agreement with Plato’s intention or method. Though the indication of emphasis is unmistakable in this usage, the identification of the speaker or speakers may be doubtful. “We,” whether emphatic or otherwise, usually means Averroes; it is a *pluralis maiestatis*. But “we” or “us” may also mean something like “we moderns” (35.12, 18-lg) or “we investigators” (53.19, 29) or “we adherents of the *sharī‘a*” (63.3 ; 66.15) or “us Muslims” (66.22 ; 81-4) or “us men” (72.8) or “we Andalusians” (66.21; 97.6) or “we Córdobaans” (84.22; 96.24). Even this list is not exhaustive. In ruling out any sort of property for the guardians, Averroes considers briefly the possibility that possessing riches may be a virtue. However one decided, that question would have no bearing on the case of the guardians, “for we ourselves do not wish them to be simply virtuous but rather virtuous inasmuch as they are guardians” (42.21-22). Is it farfetched to say that a founder of cities or a teacher of founders speaks here ?

Averroes confronts us in another way when, at least seven times, he momentarily puts aside his modest garb as a reporter of what Plato “said” and pronounces a certain problem or topic fit for inquiry or for penetrating investigation. Whether the bringer of the *sharī‘a* ought also to be a prophet is a problem of the latter sort. Having stated the problem, Averroes leaves its resolution open, promising to “investigate it in the first part of this science, God willing” (61.17-18). What is not left in doubt is that, for Averroes, the requirements for the Lawgiver are identical with the requirements for the philosopher, namely, mastery of the theoretical and practical sciences as well as perfection of the moral and cogitative virtues (60.22-61.7; 61.11-13). One might well ask: What does prophecy add, or of what does it consist? Earlier passages suggest that prophecy is an instrument by which men are informed of what lies ahead (41.1-2) and of the details concerning “temples, prayers, sacrifices, and offerings.” But the prescribing of such details is not exclusively the province of religious Law (47.24-28). Further, by equating the philosopher and the bringer of the *sharī‘a* (61.14), Averroes in effect denies that the *sharī‘a* has any decisive superiority.

Equally portentous in its implications for Islam is Plato’s “opinion” that the Greeks are the people most disposed by nature to receive the human perfections,

especially wisdom. This, too, Averroes declares to be a matter in need of penetrating investigation. He immediately brings forth evidence to contest Plato's opinion: in fact individuals disposed to wisdom are by no means limited to Greece, although such individuals are not distributed uniformly or universally. We might say that nonGreek nations are disposed to the several human virtues' being "broadcast and apportioned among them," particularly the nations in the more equable climatic zones (27.1-13). The context of this discussion is a controversy over the virtue of courage and the art of war. Following Aristotle, Averroes holds that the case here is the fairly common one of a virtue serving as a preparation for an art, and of that art in turn serving to perfect or complete the virtue. Plato, on the other hand, holds that war (and hence the virtue on which it depends, courage) exists only on account of necessity (26.19-29). If, then, Plato is correct about the potentiality for virtue among the various non-Greek nations, there is no call for waging a war to bring civilization to them. They, or the adults among them at least, would be fundamentally uneducable. Against this view Averroes—with Aristotle at his side—takes his stand. In so doing, he both supports and alters the Muslim conception of the just war. He now sees that war as depending on the proper natural conditions, instead of being directed against all men. With nations in the moderate climes, "it . . . is not impossible that many of those who have passed the years of youth should receive the virtues to some extent. . . . Could this [degree of virtue] not be established in them, they would be worthy of being either killed or enslaved, and their rank in the city would be that of the dumb brutes" (27.19-23). Where the Koran sees the just war as leading to the conversion of all mankind to the true religion, Averroes views the just war as a mode of bringing wisdom to those who have the natural potentiality for it. With that as his point of departure, it is not surprising that Averroes holds out the possibility or probability that many of the conquered will be condemned to a life of brutishness.

A recurring theme in these pages—the express or implied comparison of "this city" with "these cities"—offers further evidence of Averroes' own views. Though these recurrent terms have more than one meaning in this work, their use by Averroes is generally free of ambiguity. "This city" may mean the timocratic city (82.15, 16) or the oligarchic city (83.10; 93.7) or the democratic city (83.19; 96.1) or the tyrannical city (85.22; 101.10) or the aristocratic city (79.8), but there is no mistaking Averroes' intention in any given case. The sum of such meanings of the demonstrative pronoun is easily surpassed by the number of instances in which "this city" means the city being founded in the *Republic*. Paired with "this city" for purposes of contrast is the term "these cities." "These cities" are all too well known to Averroes, his addressee, and his readers: they are the cities that exist in deed, not in speech; they are "these cities of ours" (84.20). Only a few of these pairings can be mentioned here, but they should suffice to show how Averroes, with great economy of language, is able to illustrate and support his intention. (a) This city has

no need for the arts of adjudication and medicine; “under no circumstances has it either judge or physician.” What are called adjudication and medicine in this city have only the names in common with the judging and curing practiced in contemporary cities and in the past. Only old-fashioned, Asclepian illnesses and cures are recognized in this city. “They will not make use in this city (and this is in accord with my cogitation) of most cures other than cures for external things such as wounds, dislocations, fractures, and the like.” The implications for the chronically ill—whether in body or in soul—are quickly drawn, though with a certain ambiguity as to whether killing or suicide is indicated (37.15-38.18). (b) Just as the wants are not autonomous in this city, so the arts that arise to serve those wants are subject to regulation. Averroes notes the alternating scarcity and glut attending a market in disequilibrium. Neither the kinds nor the numbers of artisans in this city will be “of any chance number.” Necessary utility is the touchstone that is applied to all production, be it of cloth or bridles or children (43.28–44.7). (c) “The women in this city will practice the [same] activities as the men.” Averroes brings forth evidence to show that women can hold their own in war. He sees nothing to rule out the possibility “that there be philosophers and rulers among them.” A contrast is then drawn between what the Laws or some Laws prescribe regarding the status of women and what an investigation of the animals indicates. From natural history we are led to see how unnatural is the prevailing treatment of human females. “Since women in these cities are not prepared with respect to any of the human virtues, they frequently resemble plants in these cities.” By narrowing or nullifying the capabilities of women, men contribute to the further impoverishment of these cities (53.14–54.10). (d) In establishing community of property, women, and children, this city does away with the major inducements for people to set themselves apart from the concerns and good of the whole. “It is evident that if all the things in this city” correspond to this arrangement abolishing privacy, “then it will remove envy and hatred from them as well as poverty and the other evils found in these cities.” Of the citizens of this city, Averroes says: “They are indeed happy. They are beset by none of the evils besetting the citizens of these cities” (58.1–14). (e) Unlike this city, whose “existence necessitates that those ruling over it be wise, . . . these cities, presently existing, do not receive any advantage from philosophers and the wise” (63.6–8). Indeed, if perchance “a true philosopher grows up in these cities, he is in the position of a man who has come among perilous animals.” For the sake of immediate self-preservation, he does well to isolate himself from others; but in doing so he remains in some sense incomplete, for his perfection is attainable “only in this city that we have described in speech” (64.23-27). We may generalize from these examples and say that for Averroes “this city” is “the virtuous city,” Plato’s city (79.9, 12, 19, 20; 45.3 ; 52.2 1; 87.19; 93.31–32). In contrast to it are “these cities,” which are “the ignorant cities” or “the erring cities” (52.13-14, 22 ; 45.11; 79.11–18). In going as far as he does in using

“this city” as the rule or measure, Averroes goes very far indeed in judging contemporary practice and even the norms of the *sharī‘a* itself by the standards of Plato’s philosophic communism.

Averroes is not always so reserved in making such comparisons and judgments. Occasionally he digresses a bit to elaborate on the implications of his analysis. Thus, for example, the transformation of the timocratic man into the oligarchic man is illustrated by a lesson drawn from more or less contemporary history. The dynasty preceding the Almohad in Andalus was known as the Almoravid. “At first they imitated the governance based on the *nomos* ; this was under the first one of [the Almoravids].” But his successors presided over a continuing decay—first timocracy, tinged with oligarchy; then, finally and fatally, a regime devoted to the pleasures. The overthrow of this last was effected “because the governance that opposed it at that time resembled the governance based on the *nomos*” (92.4-8). These beginnings, however, are not the only similarity between the Almoravids and the Almohads. There are also analogous or nearly analogous patterns in their subsequent decline in laws and morals. “You can make this clear from what—after forty years—has come about among us in the habits and states of those possessing lordship and status” (103.8-10). That the present, Almohad, rule has decayed is suggested by Averroes more than once. But from what level of excellence has it fallen ? The several founders of dynasties to whom Averroes alludes in this work appear to have this in common : their rule originally “resembled the governance based on the *nomos*” or “used to imitate the virtuous governance” (92.7-8; 89.30-31). Their excellence was at best a quasi excellence, though even this would be a great improvement over the baseness that currently prevails. What remains is hardly a vestige: “Only he among them who is virtuous according to the Legal prescriptions remains in an excellent state [of soul]” (103.11). To follow in the ways of the *sharī‘a* is to move in the direction of recovering the earlier resemblance or imitation.

Perhaps the most interesting, ambiguous, and provocative of Averroes’ speeches are those which present a controversial Platonic teaching. By “controversial” I mean one that runs counter to either generally accepted notions or the prescriptions of the *sharī‘a*. A few examples of Averroes’ presentations of these unsettling thoughts show his different responses to controversy. (a) At times Averroes openly concurs with Plato. The subject of base stories is dealt with at length by Plato, and Averroes emphatically follows in his steps in condemning them. Among the instances of base stories “generally accepted among us,” Averroes singles out for censure the custom of saying that God is the cause of good and evil, that angels can miraculously transform themselves, that happiness is to be understood as a reward and suffering as a punishment for men’s deeds (30.22–31.25). This entire theme of base stories ought properly to be considered in the larger context of Averroes’ discussion of untrue stories as such—that is, representations or imitations—where the reference

to Plato is veiled or at least uncertain and where the lessons to be drawn are that fictions are indispensable for ruling and teaching the citizens and that whatever the multitude can learn of the speculative truth through nondemonstrative means—namely persuasive and affective arguments—is, strictly speaking, no knowledge at all (25.14—26.2). (b) At other times, Averroes dissents from what he presents as Plato’s position. I have referred earlier to Averroes’ parting from Plato on the problem of courage and adopting a view he reports as attributed to Aristotle. Some implications of this controversy for the conception of the just war have been touched upon. A further and necessary implication of Plato’s position is the rejection of a universal society, a society envisioned in the remark in which tradition has Muhammad say, “I have been sent to the Red and the Black.” Averroes can hardly conceal that such universalism does not accord with Plato’s opinion; but he is careful to avoid letting this disagreement become an open conflict between philosophy and the *sharī‘a* by asserting that the *sharī‘a* view, which is “the indubitable truth,” is also shared by Aristotle (46.19-21). In siding with Islam against Plato, Averroes appears to retract whatever concessions he has earlier made to Plato’s view that all nations are not equally disposed by nature to virtue. A universal society of true believers again appears to be both desirable and possible. Yet that this is not Averroes’ last indication of his views on the matter can be seen from his treatment of a related controversy. (c) Not all of Plato’s controversial statements are acknowledged as such by Averroes. In view of the fact that Averroes sometimes concurs and sometimes dissents, his occasional silences may also be regarded as meaningful. Though Plato’s eugenics is notoriously at odds with the *sharī‘a* of the Muslims, Averroes manages to discuss “the arrangement of [the guardians’] procreation” in such an exceedingly guarded fashion that we are compelled to say that he is silent about the conflict (54.23–55.27). Shortly thereafter, he appears to accept the notion of a fixed size for this city (56.23), which implies some kind of birth control (56.18–21) or colonization or both. Averroes does in fact speak of “virtuous cities” (97.13; 79.24–25; 57.6), and in that plurality we may discern an alternative to the universal society that would result from a successful war waged against the Red and the Black. In discussing Plato’s condemnation of unlimited warfare against enemies of the same stock and place and language, Averroes writes : “These are to be called ones who have gone astray, not unbelievers. What Plato asserts differs from what many Lawgivers assert” (59.20–60.5). Averroes leaves the matter by remarking on the difference between what Plato teaches and what Islam, among others, teaches. Averroes does not blur the contradictory statements by asserting the congruence of the Koran’s views and Aristotle’s; nor, for that matter, does Averroes declare where he himself stands. He remains silent on one of the great points of contention between philosophy and the *sharī‘a*: whether racial and linguistic unity ought to prevail over religious diversity.

These examples are only meant to be suggestive of the richness and many-sidedness of Averroes' discussion. It is a work laden with nuances and ambiguities as well as startling assertions. Without a hint of criticism or misgiving, Averroes not only reports Plato's requirement that there be absolute communism of women and children, but then goes on to treat the necessity of that communism as proved (57.4–5). Finally, Averroes himself accepts this communism, along with community of property, concluding that the necessity, propriety, and utility of all this is self-evident (57.23–58.14). As was stated earlier, the word “we” may well represent different voices. In support of a tentative identification suggested earlier, I now add this evidence. Averroes says that “there is no city that is truly one other than this city that we [*anahhnū*] are involved in bringing forth” (44.28–29). That this “we” is, or includes, Averroes himself is suggested by the repetition of the last phrase a few lines later: “Hence, this city that we are involved in bringing forth is in itself great in size and possessed of great power notwithstanding that it has, as Plato says, but one thousand warriors” (45.13–14). Our suspicions and impressions are further aroused and perhaps confirmed when, toward the end of his paraphrase, Averroes invites us to cast our thoughts back to “the things that we ourselves were praising when we were attending to the virtuous city” (93.3 1–32). This sentence happens to be preceded by “He said.” The line separating Averroes and Plato is momentarily—but totally—blurred.

In one fashion or another, the question with which this introduction begins is a question for every serious reader of Plato's *Republic*: Of what use is this philosophy to me? Averroes clearly finds that the *Republic* speaks to his own time and to his own situation. Now, whatever that relevance may consist of, it cannot be based on any simple, obvious congruence of Platonic and Koranic teachings. But if, from the fact that Averroes seems to accept the *Republic*'s teaching (at least as far as the practical part of political science is concerned), we hasten to the conclusion that he has thereby effected a complete break with Islam, we would have asserted something undemonstrable in itself and terribly damaging to Averroes. He does, to be sure, accept that philosophic teaching, by and large; but as the earlier examples are meant to show, he uses that teaching critically, selectively.

Perhaps the greatest use he makes of the *Republic* is to understand better the *sharī'a* itself. The Koran contains laws that transcend ordinary human laws—we shall call them the higher part—even as it contains laws that are analogous to ordinary human laws. This latter part, according to Averroes, presents two ways that lead to God: “One of them is through speech, and the other through war.” The higher part of the Law, which consists of those regulations and details made known to the adherents of a *sharī'a* or *nomos* by a prophet, would appear to lead men to God through silence rather than speech and through peaceful actions rather than war. Whether or not the *Republic* may be helpful in such matters as well (e.g., by

helping men understand better what it means to act justly toward one's fellows), there is at least a strong presumption that the *Republic* can help them perceive "the way in which matters are arranged in those Laws belonging to this our divine Law that proceed like the human Laws" (26.16–18).

Of physical coercion, or the war of civilization, we need say little here: it is not the preponderant mode of instruction followed within the virtuous city. How, then, are men led to God by speech? In two ways, Averroes says: either through rhetorical and poetical arguments, or through demonstrative arguments. The former way is used in presenting the theoretical sciences (or rather, certain conclusions reached by those sciences) to the multitude. The elect few, on the other hand, learn these matters in "the true ways." In an apparent reference to Plato, Averroes goes on to say: "In teaching wisdom to the multitude he used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they [sc., the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations: either they can know them [sc., the speculative truths] through demonstrative arguments, or they will not know them at all. The first [situation] is impossible [for the multitude]. The second is possible—since it is fitting that everyone obtain as much of human perfection as is compatible with what is in his nature to obtain of this and with his preparation for it" (25.14–23). Since it is by no means impossible that the multitude know nothing of the speculative truths, and since it is categorically asserted that they cannot come to know these matters through demonstration, we are left to deduce that whatever the multitude may come to know of these speculative truths through persuasive and affective arguments is, strictly speaking, not knowledge at all, but belief. Such belief may be useful, even indispensable, but it is no more to be confused with knowledge than moral virtue is to be mistaken for intellectual virtue.

If then, knowledge, strictly speaking, or the way to scientific truth, is the preserve of the few, untruth would seem to be the legacy of the many. In a certain respect the young potential guardians and the multitude of citizens are similarly situated. Neither group can digest a demonstrative argument—the one because of the temporary underdevelopment of its members, the other because of its intrinsic nature. Each member of both groups requires an education in "music" (as well as gymnastic), an education that will "represent" or "imitate" a truth that can be known demonstratively, albeit not by him. Such imitations render accessible what otherwise would be inaccessible; but, being imitations, what they convey is not the real thing. Quoting Farabi, Averroes proposes an education in which true happiness "will be imitated by what is believed to be happiness." It is safe to say that, according to this argument, the multitude will never know any better, that their education is, strictly speaking, an education in an untruth (29.9–30.13; 60.7–12). Averroes reports Plato's condemnation of untrue and base stories but says nothing in this context to preclude the use of noble lies. The subsequent discussion (30.22–32.22) is a subtle interplay between reports of Plato's views and expositions of

Averroes' own views, culminating in a defense of kingly lying on the grounds that "untrue stories are necessary for the teaching of the citizens. No bringer of a *nomos* is to be found who does not make use of invented stories, for this is something necessary for the multitude to reach their happiness." Although Averroes reports in this context Plato's view that "lying does not befit God's rulership," he does not preclude the use of invented stories in the *sharī'a*, or in that part of it that proceeds like the human Laws.

Plato's *Republic* teaches that the best regime will be ruled by philosophers and that human rulers, or rulers simply—that is, all rulers—must lie. No work speaks more cogently or more pertinently on the theme of the lying philosopher than Plato's *Republic*. If Averroes believed that Islam had been or was on the verge of becoming the best regime, there was every reason to consider with all deliberation what Plato had to teach concerning the ruling—and hence lying—philosopher. Alternatively, if Averroes believed that Islam was not the best regime, there was every reason to consider with all deliberation what Plato had to teach concerning the exposed, vulnerable—and hence lying—philosopher (64.23–27). Averroes, like kindred souls before and after him, found utility, relevance, and value in Plato's *Republic* for various reasons. Not the least of these was Plato's truth about lying.

It is fair to say that in deciding to paraphrase the *Republic*, Averroes is asserting that his world—the world defined and governed by the Koran—can profit from Plato's instruction. Plato is the standard—certainly not "these cities," not even the period of early Islam. What now prevails is distinctly second best: the rule of laws and of interpreters of laws, the parceling of political governance to the separate hands of warrior and judge (81.1–8). What might prevail is the true unity of the virtuous city, the city that Plato constructs in speech. But is its actualization a genuine possibility? Or does Plato's city require that very rule of philosophers which only the prior existence of Plato's city can bring about?

The answer is that it is possible for individuals to grow up with these natural qualities that we have attributed to them—developing, moreover, so as to choose the general common *nomos* that not a single nation can help choosing; and besides, their particular Law would not be far from the human Laws; [if these conditions are fulfilled] wisdom would have been completed in their time. This is as matters are in this time of ours and in our Law. If it should happen that the likes of these come to rule for an infinite time, it is possible for this city to come into being. [62.28—63.5]

The human Laws under which the philosophers now live are not very different from the private Laws of the philosophers. The Koran does not preclude the possibility of the rule of philosophers. But that rule or succession of rulers must go on to the

end of time before the truly good governance comes into being. It is this chain of circumstances that Averroes holds out as the alternative to Plato's expulsion from the city of all those over ten years of age (78.24–29). It is, however, an alternative fraught with difficulties. Not least of these is that “in this time” men and cities are more easily inclined to good deeds than to good beliefs. Those who have reflected on these matters will know that these men and cities are no better than their beliefs. “The cities that are virtuous in deeds alone are those called aristocratic” (79.1-8). But it is precisely in the realm of intractable beliefs that the most radical transformation needs to be effected. All things considered, Averroes has not exaggerated in declaring that Plato's manner of bringing about the emergence of the best regime is “quickest, easiest, and best.”

I conclude that Averroes is—and deserves to be regarded as—the faithful companion of Plato.

Abbreviations and Symbols

Hebr. Üb. Moritz Steinschneider, *Die hebräischen Übersetzungen des Mittelalters und die Juden als Dolmetscher* (Berlin, 1893; reprint ed., Graz: Akademischen Druck- u. Verlagsanstalt, 1956).

MPP Ralph Lerner and Muhsin Mahdi (eds.), *Medieval Political Philosophy: A Sourcebook* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, Agora Paperback Editions, 1972).

Rosenthal E. I. J. Rosenthal (ed. and trans.), *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic,"* University of Cambridge Oriental Publications, no. 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956, 1966, 1969).

⌈ ⌋ Readings adopted from MSS other than MS *A*.

[] My interpolations.

For full bibliographic information on short-title citations in footnotes, see Appendix III.

THE TEXT

(21.) Averroes' [Epitome] of Plato's *Republic* [and] Its Scientific Arguments, Which Is the Second Part of Political Science

[The First Treatise]

The intention of this treatise is 「to abstract」 such scientific arguments attributable to Plato as are contained in the *Republic* by eliminating the dialectical arguments from it. (5) We shall be strict in speaking succinctly of all this. Yet on account of the ordering of teaching, we ought to preface an introduction in which the [subject of] study is presented in due order, for Plato set down 「this」 book only after [other] books of his on this science. We shall also mention as well something of the utility of this science, and its intention and its parts.

We say: This science, known as practical science, differs essentially from the theoretical sciences. Now this is clear inasmuch as its subject differs from the subject of each and (10) everyone of the theoretical sciences and its principles differ from their principles. This is because the subject of this science is volitional things, the doing of which is within our power, and the principle of these things is will and choice; just as the principle of natural science is nature and its subject the natural things, and the principle of the divine science is God (may He be exalted!) and its subject the divine things. Furthermore, this science differs from the (15) theoretical sciences in that their end is knowledge alone; if there is anything of action in them it is by accident, as happens in many of the matters that the mathematicians study. Now the end of this science is action alone, even though its parts differ in their proximity to action. For of the general rules [whose account] is supplied by this science, (20) the more general is further removed from action and the less general is nearer, just as in the art of medicine. Hence it is that the physicians call the first part of the art of medicine the scientific part, and the second the practical. That is precisely why this art has been divided into two parts. In the first part the habits and volitional actions and conduct are treated generally, and here is made known (25) their relation to each other and which of these habits is for the sake of the others. In the second part is made known how these habits are established in the souls, which habit is ordered to which other habit so that the resulting action from the intended habit may become as perfect as can be, and which habit hinders which other habit. In general, this part supplies those matters, taken in their generality, that (22.) admit of being actualized. | The relation of what is in the first part of this science to the

second part corresponds to the relation in the art of medicine of what is in the “Book of Health and Disease” to what is in the “Book of the Preservation of Health and Removal of Disease.” The first part of this art is in Aristotle’s book known as the *Nicomachea*, and the second in his book known as the *Governance* [*Politics*] and also in this book of Plato’s that we intend to explain (5) since Aristotle’s book on governance has not yet fallen into our hands. Before we begin a point-by-point explanation of what is in these arguments [of Plato], we ought to mention the things pertinent to this part and explained in the first part that serve as a foundation for what we wish to say here at the beginning.

We say: It has already been made clear in the first part (10) of this science that the human perfections in general are of four kinds—theoretical virtues, cogitative virtues, moral virtues, and [proficiency in the] practical “arts”—and that all these perfections are only for the sake of the theoretical ones and a preparation for them in the way in which preparations preceding an end are for the sake of the end. It also has been made clear there that either it is impossible for one man to attain all these virtues or, if it is possible, it (15) is improbable, whereas it is as a rule possible that [all these virtues] be found [separately] among a multitude of individuals. It also appears that no one man’s substance can become realized through any of these virtues unless [a number of] humans help him and that to acquire his virtue a man has need of other people. Hence he is political by nature. This is not something that is needed for human perfection alone, but [even] for matters necessary for [mere] life—matters that man in a certain way shares with the (20) animals, such as appropriating food, securing dwelling places and clothing, and generally anything that man is in need of because of the appetitive or vital faculties within him. This arrangement exists for various reasons: [*a*] because of an unavoidable necessity (e.g., its being impossible for an isolated man to secure what he needs by way of food, housing, and clothing); or [*b*] because it is the easier way (e.g., its being possible for Zayd not to till the soil and sow (25) seeds [beyond his own needs], but if he tills and sows [with a view to others’ needs too] he will live at greater ease); or [*c*] because it is the best way, for if a man has chosen an art since his early youth and has practiced it for a long time, his performance in that art will be better. That is one of the causes that led Plato to hold it inappropriate that any of the citizens engage in more than one art, as we shall state later on. Hence the employment of a man in more than one (30) art is either altogether impossible or, if possible, not best. Since it is impossible that the human perfections be attained other than in different individuals within a given population, (23.) | the individuals of this species are all different in natural disposition corresponding to the difference in their perfections. For if each individual among them were potentially prepared for all human perfections, nature would have wrought something in vain; for it is absurd that there be something possible whose realization is (5) impossible. This

matter has already been made clear in natural science. The sense[s too] attest that individual humans exist with such characteristics. All the more is this evident in the noble perfections, for not every man is fit to be a warrior or an orator or a poet, let alone a philosopher. All this being as we have characterized it, there ought to exist an association of humans—[an association] perfect in every species of human perfection and [whose members] are (10) helped to their completion in that the less perfect follows the fully perfect by way of preparing for his [own] perfection, and the more perfect aids the less by giving him the principles of his perfection. A case in point is horsemanship and the art of bridle-making: the art of bridle-making serves the art of horsemanship as a preparation, and the art of horsemanship prescribes for it the best form for the bridle and how they [sc., the two arts] may associate in a single (15) intention. The various kinds of priority of rank of one art 「over」 another are discussed in the first part [of political science]. If, however, such an association does not exist, the human virtues either will not be attained at all or their attainment will be defective. In general, the relation of all these virtues to the parts of this city will be [as] the relation of the faculties of the soul to the parts of a single soul, so (20) that this city will be wise in its theoretical part through which it rules over all its parts in the manner in which a man wise in the rational part rules through it over all the faculties of the soul—i.e., the part [of the faculties of the soul that is] linked to reason rules the spirited and appetitive part in which the moral virtues are to be found. Hence it [sc., the city] will draw itself toward appropriate objects in the measure and time judged by intellect. It will also be (25) courageous in [its] spirited part, but at the place and in the measure and in the time required of it by wisdom, just as a man will be courageous in [his] spirited part only when he uses it in the case, time, and measure required by intellect. It is the same with moderation and with each and every other virtue. In general, it will possess all the cogitative and moral virtues; and priority of rank within it will (30) correspond to the priority of rank of these virtues. This is the very justice that Plato investigated in the first book of this book and explained in the fourth book. It is nothing more than that every human in the city do the work that is (24.) his by nature in the best way that he possibly can. | This is only conceivable when the parts of the city are in submission to what theoretical science and those who rule over it decree. Hence it is evident that this part—i.e., those who possess the theoretical sciences and the one who rules over them—is predominant within it. Just as justice in the soul of each consists in every one of its parts doing only what it has to do in the appropriate measure and at the appropriate time—(5) this necessarily occurring in the parts of the soul only when intellect rules over them—so too in the case of the city. You ought to know that some of these virtues are ascribed to a city because they are in one of its parts—such as wisdom and courage—while others are ascribed to it because they are in all of its parts—such as justice and

moderation. This (10) is evident in itself. But whether the virtue of liberality is in all parts of this city or only in one part of it is something that we shall investigate later on, because there is room for inquiry here. If all this is as we have described it (it having already been made clear in the first part of this science what these virtues are unqualifiedly), then 「three」 things remain (15) to be done here for a complete knowledge of them. [a] One of them is understanding the conditions given which any of these [virtues] can be actualized. For example, it has already been said what courage is unqualifiedly and that it is something in the soul intermediate between rashness and timidity—a habit by which a man acts courageously in the appropriate way and in the appropriate measure and time. But at the moment of one's acting on it, this definition is in need of particular conditions; otherwise it would be impossible to act [in accord with that definition]. The end of (20) knowledge in this [matter] is only, as Aristotle says, that one should act, not that he should know. [b] The second concerns how these virtues may be established in the youths' souls and gradually develop in them, how these [virtues] may be preserved once they have been completed, and also 「how」 the vices may be removed from the souls of the bad. In general, the case here resembles that in the art of medicine, the latter part of which encompasses and makes known how bodies can grow up in health, how one preserves (25) it, and how one removes diseases from them when they have departed from [the condition of] health. Just so is the case here. [c] The third thing is that we should describe which habit and which virtue when joined to some other virtue will make the effect of that virtue more complete, and which habit hinders which other habit. Just as the physician will tell which thing joined to what other thing in the body will (30) lead to health and preserve 「it」, so is the case here. All this can be understood only by knowing the ends of all these perfections and what is intended through them inasmuch as they are a part of a city, just as the preservation of the health of the organs and their restoration to it is understood for the most part only by knowing their relation to the other organs and their rank among them. |

(25.) After having made all this clear, we shall state through explanation the way in which each and every virtue comes to exist in the citizens' souls and how to bring this about. You ought to know, besides, that however possible it may be to formulate these in speech, that does not yet suffice to bring them about in deed in cities and nations until such time as the cogitative faculty is joined to it, as is the case in (5) the art of medicine. Hence it is said that the governance of cities is appropriate for the old in whom knowledge of the theoretical sciences is associated with long experience; just as the physician will only be complete when, together with knowledge of the immutable universals of the art, there is realized in him through experience the cogitative virtue—[the virtue] through which he can actualize them [sc., the universals] in matter. All this has been made clear in the first part of this science; we return, then, to what we were about.

(10) And we say that the virtue of courage is that with which Plato began to introduce the discussion of the bringing about of these virtues. As we have said, the way of understanding how it is attained by the citizens and preserved with respect to them in the most perfect manner [requires that] we consider what is primarily intended by the actions of this virtue in the city. We say that there are two ways by which the virtues in general are brought about in the souls (15) of political humans. [a] One of them is to establish the opinions in their souls through rhetorical and poetical arguments. This is limited to theoretical sciences presented to the multitude of humans, while the way by which the elect few learn the theoretical sciences are the true ways, as shall be stated later on. In teaching wisdom to the multitude he used the rhetorical and poetical ways because they [sc., (20) the multitude] are in this respect in one of two situations: either they can know them [sc., the speculative truths] through demonstrative arguments, or they will not know them at all. The first [situation] is impossible [for the multitude]. The second is possible—since it is fitting that everyone 「obtain」 as much of human perfection as is compatible with what is in his nature to obtain of this and with his preparation for it. Furthermore, their believing what they endeavor to believe of [what pertains to] knowledge (25) of the first principle and of the final cause, as far as it is in their nature to believe, is useful with regard to the other moral virtues and practical arts, which they were being prepared [to acquire]; and once the moral virtues and practical arts are established in their souls in this first way they can also be led toward performing the actions of these arts and virtues through the two kinds of arguments together, namely persuasive and affective arguments, which (30) will move them toward the [good] qualities. This first way of teaching will mostly be possible only for whichever of the citizens grew up with these things from the time of his (26.) youth. Of the two ways of teaching, this one is natural. | [b] The second way [of teaching], however, is the way applied to enemies, foes, and him whose way it is not to be aroused to the virtues that are desired of him. This is the way of coercion and of chastisement by blows. It is evident that this way either will not be applied to the members of the virtuous city or, if it is applied, it will be nothing other than (5) the training that is most effective for learning discipline, namely the art of war and military training. As for the other nations, which are not good and whose conduct is not human, why there is no way of teaching them other than this way, namely to coerce them through war to adopt the virtues. That these two ways of teaching the multitude are natural is clear from how the heads of households instill (10) discipline in their children, youths, and servants. Also similar to this is the way followed by those who govern cities that are not good: they castigate their people by means of disgrace, occasional flogging with rods, and execution. But that city which we are describing in speech will minimize the occurrence of this way in it—i.e., discipline secured through coercion. This way, however, will be necessary with (15)

respect to the other nations—those without; in the case of the coercion of difficult nations, nothing will be without war. This is the way in which matters are arranged in those ‘Laws’ belonging to this our divine Law ‘that’ proceed like the human Laws, for the ways ‘in it’ that lead to God (may He be exalted!) are two: one of them is through speech, and the other through war. Since this art of war is (20) not completed other than by a moral virtue by which it draws near to what is appropriate and in the appropriate time and measure—i.e., the virtue of courage—it is necessary that this virtue be found in virtuous cities as a ‘preparation’ for this activity. It may be seen from the character of this virtue that it will not complete its activity unless the art of war is joined to it, as is the case with many of the (25) moral virtues and practical arts. For it is apparent in many of the virtues that they are only preparatory for the sake of the arts, and many of the arts for the sake of the virtues. This is what Aristotle asserts about the wars of the virtuous city, according to what Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] reports. But from what we find concerning this in this book of Plato’s, why according to him this part [of the soul, sc., courage] is not prepared for this end [sc., war] but rather is on account of necessity. This is due either [a] to a primary intention of (30) removing from other cities that which they [sc., the members of the virtuous city] detest, namely their ‘money’ — and this, either because of necessity or in search of the best—or [b] to a secondary intention in relation to guarding against (27.) what might possibly harm the city from without. | This opinion would only be correct if there were but one class of humans disposed to the human perfections and especially to the theoretical ones. It seems that this is the opinion that Plato holds of the Greeks. However, even if we accept that they are the most disposed by nature to receive wisdom, we cannot disregard [the fact] that individuals like these—i.e., (5) those disposed to wisdom—are frequently to be found. You find this in the land of the Greeks and its vicinity, such as this land of ours, namely Andalus, and Syria and Iraq and Egypt, albeit this existed more frequently in the land of the Greeks. Furthermore, even if we accepted this, we might perhaps say regarding the other virtues that it is not impossible that one kind of nation be ‘more’ disposed by nature with respect to some virtue. The example of this is that the part of wisdom is more in the Greeks, and the (10) spirited part in the Kurds and the Jalāliqah. There is room here for penetrating investigation. It might be thought that where ‘the part’ characterized by wisdom is most present, there the virtues are most appropriate and most established —i.e., established by nature. However one accounts for the matter, the majority of the kinds of nations are indeed disposed that these virtues be broadcast and apportioned among them, and particularly [those in] the two equable climates —i.e., the fourth and the fifth. It seems one might say in argument for Plato that it is possible for humans to (15) excel in these virtues only if they have been raised with them from youth, but if these have been lost to them after these years have

passed, this is no longer possible for them. If that is so, there is no case here for coercing under a virtuous governance one who has already come of age and grown up. But even so, it would be necessary that they be coerced by taking their children from them 「and ordering」 them toward the virtues. It also is not impossible that many of those who have passed the years of youth should receive (20) the virtues to some extent, in particular those who have not been raised under a governance close to a very virtuous governance. Could this [degree of virtue] not be established in them, they would be worthy of being either killed or enslaved, and their rank in the city would be that of the dumb brutes.

After it has become clear from this speech what was intended concerning just wars, it is proper that we (25) proceed with what Plato says about choosing those natures that are disposed with respect to these virtues and about what stratagem should be employed in establishing them in their souls and so accustoming them to them [sc., these virtues] that the actions proceeding from them would be most fully consonant with this virtue. We say that Plato holds that not a single man among the citizens should grow up with more than one art. This is because not every man is (30) fit by nature for more than one art. Further, only by growing up with it from youth does a man acquire the habit (28.) by which the 「activity」 of the art is improved. | Now if a man will not succeed in the tournament game called *tornei* and the sport of horse-racing without persisting in both of them and growing up with them from youth, so ought to be the case in the art of war. Moreover, since many of the arts are being perfected at the same times and 「their times」 coincide, busying oneself with more than one art will necessarily(5) frustrate the actions of them [all]. It is on account of all this that Plato asserts that the guardians should be cut (374*de*) off from the other arts. He also holds that in choosing from (375) among the [different] natures for this activity, the fitting [candidate] would be one who joins to bodily strength quickness of movement and keenness of sense so that he instantly perceives a thing, runs to inquire into it, and grasps it. It is like the case of the nature of a puppy and of the dog used in hunting, for there is no difference between (10) the two natures as far as what is required of it for guarding. These, then, are the bodily dispositions that the guardian and the warrior ought to have. As for the qualities of the soul, it is required of him that he be 「spirited」 by nature, for one who has no spiritedness will be unable to become heated or to repel. In this matter the case of man is like the case of the other animals, except that it might be thought difficult for one formed with these qualities in his body and (15) soul to be able to hate and to love. For two opposite things ought to be associated together in these people: one of them is that they have utmost 「love」 and feeling for the citizens; and the other, utmost force and grief for their enemies. On account of this it is thought impossible that a man be formed by nature with these two dispositions. But the guardian will not be much of a guardian unless these two dispositions are (20)

associated together in him. As for its being thought impossible, why its possibility may be observed in many of the animals. An example is the dog of strong dispositions, who is formed with a similar nature. He is one of the most companionable of things toward one who frolics with him and the opposite of this toward whomever he does not recognize.

He says: It is a condition for being a guardian, therefore, that he by nature love the one whom he knows. This nature (376*ab.*) (25) is, without a doubt, a philosophic nature, for in choosing the thing with a view to knowledge and wisdom he is by nature virtuous. And he will hate whomever he does not know, not because of some prior harm the other had caused him, 「but」 for his very ignorance of him; just as his love for one whom he knows will not be because of some prior good the other had caused him but because of his very knowledge [of him]. The same is the case with the animals to whom we (30) previously compared the guardian. That is, on coming face to face with a man unknown to him he will hate him even without there being any prior harm caused him by the (29.) other; | 「and on seeing」 a man known to him he will frolic with him even though no good has come from him. Indeed, we have made this nature a condition for being a guardian in order that he have these two opposite dispositions in consummate [form]: love for everyone whom he knows, namely the citizens, and hatred toward whomever he does (5) not know, namely the enemies without. For love or hatred (417*b*) grounded in advantage and disadvantage would prevent this [union of opposites], turning enemies into chiefs and chiefs into enemies. This is self-evident. It has, then, been (376*c* 376*e*) made clear from all this that the guardians and the fighters ought to be in their natures philosophers, lovers of knowledge, haters of ignorance, spirited, quick of movement, strong in body, and with keen sense[s]. As for the mode of teaching them discipline and bringing them up, that will be (10) in two ways: one of them 「through」 gymnastic, the second music. Gymnastic is for acquiring true virtue for the body, and music is for the discipline of the soul and its acquiring virtue. This discipline—i.e., discipline through music—is (377*a*) usually prior in time because the faculty for understanding precedes the faculty for exercise. By “music” I mean imitative arguments having a 「melody」 from which the (15) citizens receive discipline. It is only intended that they [sc., the arguments] have a melody because thereby they become more thoroughly effective and more fully moving to the souls. For the art of music, as has been made clear, only serves the poetical art 「and carries forward」 its intention. The arguments by which the citizens are disciplined are, as we have said, either about scientific things or about practical things. These arguments are of two kinds: demonstrative (20) arguments, [and those that are] dialectical, rhetorical, and poetical. The poetical arguments are more particularly for the youths. If, when they grow up, some one of them is fit to move on to a [higher] stage of learning, he [sc., the ruler] brings that about in him,

to the point that one of them arises who has it in his nature to learn the demonstrative arguments. They are the wise. He who does not have this in his nature remains at the stage beyond which there is no possibility in his nature for him to pass. This would be either at [the stage of] the dialectical arguments or at the two ways common to the instruction of the multitude, namely (25) the rhetorical and poetical, the poetical being more widely common and more particularly fit for the youths. The theoretical things, for the most part, are the concern of all [students of] divine [science], except for whatever of this it is thought ought to be imitated as far as possible by 「all」 men in relation to the completion of their intention and goal, and particularly the humans of whom we spoke—for example, as when he [sc., Plato] says of the dead that they (30) are alive in some other manner than the untrue fables declare. As for the theoretical things which ought to be imitated to the most exalted degree, why Abū Naṣr [alFārābī], in his book “On the Degrees of Being,” has spoken (30.) of them, and this may be brought over here from there. | As for the practical matters, they too are matters that have been made clear in this science. Of the imitations, as he says, some come close [to the original], some are remote [from it], some are correct, some untrue. An example of an untrue one would be if you were to represent a 「man’s」 form by an ox’s form. Now these ought not to be used at all in this city for they are very harmful. Similarly the (5) remote ones ought as far as possible to be rejected. But the imitations that come close [to the original] are those that ought to be made here, just as we imitate the first principle and the second principles “by their likenesses among political principles. The divine acts are imitated by the acts of the political principles, and the acts of the natural powers and principles are imitated by their likenesses among the voluntary powers and arts. The intelligibles among these are imitated by their likenesses among the sensibles, such as (10) the imitation of matter by privation or 「darkness」. The kinds of ultimate happiness—that being the end of the acts of the human virtues—are imitated by their likenesses among the goods that are believed to be the end. The happiness that is truly happiness will be imitated by what is believed to be happiness. In general, the ranks of the beings in existence are imitated by their likenesses among ranks of place and time.”

Plato says that what is most harmful for children is that (15) they hear untrue stories during their childhood, for they are (377b-378e) ready at that time easily to accept whatever forms they wish them to accept. Hence one should guard against their hearing any of the untrue imitations at this time, and in general guard the beginning of their upbringing with utmost watchfulness, for the beginning of every action is very weighty. And we shall beware, as Plato says, of accustoming their souls to, and leading them by, base fables even more than we beware of 「the harm to their bodies from snow」 — (20) this [especially] when we hand them over while they are 「yet」 small to wet-nurses, who train them. Later, 「when they have

become strong⁷, they lead them to temples and houses of sacrifices. But the untrue
 「and base⁷ stories will not achieve the purpose. Plato recounts of this what was
 generally accepted in his time and warns against it. We ourselves follow after him
 and also recount of this what is generally accepted among us. We say: Among these
 base imitations—in accord with what has been explained in the (25) theoretical
 sciences—is the custom among humans of saying that God is the cause of good and
 evil. But He is perfectly good; He neither does evil at any time whatever nor is the
 cause of it. The statement concerning this made by the Mutakallimūn among the
 people of our time—[to the effect] that good and evil are not to be conceived in
 relation to God (may He be exalted!), but that 「all⁷ actions [in themselves] are
 good—why that is a sophistic statement whose absurdity is apparent. For by this
 account neither good nor evil would have a fixed nature in itself, but would be good
 (30) or evil by fiat. Evil ought, therefore, to be attributed to another principle, as
 this is said of Ashm'day and the demons, though these imitations too are bad in
 another respect. For if a youth hears from the outset that there are demons that
 cause walls to tumble upon people, that they (31.). cannot b e held fast with locks,
 that | they see but cannot be seen, that they exist wherever they wish, that they are
 clothed in whatever form they wish, it is certain that he will not end up a
 distinguished guardian. For these things will implant soft-heartedness and fear in
 the youths' hearts and establish these in them. Even baser than this is saying of the
 angels as well that they can change themselves into different forms, and this because
 it is the work of miracles. Hence, (5) evil ought rather to be attributed to the
 imitation of matter, as when one attributes evil to darkness or to privation. Many
 things belong to the class of those attributing evil to God; they will not be concealed
 from one who looks at them 「closely⁷. Also among the imitations that are not
 good are imitations of happiness as being a recompense for actions through which
 happiness ordinarily is attained and a reward for renouncing actions through which
 happiness ordinarily (10) is not attained, and of suffering as punishment for
 renouncing virtuous actions and clinging to defective actions. For the virtues that
 come to pass from such imitations are closer to being vices than virtues. Hence the
 moderate one among them is only moderate regarding pleasure 「so as to obtain an
 even greater pleasure⁷. Similarly the courageous one is not courageous because he
 holds death to be good but because it is a thing over which fear of an even greater
 evil (15) takes precedence. Similarly the just one will not refrain from the property
 of humans because he holds this obligatory in itself but leaves it alone so as to attain
 thereby twice as much hereafter. Moreover, his movement toward many of the
 noble virtues will be for the sake of the base things—since most of the imitations
 concerning recompense are only of sensual pleasures—so that a man would only be
 courageous, just, faithful, and have virtues predicated of him, in order that he might
 copulate, drink, and eat. All this is (20) self-evident to one trained in the sciences.

It seems that the dispositions that come to pass in the soul from these imitations resemble the dispositions that come to pass in those who restrain themselves—they are not virtues at all. One ought rather to believe that happiness comes to pass from the actions that bring it about, in the way in which health comes to pass from nutriment and medicines. This is likewise the case with [actions that bring about] suffering, in the way in which wisdom comes to pass from learning. Hence, if happiness were represented as the health of the (25) soul, and its immortality and eternal life, that would be a fitting story.

Plato said: Such guardians as these, if they wish to be of utmost strength and courage, ought not to be frightened by (386*ab*) forewarnings of what might meet them after death. If some one of them should imagine such things, he would choose to be oppressed 「and enslaved」 rather than to die in war. Such stories as these 「ought」 to be rejected concerning theoretical (387) (30) matters. As for the stories that ought to be rejected concerning (32.) practical matters, why they are the stories that conduce to baseness and defectiveness. So it is necessary that women's songs be kept from them and that they not hear them. This is because none of them ought to believe that his companion's death is something grievously hard for him to bear, and that in death [his companion] has been overtaken by an evil because of which he will mourn and weep over (5) him. The opposite ought to be the case with the guardian— i.e., either he will not be grieved about it at all, no matter what beloved, companion, or relation is missing; or he will grieve but little, enduring such sorrow as comes upon him patiently and well. Weeping, too, is an activity of 「women and」 weak souls, very far from the nature of the guardian; hence prophets and chiefs ought not to be characterized as being fearful.

(10) He said: They ought not to be lovers of laughter, for in even barely indulging his soul with powerful laughter, a (388*e*) man will have need of a powerful countermeasure to remove from that condition. That is why the righteous and the chiefs ought not to be characterized by excessive laughter. He said: They ought to be exhorted with exceptional diligence for zeal for the truth, for lying does not befit God's (389) 「rulership」 or the angels or the multitude of humans—i.e., (15) they ought not [even] to come close to it. So if some artisan or some other of them be found to be lying, he ought to be punished. The multitude ought to be told that when one of the multitude lies to the chiefs, there is a possibility of harm resembling the harm that comes when an invalid lies to the physician about his sickness. But the chiefs' lying to the multitude will be appropriate for them in the respect in which a drug is appropriate for a disease. Just as it is only the physician who prescribes a drug, so is it the king who (20) lies to the multitude concerning affairs of the realm. That is because untrue stories are necessary for the teaching of the citizens. No bringer of a *nomos* is to be found who does not make use of invented stories, for this is something necessary for the multitude to reach their

happiness. Above all, they ought to reject statements that conduce to [preoccupation with the] pleasures. This is prevalent in the poems of the Arabs. They will listen to statements warning them to shun them [sc., the pleasures] and against indulging in them, for (25) self-control—as Plato says—can only be [found] together with moderation and shunning the sensual pleasures, as will be made clear from his statement in what follows. The greatest of the acts of self-control is that these people faithfully obey the great ones among them and become chiefs ruling over the pleasures rather than those whom the pleasures rule. Hence it is inappropriate to decide that they should listen to statements that incite them to such acts [of (30) self-indulgence]. Hence it is most harmful of all if the great ones and the chiefs are described as having even one of (390) these dispositions, and even if only for a brief time. Nor is it appropriate that they hear statements exhorting them to (33.) hold and acquire property, for more than anything else, possessions hinder these arts as is said hereafter. The youths ought to be warned against listening to this and what resembles it. You know that the poems of the Arabs are filled with these evil things. It would therefore be more harmful than anything else to accustom youths to them from the outset. This, then, is the sum of the discussion (5) concerning the class of customary fables.

Plato does not leave it at letting it be known which fables ought not to be listened to by the guardians, but also distinguishes the [manner of] speech they are not permitted. He says: Narrative statements tell either of past or present or future things. These stories and legends are one of three (3902c–394c) kinds: either simply a story in which a simple story is told of (10) the thing without imitation, or else a story with an imitation of the thing being told about. Imitation is of 「two」 kinds: either imitation of voice or looks, or imitation through imitative words. Poetry among the ancients, at first, mostly imitated through voice and looks. Finally, they fell upon imitation through words, this imitation being more appropriate for the art of poetry since one imitates through the (15) statement itself, not through something external. The Arab poets mostly make use of imitations of the latter class—i.e., imitation through words.

After Plato explained the kinds of narrative statements and explained that they are of two kinds—one, statements without imitations; the other, statements wherein the thing being told about is imitated through looks, these being the most powerful imitations for them [sc., the Greeks]—he then (20) investigated whether or not these guardians ought to imitate, and if so, what are the bounds of the permissible (394e) imitations. He explained that they ought not to be permitted to imitate, for—as has been said—in this city each and every human turns 「only」 to one activity that he may thereby be more prepared for it and better at it. The same holds for imitations: i.e., if we wish that a man be a good (25) imitator, he should do well at one kind of imitation. Hence we find that the nature of some humans is such that

they surpass at imitations consisting in blame while others 「only」 do well at praise (as is said of Ibn al-Taḥam, that he could praise, but not blame). This being so, as they ought not to be permitted to imitate everything, there is no need for them to engage in even one kind of imitation. But as they undoubtedly choose to imitate something, they should—from (30) their youth—imitate what is becoming to them, patterning themselves after those who possess strength, a sound mind, (34.) freedom, and other such dispositions. | But they ought not to approach the imitations of the base and vicious because the prolonged continuance of imitations dating back to youth will establish a disposition and nature in both body and soul. That is why he said that the most highly regarded of people ought not to imitate the actions of women crying (5) out in their throes of birth, or women copulating with their husbands, or women—「believing themselves already」 fit for rulership—quarreling with their husbands, or women mourning, crying, and lamenting. Nor will they be permitted to pattern themselves after handmaidens and slaves, (396) nor imitate drunkards or madmen. Nor is this all: we will not leave them to imitating the craft of tanners or shoemakers or other such crafts, for just as it is not permitted (10) them to practice these crafts, so is it not permitted them to imitate them. Even less suitable would be permitting them to imitate the prancing of horses, the braying of asses, the sound of rivers and the sound of the sea and the sound of thunder, for all this resembles madness.

I say: There ought to be rejected the poems that follow the 「Arabian」 custom of describing these things and their (15) imitations that come close to being of this kind. Because of all this, poets in this city ought not to be permitted to imitate everything. And this on various grounds: [a] The activity of a given imitator will be good only if one [restricts one's] imitation to one kind, as in the case of the arts. [b] Moreover, the imitation of base things or of what has no bearing on whether something is to be chosen or shunned (as is the case with many of the poems of the Arabs), is something for which there is no need in this city. Rather, the poets in this city 「ought」 only to be permitted to (20) describe illustrious women and their probity, and, in general, the moral virtues. Just as the poets in this city ought not to be permitted to imitate any chance thing whatever, so also is the case with painters. They ought not to paint in this city, and in particular whichever of them paints the (401bc) vicious. As for the virtuous, there is need that the children (25) and the youths should [not only] hear good speeches but [also] see good things so that beautiful actions be established in them in every respect. In a similar relation is one who dwells in a healthy place, receiving benefit from everything that is brought forth there by way of sweet savors, herbs, and the like.

This, then, in sum is what Plato says about the fables through which the guardians are to be trained. After this he lets it be known which class of melodies ought to be used (398c–398e) (30) with these fables in teaching them. As has been

said, a melody occurring in a narrative is composed of three things: rhythm, harmonic mode, and the speech to which the melody is set. As for the statements to which 「melodies」 are (35.) composed, | it has already been stated of what character they are to be. What remains to be discussed is what he says as to which of the melodies and which of the rhythms are appropriate for these. Plato asserts that the melodies making use of fear and fright will not be suitable for them, just as speaking without a melody about this class [of fear-inducing things] will not be suitable for them. Nor will these be (5) appropriate: the soft modes used at a drinking party and weddings, and in general melodies with many changes, for these people are not idlers. Only two kinds of modes need to be composed 「with respect to them」: first, the kind that (399) conduces 「the soul to courage and perseverance in wars; second, the kind that conduces」 the soul to whichever of the virtues he intends for it to accept with ease, calmness, (10) and quietness. The determination of what these compositions 「are」 belongs to the art of practical music.

Plato, however, defines them by ascribing them to people generally known in his time for the making of melodies. This teaching has decayed 「in this time of ours」. Hence there ought not to be left in the city any of the instruments still in use, such as the instrument called the tambourine and many other instruments. Plato commanded that the only instruments to be left in the city are those called the lyre and the either.

(15) He said: And for the country folk a sort of pipe. This also will be the case with the rhythms. We ought to choose from among them the kind that is not ordinarily among women or idlers, but rather the kind that makes for courage of the soul and an easy conjoining with whatever is desired to be joined to it. These rhythms were generally known in Plato's time, but in this time of ours we ought to investigate them. (20) Plato asserts that when those are chosen in whose nature there is a possibility of accepting these virtues and who (402) moreover are brought up in this musical upbringing, they will reach the utmost in self-control, courage, strength of soul, love of 「beautiful」 excellent things, and [in] their desire 「for justice」 in both small forms [and large], and in shunning pleasure. For there is nothing at all in common between a sound mind and pleasure. That is because pleasure (25) throws a 「sharp-」 minded man into a perplexity resembling a madman's, all the more when he goes to excess. For example, the pleasure of copulation, more than anything else, will drive a man mad. Hence 「pleasure」 should (403a-403c) not be mixed with the desire of the musical one; rather he should desire 「only the beautiful」 with self-control. But pleasure has something in common with baseness of soul (36.) and the other vices. | This being so, it is improper for the desirer and the desired—if the one is to desire rightly and the other is to be desired especially—that their desire turn to pleasure or have anything

in common with it. Hence a nomos ought to be laid down in this city that love and desire between them be like the love that is between fathers and sons. This is the end at which the activity 「of music」 aims. (5) This, then, is the sum of what Plato mentions here concerning the subject of music. After this he takes up mentioning gymnastic, food, and in general the things through which true virtue is acquired—not that this is unqualified true virtue, as Galen and other physicians say of this, but that this is true virtue through which is realized that virtue of the soul which is designed for the activity of guarding, (10) namely the virtue of courage. Gauged in this respect, gymnastic and food not only acquire health for the body, (410b–4122) but also acquire 「virtue」 for the soul in the purpose that has been designated for it. An example is simple gymnastic, which acquires health for the body but also moves the spirited part of the soul and renders it stronger than it had been. Hence Plato commands that we not deal insufficiently with these [guardians] by using gymnastic without music or (15) music without gymnastic. This is because using music by itself renders the soul soft and lax in the utmost quietness and calmness, particularly when one makes use of its soft kinds. Gymnastic, too, by itself renders the soul savage to the utmost degree, impervious to persuasive arguments, becoming rather an extreme misologist, as we see happening in fighters of 「gross」 disposition and in the undisciplined. (20) Hence these two arts, as Plato says, work on the spirited kind and the philosophic kind of the parts of the soul so that the virtue intended for guardianship is prepared 「from their mixture」. That is to say, he will bear the utmost delight and love toward citizens, and strength toward those without.

He said: The gymnastic that they ought to practice is the (25) simple, straightforward gymnastic suitable for war. As for (404) food, we ought to restrict them to simple foods that combine easy availability with a strengthening of their bodies for what is desired of them, such as roasted meat and simple beets cooked with water, salt, and oil. If they grow accustomed to meals other than this and miss them while in camp, they will fall gravely ill. Hence these ought not to become so habituated in their gymnastic, meal, drink, and passions of (30) their soul, that if they are separated from them it would be a cause of their falling ill. For these people, as Plato says, need health just as a dog has need of keen sight and (37.) hearing | more than anything else. Hence they ought not to get drunk, for of [all] human beings the guardian least of all and last of all should get drunk. Otherwise the guardian would need a guardian. All this being so, drunkenness and (5) meals of varying types are forbidden to the members of this city; similarly, sweets and whatever resembles them in kind. In general, their way with food and gymnastic resembles their way with music, namely that they only make use of these simple kinds alone. That is because music that is not simple produces evils in the soul, while gymnastic that is not simple produces illness in both body and soul. The absence of discipline in music and unrestrained gluttony in food and (405) (10)

drink, if they increase in the city, will of necessity bring with them the need for two arts—the art of adjudication and the art of medicine. Nothing is more indicative of the citizens' evil dispositions and the baseness of their thoughts than 'their being in need' of judges and physicians. This is because these [citizens] have no virtue at all of their own, but 'only' attain it through compulsion. The greater the body's need for these two arts and the more they heap honors on them, the further they are from what is right. (15) Hence, among the properties of this city is that it has no need for these two arts and that under no circumstances has it either judge or physician. If there be such, it is [only] homonymous with the medicine and adjudication performed in cities today. For if the food for these is gauged with respect to quantity, benefit, time, and [as being of] good quality, and their movement is of this character, it seems that they will have no need for many of the cures (20) made in this time of ours and in the past. Plato thinks that these illnesses, originating in these cities, are new, not having been matters of watchful concern to the sect of Asclepius, and that these words by which they are designated are also new—i.e., these illnesses whose cause is a bad mixture of matter, such as abscesses, fevers, and so on. All this being as we have characterized it, they will not make use in this city (and this is in accord with my cogitation) of most cures other than 'cures for' external 'things' such as (25) wounds, dislocations, fractures, and the like. They will have need there of a physician to distinguish one in whom there (407*de* 409*e*–410*a*) has appeared a defect that can be cured from one in whom there has appeared a chronic defect that cannot be cured. The former will be cured; the latter will be let come to grief, even if it were possible to keep him alive through medicines but [at the cost of] his no longer participating in any of the city's affairs. This, then, is what Plato asserts (30) about the defective ones: namely that there is no need to cure anyone for whom it is impossible that he truly have all the virtues. This is because with the disappearance of a being's end, for the sake of which it was brought into being, (38.) there is no [longer any] difference between its nonexistence and its existence. Hence Socrates chose death over life when he saw that it was impossible 'for him' to live a human life. And since every one of the people was only brought into being that he might live as a part of this city so that he (4046*c*–406*e*) undertake some action for it, with the disappearance of this (5) usefulness from him, death is better for him than life. Hence the physicians try to sever from the body any limb that is already rotting and whose efficacy has been rendered nugatory, such as rotting fingers and 'rotting' molars. 'Moreover', if we leave such as these in the city they will commonly be a cause for the birth of [additional] defectives. You can make this clear by considering craftsmen bent on their work. When they fall sick they ask the physicians to purge them with an emetic or vomiting or blood-letting (10) that they might thereby return quickly to their work. If he prescribes this, they obey his orders. But if he orders a regimen for

them that suspends their activity for a long while, they reject what he says as if they reckoned their lives to be useless if they are unable to perform through them those actions that they ordinarily perform. The only ones eager for life notwithstanding a chronic defect are those who loiter at street corners; they are idlers. As for the defectives for whom it is possible to live without being (15) cured but who cannot possibly further the existence of the city in any way: some humans [hold that] they ought to be killed; some humans assert that they ought to be spared. As for the assertion of those who would place the 'burden' [of caring] for them upon the citizens—it is of no account. This, then, is what leads to the need for a physician in this city: i.e., that he cure external injuries and distinguish chronic defects from those that are not chronic. It might 'be thought' that there also will be need for him in this (20) city for another matter: namely gauging food with respect to time, amount, and condition for each and every individual, time, and place. This is done through the cogitative faculty, which he acquires through experience. Hence the physician will not be of this character until—[over and (408*de*) beyond] his study of the art of medicine—he has encountered many of the illnesses and experienced this in others and in himself. By experiencing illnesses in himself he acquires for himself a knowledge that he could not acquire by perceiving (25) them in others. A judge too will be needed in this city to consider whoever has a bad nature and does not accept the (409–410*a*) cure—i.e., reproof of the soul; him he will have killed. As for the one who possibly can accept discipline, him he will castigate. His knowledge of this will come only after long experience, because knowledge of the causes of wrongdoing only comes to him after he has investigated them in others. It is one of his prerequisites that his soul be not bad but virtuous from the outset, having grown up on simple music. (30) His case is not like the case of the physician, for the physician is not harmed if he is sick in body. But the judge cannot possibly be an upright judge if his soul is bad, for a (39.) bad soul knows neither virtue nor itself. Virtue, however, knows itself and the badness in others through long experience. Hence it is laid down as a condition for a judge that he must undoubtedly 'be' old, for youths know only the good—that is, youths who have been brought up on simple music and good fables. It is in this manner, then, (5) that the art of adjudication and the art of medicine exist in this city.

Further, after this he states the criteria for choosing the nature of that one who is desired as head of these guardians. (412*c*–414*a*) He said: There ought to be chosen that one among them who is most virtuous and who most loves the advantage of the citizens and who is most disciplined. This will be only if various conditions are combined in him, among them that (10) he not depart from this opinion against his will. This is to be understood in various respects, among them that he will be moved from it by compulsion (as when beset by sorrow and fear), and by deception and falsehood (as when being deceived by one of the appetites or forgetting over

time). This is because there are two kinds of opinion. In one kind, a man departs from his belief willingly—「this is false opinion—just as shunning evil can be only through his willing so. In the other kind, a man departs from his belief」 against his will—this is correct opinion—just as the good is taken away from a man other than through his willing so. (15) This will be through compulsion, as we have said, be it by force or deception or falsehood. Hence one ought to beware of these changes in him whom one would have neither forget what he is led to believe concerning the obligation of doing whatever is most advantageous for the city nor ever be deceived about it. And they should also be tried in things whereby something of this opinion might be generated in them—i.e., pleasure—and similarly they should be measured (20) [by means of] terrors. Whichever of them is perfect in all these dispositions, is not to be moved from his opinion, standing up to 「the test」 like gold refined in fire—why this is the one who ought to be ruling over the city, and he ought to guard it; and he should be honored in his life and death and burial and in the other ways by which the living seeks to commemorate the dead.

Now we shall explain the other conditions that ought (25) to be made for the chiefs—namely the moral and theoretical virtues. For the chiefs in this city are undoubtedly the wise in whom are combined, along with wisdom, these virtues and others [as well], in accord with what we shall recount of this in what is to come. Since it is possible for one born in the class of guardians not to be disposed by nature to be a guardian—even though this will happen infrequently—it also is possible that one born in (40.) one | of the classes of citizens other than that of the guardians be fit to be a guardian—though this too is rare. That is because each 「class」 will copulate only within its own class—i.e., the guardians will copulate within the class 「of guardians」, and similarly farmers, for example, within the class of farmers. These being formed by nature for the activity in which they ordinarily engage, their children's (5) nature will usually be of that nature since father and mother usually transmit only what resembles the substance of the two of them. But since, as we have said, this [generation of like by like] may be thrown into confusion, and since the thing that 「most」 leads to—and is the most powerful of causes of—the destruction of 「this」 city is that someone carries on an activity in it to which he is not disposed by nature, Plato 「cleverly provided」 that a story be adopted in (10) the city by which the guardians and the rest of the multitude may be persuaded to transfer their offspring from class to class. The story is this. We shall say 「to them: You」 are the chosen and the exalted. You were generated in the womb (414*de*) of the earth with this disposition of yours, your weapons, and the rest of this before you were completed. When you were completed the earth brought you forth. 「She」 is a mother to you, and you are brothers. Your opinion concerning this is a foundation of the city, an opinion—if anyone makes war against

it—of one who has great feeling for his brethren born of one earth and one mother. You as (15) a whole are a community of classes of citizens, brothers in that she was your mother. But when God created you, He (415) had in view whichever of you would be fit 「to be chief」 and mixed refined gold in His bringing him into being; that is why they are most honored. He also had auxiliaries in view and mixed silver in their being. He also considered the poor and the other working craftsmen and mixed iron in the (20) being of some of them and bronze in others. Since you have all been generated—notwithstanding that you are of one class—you are of different kinds. For the most part, an offspring born to each of you will resemble him in kind. Sometimes [however] silver will be born of gold, and gold of silver, and similarly with each and every kind in accord with this analogy—i.e., that gold or silver will be born of bronze, and the reverse. Hence God commanded the chiefs (25) that in nothing should they take 「such」 care in guarding as in their care in guarding their children, directing their natures, and examining what is mixed in them. If the son is bronze they will not 「leave him in the midst of the other children」 but rather admonish him with coercion in accord with what is due his nature and thereafter thrust him out among the craftsmen and the poor. If it should also happen that these [latter] generate gold or silver, they will honor them and appoint the one who is suitable and appropriate (41.) to rulership. And it is due to his care [for the city] that | the prophet announced that the ruin of this city will only come to pass when its chief 「who guards」 it is of iron or bronze. This story will be transmitted to them through music from youth, just as the other stories are transmitted to them. (5) When he finished this he said that the settlements of these chiefs and guardians of the city ought to be raised above the city and that if there is one of them who does not wish to accept the Law he will be smitten, and also so that if an enemy from without approaches the city they will attempt to seek him out, pursue him, and avenge themselves upon him. When he had set the bounds of their dwelling places he investigated whether guardians ought to possess anything (10) by which they might be singled out from the citizens by way of their dwellings or otherwise. He said: There is nothing more ugly in shepherds than that the dogs they have reared (416) with a view to guarding whatever they wish them to, should depart from that disposition on account of their hunger or their fear 「or some other bad」 habitude [and go on] to harm the sheep and to injure them, thus turning into the opposite of [watch-] dogs—「wolves」. So is it with the guardians: namely that it is among the most injurious of things that (15) 「they have」 a disposition that necessarily leads to injury to the citizens, especially since they are more powerful and stronger than the other citizens. Of this, then, above all other things, ought one to be wary in the mighty. (You can make this clear from the cases of the mighty taken from these cities, for on the death of the tyrant who had been subduing them,

they turned on the grazing [flock] and (20) devoured them.) Of this matter concerning the guardians, above all other things, ought we to be wary: namely that there be in them a disposition by which they leave off being good guardians [or], even more, cease being guardians altogether. It is easy to show that none of them ought to have any possession, neither dwelling nor tools nor anything else. But they will have a claim 「against」 the other citizens (25) for what will suffice them for food and clothing. Of gold and silver they have no need at all. Rather we shall tell them: You have in your souls something of 「a divine」 [sort of] this [sc., gold], which God has given in its place. Because of this, there is no need of that [sc., gold] from which there arise damages to others. You are not allowed to mix the virtuous gold that was given to you with the gold of mortals, for the money of [such] people is employed in many illicit pursuits [while] the gold in you is pure, refined gold. You cannot (42.) handle gold or silver, or store them up beneath the rafters (417) of the houses, nor seek after them, nor drink in vessels of silver 「or」 gold. The acquisition of property is harmful to the guardians because if they acquire land and houses and money, each will appropriate for himself and want to isolate (5) himself from the citizens by assembling as much property as is possible for him. They will thereby turn into enemies of the citizens, haters of them; similarly, one with another. For the most part they will not kill, except for their [own] wealth—not for the sake of the citizens. In general, what will happen to them in their relations with the citizens and with one another—enmity, hatred, and mutual fraud—is like what happens to the inhabitants of these cities. Sometimes this is a cause of their conspiring against the citizens (10) and devouring them. In general, citizens will have for them the status of enemies, and they [sc., the guardians] fear them [sc., the citizens] just as they fear the enemies without —and their war will be with them. Or they [sc., the guardians] may wage an occasional [external] war—but for the sake of their [own] lives and wealth. If an enemy harms them and they are able to rescue the citizens, they [sc., the guardians corrupted by private wealth] will do so and especially if they have imposed a tribute upon them by (15) plundering the citizens. Possessions, too, hinder them from the business of guardianship. If they 「wage war on account of their possessions」 their guardianship of the citizens will be incidental; they will fight when possessions require it of them and flee from war when that is not their expectation. This is something that necessarily happens to them when they are propertied. Because of all this, if we wish the (20) guardians to be in the best condition as guardians, it is obligatory that they have nothing at all. Even if the possession of wealth and riches were a virtue, it would not be obligatory for guardians as guardians that they be rich. For we ourselves do not wish them to be simply virtuous but rather virtuous inasmuch as they are guardians. Imagine someone saying: You have forbidden these people the most (25) exalted thing by making them auxiliaries—[making them], (419–420) just as Plato said, paupers

possessing nothing. This is like someone's saying to one who has drawn a man's form: You have not put the noblest color on the noblest part, for you are obliged to paint the eyes—since they are the noblest part—with the noblest of colors, which is purple, not black. This is silly, for it is not fit that the appearance of the eye be fair simply, but rather in respect of 「the activity of the (30) eye that comes to pass from it. The case with guardians is similar: it is not fit that we seek for them the simply (421bc) exalted thing, but rather in respect of」 their being guardians —assuming that wealth is a virtue. |

(43.) When it became clear to him, with respect to the guardians, that they ought not to possess anything, he also (421de) considered the case of the artisans and workers among the members of this city. Ought we to permit them possessions so that they receive wages for their work and [consequently] have possessions from it? He found this case identical with the other, since it was clear to him that nothing is more (5) harmful to this city than the entry of poverty and wealth. For if we permit the artisans to acquire possessions through their work, the end of their work will be acquisition and the return they get from the [proper] arrangement of their wealth. Their usefulness to the citizens will be a kind of accident, their work being not for the sake of what results [from it essentially] but rather for the sake of their possessions. This being so, they frequently become confused about the end that is truly the end—namely usefulness to the citizens. For if they have a sufficiency, they 「detest」 their (10) work so that they shun it or become idle artisans. If [on the other hand] they are needy, the tools and everything needed for it [sc., their craft] will be too dear for them, and their work will be shoddy. This being as we have characterized it, it can be seen that Plato asserts that there is no wealth in this city for anyone in particular to acquire and to use as he wishes. This being the case, they have no transactions in gold or silver, nor will they need them at all in this city. (15) For gold and silver, as has been explained in the *Nicomachea*, are only needed in these cities because of the difficulty of transactions; and they also serve as an intermediary between diverse things so that there may be an equality in transactions involving things wherein it is difficult to gauge the existence of equality. A case of the difficulty of transactions: for example, a farmer who wishes to have an iron plow has nothing to give a smith in exchange other than (20) food. But if the smith has no need of food but rather has need of clothing, for example, or something else, their transactions cannot be completed. They need to set up something that is potentially all things, so that when a farmer gives it to a smith and takes an iron plow from him, the smith has already taken all that he wishes for and has need of. Similarly with each and every one of the other citizens. When the farmers have what is needed by them and the citizens, they gather the food; and the smiths make (25) whatever tools are needed by the citizen; and similarly the weavers, builders, and the others. There will be a kind of money in the city with which all these tools

and provisions will be paid for. Then they distribute them among the citizens in the measure that each kind has need of. This is with respect to the necessary arts in particular, not to the unnecessary arts wherein the sole intention is pleasure, such as the art of the perfumer, the painter, the sculptor, 「the (30) maker of rings tones」, and other such things in these cities. It is evident that they will have no need at all of dinar or dirham. Nor will the numbers of artisans in this city be of any chance number, so that at one time things will be scarce (44.) and at another time be in a glut, with the arts consequently being useless, as we see happening with barbers and others in these cities. Where the art has some necessary utility for all citizens, they will take a sufficient number of artisans for it, such as the art of farming and weaving. And where the art has some necessity only for some class of people, (5) they will also take a [proportionate] number of artisans for it, such as the art of bridle-making. Hence none of the members of this city will copulate when he so desires or with whom he so desires, but rather in a fixed measure so as to preserve that class whose [determined] number is intended in the city, as shall be stated hereafter when we speak of the guardians' copulations.

After it became clear to him that this city would not (10) make use of gold or silver, a doubt seized him concerning (422) war with other cities whose lord is wealthy and powerful. He says: Perhaps it will be too weak to kill the likes of these. When he considered the matter it became clear to him that the case is the opposite of what is thought. For wealth and prosperity cause their possessors to be contumacious, leading them to neglect the study and drill of war. But when these guardians grow up in the manner we have stated and attain (15) the martial quality, being also disposed by nature to this, their standing among the wealthy and prosperous is that of the wolf 「among」 the fattened flock. It is possible for these to battle with twice or thrice their number. (You can see this clearly in communities that grow up in the desert, [these people] being [both] tough and poor. They quickly subdue communities that are at ease and prosperous, as happened to the king of the Arabs with the king of Persia.) (20) Also, when this city wages war with another, it must wage war with either two cities or one. If it wages war with two cities, the case here is very easy. For if they rush 「their envoy」 to one of those two cities with supplication and entreaty, saying to them—“We ourselves make use of neither gold nor silver, for this is not permitted us by our Law, but it is permitted you. Rise 「and wage war」 together with us so that we take 「away their」 property and their possessions”(25)—if they do this they quickly will be friends with whatever nation they deal with 「in this way」. Someone might say: Perhaps the members of that city to whom dominion has been given, once they have attained prosperity and filled their hands with loot, will thereby be able to wage war against this poor city. But the case is not as it might seem, for there is no city that is truly one other than (45.) this city that we are involved in bringing forth. | The rest of the cities are truly many

cities notwithstanding that their dwellings are in one place, for their politics is for the sake of the governance of the household rather than the governance of the household being for the sake of the governance of the city. Hence if you assemble a single city, that is [only] by accident. The case of the virtuous city and its parts is like the case of the body as a whole: for the hand or the foot, (5) for example, exists only for the body as a whole, [not the body] 「for the sake of」 its limbs. But the opposite is the case with these cities: their assembling together as a whole is only through a kind of compulsion in order to preserve the household. This is self-evident to one who has even a bit of training in this science. In general, as Plato says, these cities 「first」 break down into two cities, one the city of (423a–423c) (10) poverty, the other the city of wealth. Furthermore, from each of these two cities many others branch off. If, in addition, the impoverished members of this city are given the possessions of the wealthy, why then waging war against one of these ignorant cities would be like waging war against two cities. Hence, this city that we are involved in bringing forth is in itself great in size and possessed of great power notwithstanding that it has, as Plato says, but one thousand (15) warriors. For they are like those warriors of whom it is said that 「twenty」 free men will vanquish two hundred. Now since this city will not be of any chance size, the virtuous community will result from it. It ought not, however, to be so small that neighboring nations vanquish it, nor so large that the benefits from plowing, sowing, and the rest would become costly for them.

(20) He said that the rulers ought to determine for them the extent of this city as to largeness or smallness, and determine for them, for example, the number of guardians among them and the proportion of each and every class of artisans. The case of this city is like the case with natural beings. Human actions cannot be completed if they are performed in any happenstance scale of smallness (as is said in tales of people whose height is a hands pan or a cubit), or in any (25) happenstance scale of largeness either (as it is said that in the past there have been people whose height was sixty cubits, and the like). Rather [one must take one's bearings by] the scale that is found in the majority of people. This is to be found not only in natural matters but also in artificial matters, for it is not by any chance measure that there results from a rhythm the mode for which it was designed. This being so, a questioner might ask, saying: What will be (46.) the extent of this city, and what will be the number of guardians in it? We say that this will vary according to the time, the place, and the nations that are near it. Hence the actualization of this and [maintaining] its health turn on the political cogitative faculty—i.e., the experiential faculty that gauges 「these」 general things so that they come to (5) exist in matter in actuality. Plato asserts that it suffices if the guardians in that city—it would seem that this is in accord with his time and according to the nations that were near to them—come to one thousand warriors.

Galen took exception to him on this, saying that if he [sc., Plato] had comprehended 「this」 time of ours he would know that this is absurd, alluding thereby to the strength of the realm that existed in his time. But what appears from Plato is that he did not make that statement wishing it to be unalterable (10) like the other general things that he mentions here. Rather he said this in accord with his time and in accord with his people, i.e., the Greeks. If we see that this city is [not] fit to wage war with 「all」 the inhabitants of the earth, could Plato then not see it? But perhaps someone will say that Plato meant 「only」 that no assemblage in a single city ought to be more than this assemblage—i.e., in a single place. Moreover, many cities could be taken out of this [one city] (15) in accord with the proper size. Nevertheless, the case of this gauging [of proper size] also will vary according to the localities. But each and every one of the virtuous communities ought to be of a limited area, i.e., for each one of them. Yet if these communities be of a determined number intended to limit them, then the truth of this ought to be shown by the conformity of this opinion to the natural climates or all the natural people. This is alluded to in the (20) saying of the Lawgiver: “I have been sent to the Red and the Black.” If this be the [correct] opinion, Plato does not favor it; but it is Aristotle’s opinion, and it is the indubitable truth. He says that the lording-it-over expressed by a command such as this—i.e., that this city have a limited size—is (423c–423e) more trifling for them than what we previously ordered them to do. Namely that it was proper that a bronze son born to guardians be thrust out among the others [like him], (25) and that a golden or silver son born to these others be thrust out among the guardians. This is commanded of the citizens’ offspring so that they might be one in nature, since every one of the humans in it [sc., the city] corresponds to one particular job, and that is the job for which he is naturally suited. In general, all these commands and the lording-it-over them to observe all these nomoi and the others that we shall mention hereafter regarding copulation, procreation, and the rest, are no great matter that would (30) afflict people like these. They are all trifling matters for them if they guard them by bringing them up well in the education that we have mentioned—i.e., music and gymnastic. (47.) | Hence one ought to be extremely wary of making any innovation in music apart from what the ancient nomoi (424) have laid down. For if this were done, disease would easily be transmitted to the city without anyone’s being aware of it. This would not cease by settling calmly and quietly in the dispositions of the soul, but [rather continue] until the matter finally turns into the destruction of the Laws and (5) the nomoi. This is evident from the case of those people who, having grown up with such general nomoi and general (425) Laws, are able, by themselves, to arrive at many 「partial」 nomoi 「and good disciplines, such as honoring parents, remaining silent before elders, and other such」 practical 「nomoi」. Hence partial things like these ought not to be laid down as nomoi. That is because the general

Laws, when firmly established, will lead the citizens to these partial (10) nomoi easily and by themselves because everyone only moves toward that which his upbringing in discipline and 「his」 nature move him toward. If [they are] good, then [it is toward the] good, or if [they are] bad, then [it is toward the] bad. But if one strives to lay down these partial nomoi without laying down the general ones (as happens to many 「legislators」), why he is on the level of one who would heal diseased people who are unable to derive any benefit (426) from that by which they might be healed on account of their excessive desire for food, drink, and copulation. That (15) is because their diseases will change markedly for the worse on account of these medicines. Hence anyone who strives to lay down partial nomoi such as these will not cease improving their affairs 「as long as he lives」, and they will rely on him. He will think that he is attaining an end thereby, but he will not attain it. You can make this clear from the cases of many of the legislators whose accounts have reached us. The case of striving to improve these cities is, as Plato (20) says, like one cutting off a single head of the [many-]headed serpents. He is doing something useless since they will emit their poison with their remaining heads. This being so, one ought at first only to lay down general nomoi like these, (427a–427c) which have already been mentioned and which will be spoken of yet again in this book. He said: But as for the nomos to be laid down concerning temples, prayers, sacrifices, (25) and offerings, which will imprint in the souls humility and the extolling of God and the angels, why he would leave them to what God (may He be exalted!) commands through prophecy. It is as though he asserts that these are divine things, and that whatever of these there is in 「cities」 we ought to acknowledge as such, for they [sc., the divine things] are, as it were, common to all the Laws and conventions of the nomoi. Since Plato, at the beginning of this book, had already investigated what justice is and refuted (30) what was said concerning justice by the opinions generally accepted in 「his」 time, he promised first to make known (48.) the nature of | justice in the city and then to make known the nature of justice in the individual soul, being as it is more evident in a city. He said: An example of this would be if a particular man were ordered to read a script with (368de) tiny letters from afar, and we knew that the selfsame book (5) with large letters was to be found in another place close by him. We comprehend that it is right that we direct [our attention] first to that book with broad lines and read it first. And after we comprehend it, then it will be possible for us to read the book with tiny letters with ease. Similar to this is the 「case」 with justice in the city and in the particular soul. But as we have said, before making known the nature of justice through definition, he began to explain how life in the just city is. Having reached this point in it [sc., the *Republic*], he wished to make known the nature of (10) justice since it could already be seen quite clearly there from what he says about the life of the city. Similarly, it is also evident from this very thing [sc., from

the life of the (427e–428) city] that it [sc., the city] is wise, courageous, moderate, 「and just. He proceeded」 to investigate what is the nature of each one of these four virtues that exist in this city, and in which part of it it is to be found. He began with wisdom, saying that it is clear that this city is wise, possessing (15) knowledge. That is because it [displays] fine understanding in all things to which the Laws and nomoi point, which we ourselves will mention by recounting them. Good governance and good counsel are undoubtedly a kind of knowledge. But 「we」 cannot say that good governance and good counsel are in this city on account of wisdom in the practical arts such as agriculture, carpentry, and so on. Since this is so, then it [sc., the city] can 「only」 be wise through that (20) knowledge on whose track we are. It is evident that this wisdom can only be completed through knowledge of the end of man since this governance moves in that direction. And it is evident that we can only perceive the end of man through the theoretical sciences. Hence this city is necessarily spoken of as wise in two kinds of knowledge simultaneously—i.e., the theoretical and the practical. That part in which this wisdom will be is the smallest of its [sc., the (25) city's] parts, namely the philosophers. That is because these natures occur less frequently than the other natures—i.e., [the natures of] the possessors of practical arts. It is evident that this wisdom ought to be firmly established in the ruler of the city and rule over it. This being so, the heads of this city are necessarily the wise. We have then told of the knowledge on whose account this city is said to be wise and in which of its parts [it resides]. †

(49.) As for the courage ascribed to this city, why it consists in (429–430b) preserving this opinion as explained and seeking to strengthen it in all natural people in every case of strength and weakness. By “strength” I mean such as fear and anxiety; by “weakness,” such as the desires. It is evident that the multitude in this part will be of 「this」 character only if we inculcate in them the characteristics that we have mentioned (5) and try them by means of 「those」 proofs—i.e., music and gymnastic. For once they are of this character it will be difficult for fear or desire to uproot this opinion from their 「souls」. But if, in the course of their being governed, they imagine these things [sc., fear and desire], it would be easy to remove and transfer this opinion from their souls. An image of this is, as Plato says, what dyers do. When they want to dye camlet so that it is colorfast, they first 「choose」 white from among the colors of the garment. Then they (10) prepare it beforehand and ready it with not a few things to receive the color so that the camlet receives the color in as good a manner as possible; so that when the color is put down and permeates it, it is impossible to eradicate it by washing it with scouring agents. As for the garment that has not been so prepared, its color will be washed out from it when washed with scouring agents. So is the case with the guardians. If they are not brought up with the education (15) we have described and if their

natures are not chosen [with deliberation], it is doubtful whether this opinion will [not] be eradicated from their souls and its color removed, for pleasure is the most powerful scourer of the virtues and most effective in eradicating them. Similarly with anxiety and fear.

It is clear in what thing of this city this virtue—i.e., (429*b*) courage—is to be found and also to which part it is to be ascribed. This can 「only」 be ascribed to it [by virtue of] these people whose natures we have chosen for guardianship and whom we have arranged to maintain this part. For it (20) is clear that cities are not said to be courageous or timid in all their parts or in just any part—i.e., the moneyed class or the 「class」 [engaged in] the practical arts—but only in the guardian class.

We have then perceived what this virtue is and to which of the parts of the city it is to be ascribed. It remains for us to speak of the two remaining virtues, namely moderation (430*de*) and justice: what they are, and to which of the parts of the city they are to be ascribed.

(25) We say that moderation is some middle way in eating, drinking, and copulation. The moderate one is the individual who, on his own, can always be on this middle way. That is why it is said that moderation is some kind of conquest and forcing of the soul from pleasures and desires. It has been said that the moderate one is more powerful and stronger than himself. This means that, seeing that man has in him a nobler part—namely reason—and a base (431) part—namely the appetitive soul—if the nobler is more (30) powerful and stronger than the baser and the baser is in submission to it, then it is said that this man is stronger than himself. But if he is humbled by the baser, whether because of upbringing or otherwise, it is said that he is (50.) weaker than himself and licentious. | This being so, it is evident that this city will be more powerful than the others and stronger than 「itself」 and that this virtue ought not to be in one particular class of citizens 「but in the rulers」 and the general multitude. For not a single human activity is called human for the virtue that it attains other than moderation. The case here is not like the case with wisdom (5) and courage, which are ascribed to the city in that they are in a part of it. This virtue, however, ought to be spread throughout the city 「and」 transmitted to the generality (432*ab*) from the beginning of [its] growth in one way—i.e., the unanimity in it. Its opposite should be rejected. We have said, then, what moderation is and how it is ascribed to the city. The fourth virtue remains, the investigation of which (10) goes back to the beginning of the matter, namely justice.

We say that equity in this city—and self-control, which is the work of justice—is nothing more than what we were (433*a–433d*) saying it was in the previous account concerning the governance of this city. 「Namely, we ourselves have already said that every single one of the people in this city ought to lay hold」 onto

[only] one 「of the activities of the city」: namely that activity to which he is disposed by nature. 「This is that」 equity which gives preservation and duration to the (15) city as long as it is to be found persisting in it, and it gives it the three powers that we have finished discussing. This will be when the opinion of the lords and the multitude concur in 「preserving」 what the nomoi oblige them to, so that this disposition comes to be found in the youth, women, slaves, freeborn, rulers, and multitude, and in general in all its parts. That is, every one of them will perform the activity that is his by nature and will not long for what does not (20) belong to him. This being so, this city will be just in 「their associating together in it」, for the equity in it consists 「only」 in every one of its citizens doing what is singularly his. This is political justice; just as perversion in cities, which is the cause of injustice, is nothing more than each and every (434) one of its citizens growing up in more than one thing and transferring 「from thing」 to thing, from activity to activity, and from rank to rank—and this, notwithstanding that it is (25) thought not to be harmful to the city in the practical arts. Its harm will be very evident in the transfer of classes from one to the other, as when one who is parsimonious and wealthy is transferred, [thanks] to his parsimony, so as to enter the class of warriors or, even more, the class of chiefs. (51.) This leads to many evils. You can make this clear | from [what happens in these] cities. It has then been made clear from this statement what justice is and that it is something that exists spread over all parts of this city.

When he had finished making known the nature of justice in cities, he set out to consider whether it is the selfsame thing in the individual soul. If this in fact corresponds to (5) what was said of this in the city, then it is right. If not, then he would reconsider what was said of this in the city. For (435) things differing [only] in smallness and greatness are of one class, and there is nothing in the one that is contrary to what is in the other. Hence whatever must necessarily be justice and equity in the individual soul is the selfsame thing in 「the」 individual city.

He said: We have already said that equity in the city (10) consists in each of the three natures—i.e., the calculating nature, the spirited nature, and the appetitive nature—doing what is appropriate for it in the appropriate measure and in the 「appropriate」 time. 「It is on account of this」 that we say of this city that it is wise, courageous, and moderate. 「Even if」 these three kinds exist in the individual soul, there is neither self-control nor justice in the individual soul unless these faculties exist in the true manner in which they exist in the city, so that the cogitative part rules over the other (15) faculties and the other faculties are in submission to it. It is clear from this that if these faculties were not in the soul it would be impossible for them to be in the city, for these things cannot exist in it other than through humans. It has already been made clear in physics that there are two (439d–442a) opposing faculties in us: one, cogitation; the other, appetite. This

is evident in that we may have an appetite for something and yet not do it. Appetite is partly desire and partly (20) spiritedness. It is also evident in that spiritedness oftens wars against desire and rules over it as though it were an instrument of ascendancy 「by」 which it [sc., cogitation] rules over them. Hence it is that we frequently grow angry at what the desires bring [us] to thoughtlessly. If all this is as we have characterized it, these three faculties exist in the soul in the way they do in the individual city. Indeed, the cause of their being in the city is the very cause of their being in (25) the individual soul. The justice and equity in the individual soul consist in every one of its parts doing what it has to do, as is the case in the city. Hence the cogitative kind will be ruling if it is wise or helped by the entire soul. And the spirited kind will obey and submit to it, heatedly aroused by it 「and」 battling with the other kind [sc., the desiring kind]. This harmony in the individual soul is achieved (52.) through music and gymnastic. For gymnastic strengthens the spirited soul and gives it courage, while music renders it disciplined, submissive to cogitation. If these two parts grow up in accord with this description, they will turn to that other part and discipline it. The particular individual is called wise precisely on account of that part because of (5) which we called the city wise; and the names “courageous” and “moderate” are predicated of the very same parts. For the courageous individual is one who always preserves what (442cd) cogitation orders and commands him—by “always” I mean through times of fears and anxieties and desires. 「Thus」, in what has preceded, we have been defining political courage. Similarly, the wise individual is only he in whom the cogitative part forever rules over the other parts, 「as」 is the case 「in」 the city. Similarly, the case of the moderation of (10) the 「particular」 individual is the same as the case of the moderation of the city. Hence, the individual stamped with the nature of this city will be of the utmost virtue just as this city is of the utmost virtue.

It has then been made clear from this that the equity and justice in the individual soul are identical with the equity and justice in the city. From this it can be seen that the deceit and injustice in the individual soul are identical with (444) the deceit and injustice in the ignorant cities. This is nothing more than when one of these 「faculties」 that is not fit to rule (15) sets itself up as chief and rules over them, as when the spirited soul or 「the desiring soul」 rules. The case here is like the case with the body’s health and disease. Just as its health consists only in the equilibrium of the humors and nature’s ruling over it, and its disease consists 「only」 in their being dispersed contrary to nature and their ruling over it, so is the case with the soul. Its health consists in its linking up with the cogitative part, and its disease consists in its [sc., some other part of the soul’s] ruling over it [sc., the cogitative part]. Thus virtue is some kind of health and beauty, and vice is some kind of disease. Just as health is (20) one, so is virtue one. Hence the virtuous city is one. The (445cd) vices, however, are many and varied, just as the diseases are many and

varied. Hence the ignorant cities are many and varied, save that they are comprehended under four classes, according to what he says later on. The virtuous governance has two designations: One is kingship, 「and (25) that is when [there is only] one who is in charge of it. The second is aristocracy」, and that is when 「they have」 more chiefs than one. Having completed the statement concerning the classes of virtues that are in this city, he returns to what remains in the case of the guardians, namely the inquiry concerning how they copulate, the upbringing of their children, and the manner of their procreation.

We say that it is clear that if we wish the natures of these (30) guardians to be preserved through procreation—i.e., that for the most part they should procreate their like—it cannot be that they copulate with any chance women, | but [rather (53.) only with] women who resemble them in nature 「and who」 have grown up with something like that training. This is obligatory not only for guardians but for each and every class of citizens. Hence it is [a subject] fit for investigation whether there exist among women natures resembling the natures of each and every class of citizens—and in particular the guardians—or whether women’s natures are distinguished from men’s natures. If the former is the case, then (5) as regards the activities of the city, women would have the very same standing as men in those classes, so that there would be among them warriors, philosophers, rulers, and the rest. But if this is not the case, then women are only fit in the city for activities that men in general are unfit for, as if you were to say upbringing, procreation, and the like.

And we say that women, in so far as they are of one kind (10) with men, necessarily share in the end of man. They will differ only in less or more; i.e., the man in most human activities is more diligent than the women, though it is not impossible that women should be more diligent in some activities, such as is thought concerning the art of practical music. That is why it is said of melodies that they are perfected when men produce them and women do them (15) well. If this is so, and the nature of men and women is of one kind, and the 「nature」 that is of one kind 「turns」 to only one activity in the city, then it is evident that the women in this city will practice the [same] activities as the men, except that they are weaker at it. Hence it is obligatory that the less recondite activities be handed over to them. This will be brought to light with evident clarity through (20) investigation. We see women sharing arts with men except that they are weaker at it, although most of the women in [some] art may be more diligent than the men, as in the art of weaving, sewing, and other such 「arts. As for」 their sharing in the art of war and the rest, why this is made clear from the inhabitants of deserts and the “City of Women” [Dāghūda]. Similarly, too, since some women are formed (25) with eminence and a praiseworthy disposition, it is not impossible that there be philosophers and rulers among them. Since it was thought that this class existed only infrequently among

them, some Laws ruled out women's being priests—i.e., the high priesthood. Some [other] Laws, however, not ruling out [the possibility] of this existing among them, rejected 「this」. This is already clear from investigation of the animals—i.e., that it is fitting that there be female guardians. This refers to the animals to whom we (54.) previously compared the guardian. We see this | in female dogs who guard what their males guard and strike at hyenas just as their males strike at them, save that they are weaker at this. That is why nature sometimes, but rarely, gives the male an instrument with which he can fight that is not in the female, 「as is the case with the boar」. But since the fighting instruments of those animals whose wont it is to fight are for the most part common to the male and the female, it [sc., nature] intends that the female also perform (5) this activity. The competence of women is unknown, however, in these cities since they are only taken 「in them」 for procreation and hence are placed at the service of their husbands and confined to procreation, upbringing, and suckling. This nullifies their [other] activities. Since women in these cities are not prepared with respect to any of the human virtues, they frequently resemble plants in these (10) cities. Their being a burden upon the men 「in these cities」 is one of the causes of the poverty of these cities. This is because they are to be found there in double the number of men, while not understanding through [their] upbringing any of the necessary actions except for the few actions—like the art of spinning and weaving—that they undertake mostly at a time when they have need of them to make up for their lack of spending [power]. This is all self-evident. This being so—and it is clear from the case of the females (15) that they are to share with the males in war and the rest—it is fitting that, in choosing them, we seek for those very natures that we sought for in the men and that they should be trained in the same way through music and gymnastic.

He said: They have no 「cover」 on them when they practice gymnastic with the men, since they will be devoid (457a) of [everything save] virtue. When it became clear to 「him」 that the women will stand guard 「just as」 the man does, and that these female guardians will be with the men in the same place—since none of those who are virtuous (20) guardians in this city has a dwelling 「in which」 to isolate himself—and that their meals are to be taken as one, he (458c–458e) said that necessity undoubtedly will bring them [sc., the women] to desire copulation. But copulation ought not to be permitted them whenever they wish and with whomever they wish, since we wish that this activity be human among them and that their copulations not be of any chance character. The arrangement of their procreation will be the best possible with respect to their conditions of guardianship, but at fixed times and with determined individuals (25) and characteristics. This is, as it were, common to the other conventions and Laws, though as it appears the adherents of the Laws differ from one another in the force of the statements. We ourselves will explain here briefly what Plato asserts about these things.

We say: As for the time during which these guardians will engage in copulation, he holds that its determination (459–460) turns on the preservation of their kind. Thus also the increase or diminution [in frequency] of copulation: this (55.) varies in accord with the wars that occur | and other such things that necessitate an increase in copulation or its diminution. As for which individual in this city should copulate with which other individual, why [they should be] the 「individuals」 who resemble one another 「with a view」 to preserving the good natures in their offspring. When one wishes to raise hunting dogs or raptorial birds, he takes care to mate the excellent natures with the excellent nature so (5) that the offspring will be of that character. All the more ought care to be taken of this matter in this city. This is precisely why it ought not to be permitted in the city for anyone, with a view to having children, to copulate at any age he wishes, but [only] during the prime years, namely—as Plato says—from twenty to thirty in women and in men from thirty to fifty-five. As for the arrangement under which (10) he holds it to be proper for these guardians to copulate and have children, why it is that these women be common to all the men, no one woman living alone with one man as is the case in these cities, and that their children also be common. As for the community of women, it is to be of this character: namely that the women dwell together with all the men, only without copulation being permitted them. When the rulers hold that necessity points to procreation, (15) they order that weddings for grooms and brides be celebrated in the city. They bring sacrifices, offer donations, and institute prayers in which they call on God (may He be exalted!) that He may be gracious unto them; and they order that a poem be sung using verses and lines suitable for weddings. In general they take the meetings of the citizens [as occasions for] these gatherings. Then, after this, the men and women gather together; and they [sc., the rulers], acting subtly in the drawing of lots, draw lots among them for the women. The drawing of lots makes it appear (20) that whatever befalls each and every woman is only something begotten by chance and accident. Thus [the men] hold that [the women] are common to them [all], but in fact the drawing of lots concerns what is to be born among comparable kinds. That is, the good kind of women are allotted to the good kind of men, and the bad to the bad, without any of the citizens other than the lords being aware of this. (Galen has mentioned that there is a book 「of his」 on this kind of drawing of lots; it is the one called *Deceptive* (25) *Lottery*.) By proceeding in this way two [advantageous] things are joined: first, what they hold concerning the community of women; second, the preservation of the good nature in procreation. What can be imagined with regard to one of these [classes] can be imagined as well in many [other] respects. |

(56.) He said: Then the women 「are separated」 from the men and dwell with those among them who are pregnant until their delivery. When they have been delivered of children, it is incumbent upon them not to see their children; the

(460cd) offspring are transferred to one another or to governesses and wet-nurses if the mothers do not have enough for suckling. This 「he did」 in order that they see that they have their children in common so that every one of them (461c–461e) (5) holds the offspring of all members of 「that」 class to be his children, and the children hold all these parents to be their parents. And all this is for the sake of love. This being so, there are no relatives in this city other than parents, grandparents, sons, daughters, grandchildren, brothers, and sisters. This city has ranks: child is an acknowledged rank, and parent is an acknowledged rank, and similarly the (10) rank of grandparents; so that all children wax in praise of all the parents in the manner in which parents [customarily] are esteemed, and the parents love all the children with the love with which children [customarily] are loved. That is why the copulations in this city are only between brothers and sisters. 「But the copulation of parents with children is forbidden since they [sc., the children] are lower [in rank]; similarly that of children with parents since they [sc., the parents] are higher [in rank]」. And this is so 「only」 so that parental esteem not be mixed with the contempt associated (15) with copulation, nor filial love with the love of [sexual] desire. Once 「the children's」 esteem for parents fails, the city necessarily is ruined. This cause is operative in all Laws, even though they differ from one another in determining this [and even though] their nomoi too are not congruent with one another. Age is one of the conditions laid down concerning copulation. As to whether one who has passed the years for copulation [i.e., the prescribed years for procreation] is permitted to copulate in the city for the sake of ejecting the superfluous [semen in his body]— (20) since of the superfluities the ejection of this is most truly necessary—why there is room for inquiry here. Plato permits it on condition that no offspring of theirs be seen [alive] in (461c) the city. But this [copulation] too ought to be determined according to what will preserve health. It is evident that these weddings are to be repeated among them according to the need for procreation—i.e., frequently or seldom—since this city indeed is to be of a fixed size forever. This also depends on how many women become pregnant at each and every wedding. Galen, due to his ignorance of Plato's intention, became confused in trying to understand (25) from Plato whether or not these weddings ought to be repeated. For if they are not repeated, each and every man is left with a particular woman; and therewith the community [of women] ceases and mutual love is negated. Each one of them will love to bring good things for his or her spouse more than he will love doing so for others; and it will turn into [a city of] households, not a single city. This (57.) is clear to one who has been trained in this science. This being so, it is even more farfetched than all this to permit an individual to dwell in a separate house, for no one in this city possesses any thing of his own. Rather, the case of their community is like the case of the community of the limbs of the body. A man ought only to copulate with women during those weddings for that measure

of time that he knows the woman is most likely to become impregnated. This, then, is what Plato asserts concerning the community of children and women.

(5) Then, after this, he undertakes to bring proof of the necessity of these communities. He begins, saying: He who governs these cities is obliged in his governance to aim for (462) the greatest good for the city just as he ought to remove the greatest evil from them. Now there is no greater evil in the governance of the city than that governance which converts a single city into many cities, just as there is no greater good in cities than that which joins them together and makes (10) them one. This being so, it is clear that community in advantages and damages will lead them to be bound to the city and befriend it. This is because the citizens, if they live, all live together, and if they are killed, are killed together. Their joys and their sorrows in this are of a piece. The separation of the citizens and the removal of each from his fellow in such matters as these confuses them and destroys their assemblage. This is when some of them are (15) joyful and others of them sorrowful, even sometimes [going to the point] that some of them rejoice in the sorrow of others. That is why it is said that people's being near other people is advantageous. In general, there is nothing more productive of evil and confusion to the city than its citizens' saying of some particular thing, "This is mine and this is not mine." As for the cities in which what is laid down for one is laid down for the association [as a whole] and what befalls him is closer to being what befalls all, why that is the (20) city that is joined, compounded together, and natural. For the case of the community between the parts of these cities and the cities is like the case of the community between the limbs of an animal's body and the rest of the body as regards pain and pleasure. The entire body is pained by a single finger's hurt so that this pain is confirmed upon the whole body and one says that it is feeling weak. The same is the case with joys and pleasures. All this being as we have characterized it and since the cities whose association we wish to be virtuous ought to be of this kind, why it is evident (25) that that community of children and women of which we have spoken is one of the most necessary of things. For it will not be possible for any one of these guardians to (463cd) designate another as either unrelated to him or as a relative. Rather, every one of them whom he encounters he will hold to be his father or grandfather or mother or grandmother or brother or sister or son or daughter. Hence, as we have said, they will treat parents with shame before them and (30) esteem of them as prescribed by the general *nomos*. This is (58.) the greatest good for the city—i.e., that in joys | and (464) damages its parts be to its whole as the case of the limbs of a single body to the body. The case of the community of children and women resembles their community of property. That is why we said that it is not fitting that any one of them have a dwelling of his own or something by which he would be isolated so that one of them would dwell in his house without 「the others」 as much as it was possible for (5) him to do so, and the

others also would do likewise. Still less ought he to have a child of his own and women of his own [for thereby] evils of his own and damages of his own will come to pass, sometimes 「being」 —as we have said—a cause of the growth of evils besetting others. This is the cause of the disputes occurring among citizens of this city over money, children, and women. It is evident that if all the things in this city are in accord with this, then it will (10) remove envy and hatred from them as well as poverty and the other evils found in these cities. Hence there will be no need in them [sc., the citizens of this city] for instituting fines on account of the taking of property, theft, and other such things as occur in these cities. Rather, these people are of the utmost elevation and happiness. They are indeed happy. They are beset by none of the evils besetting the citizens of these cities. All of this is self-evident to one who has investigated these associations.

(15) After it became clear to him that these communities [of children, women, and property] were necessary and that (466c–466e) the women ought to guard along with the men—i.e., the women of the guardians—whether standing guard in the city or going out to war, just as female dogs do with their males—i.e., that they share with them in everything having to do with guardianship—he undertook to investigate whether their children [too] ought to go out to war for the sake of becoming expert in it by observing them, as is done in the other arts, so that when they had become perfected (20) they would begin doing it. This happens in many of the arts, such as the art of smiths and others, who keep their (467) children in their presence so that they might for a time observe them and what comes out of it [sc., the art]. This is prior to their doing anything [themselves], for there is no 「small」 difference between learners who contemplate the crafts from the very outset and those who do not observe. Since this exists in the other arts, all the more should this be (25) the case with the guardians' children, considering that we wish guardians of the utmost expertness to emerge from them. Moreover, when their children go out to war their zeal for killing is strengthened, as one sees happening with most animals. When fighting in the presence of its offspring, it becomes more emboldened thereby than by all other things. However, it is not intended that the youths, on account of their softness and weakness, should be killed while attending the parents or that they should on occasion endanger 「their [parents'] lives」. Hence their parents, who (59.) possess the requisite knowledge, 「ought」 to consider | [the chances of] war. Whoever among them [sc., the youth] is timid will not go forth to it, and whoever of them is without timidity will go forth to it. Also, this is to occur [only] 「after」 they have become proficient at riding horses. We shall cunningly provide for their security [by making them mount] old horses, and they shall be in a place from which they may view the battle. They shall lay down nomoi in this city that anyone who leaves the center of battle or (468a) (5) throws away 「his」 arms or does any act of cowardice and weakness shall come back to be one of the

artisans who work with their hands. As for whichever of them is seized prisoner, we only deliver him to the enemies without our caring about him evermore since he has so entangled himself on his own that he was caught as a ram is caught. Hence a nomos ought 「to be laid down」 that they are not to strip (469c–469e) the dead, for many an army has been lost through this activity—excepting whichever of them takes his [sc., the (10) slain’s] weapons, needing to take weapons only because his own knife or sword has been broken. And Plato permits every one of these guardians, while in camp, to welcome (468b–468e) whomever he wishes and kiss him for this will lead them to fight [more eagerly].

He said: It is fitting that the choicest of these guardians be honored with singular honors in the city, with sacrifices and offerings being brought to them and eulogies and songs (15) composed about them. 「As for」 those of them who die in war, why it is obligatory to speak of those who die in this (469a–469c) way as turning into angels walking on earth, pure and holy, guarding humans against falling into evils and vices. It is also fitting to 「bury」 them in a unique manner and in a unique place and to use their 「tombs」 as temples in which to pray. Something like this is done with one who has died otherwise than through having been killed [in battle] if he was praiseworthy in conduct.

(20) When he completed this he investigated whether the citizens ought to enslave one who was of their class and [spoke] their language in common with them—by “class” I mean the stock and the place—or whether the brunt of (470–471b) war upon them ought to reach [the point of] burning down their houses and cutting down 「their trees」. He said that it was not fitting that this class, which is one, do this to its own class. Thus, it is not fitting that Greeks, for example, enslave Greeks, burn down their houses, and cut down their trees. It is more fitting that what is like this be called (25) severing and mutilation rather than be called war, for such a war resembles the strife that breaks out between members (60.) of a single household or between lovers. | When, therefore, this strife breaks out among some class of people, the guardians ought to lay down a nomos for them not to destroy their houses, cut down their trees, or enslave them. These are to be called ones who have gone astray, not unbelievers. What Plato asserts differs from what many Lawgivers assert.

(5) He said: As for any not of their class, why it is permissible for the guardians to do all these acts to them. This, then, is (471b) the explanation of what Plato says concerning the training of this particular class of the city—i.e., the guardians—and how there is community among them. You ought to know that much of what he says concerning community and upbringing in music and gymnastic is common to all classes of the city, even though gymnastic differs from class to class. Similarly with the fictions that they transmit to them (10) through music: namely that every kind be moved by the affective speeches only toward the activity designated for it by

nature. Only Plato does not lay this down so as to mention these things for each and every class of citizens since this depends in proximate potentiality on what he said about the guardians. What we have yet to set apart in discourse is the speech concerning the class of the wise, as he did subsequently. We shall speak concerning the recognition of the natures that are disposed to this; and what is (15) the manner of training them; and, when they have become perfected, what is the manner of their rule and lordship over the city. We make this the conclusion of the first treatise of this epitome.

21.1 The Hebrew text of Rosenthal's edition begins on page 21. The numbers in parentheses and bold of the present translation show the page numbers of the Hebrew in Rosenthal's edition. The numbers in parentheses show the line numbers corresponding to the page numbers in bold. The numbers in parentheses and italics are the Stephanus numbers of corresponding passages in Plato's *Republic*.

21.3-4 Averroes opens his epitome of Aristotle's *Physics* in similar fashion (*Kitāb al-samā' al-ṭabī'ī*, p. 2, in *Rasā'il Ibn Rushd* [Hyderabad, 1365/1946]).

22.9-12 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 13. 1103a3-7, 6. 1. 1138b35-1139a15, 10. 7. 1177a12-b4; Farabi, *Attainment*, 2.4-5, 26.11-19 (*MPP*, p. 82 n. 6, p. 67).

22.15-21 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 7. 1097b8-11; Farabi, *Virtuous City*, 53.8-13 (Dieterici tr., p. 84).

23.12-15 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 1. 1094a9-15.

24.10-11 For liberality, see 72.24, below, and note thereto.

24.12-13 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 2. 7. 1107a33-b14, 5. 1129a-1138b, 6. 7. 1141a9-b8.

24.18-20 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 2. 2. 1104a5-9, 6. 1106a13-24, 1106b36-1107a2, 9. 1109a20-30, 7. 10. 1152a8-9.

24.23-25 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 13. 1102a16-26, 5. 9. 1137a9-17, 10. 9. 1179b29-1180a5; Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 22.8-23.14 (*MPP*, pp. 182 f.).

25.2-8 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 6. 7-8. 1141b8-1142a30, 10. 9. 1180b28-1181b12.

25.15 Compare the following discussion (to 26.11) with Farabi, *Attainment*, 31.8-33.8, 40.2-41.11 (*MPP*, pp. 71 f., 77 f.); and Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 15.9-13, 21.4-22 (*MPP*, pp. 176, 181).

26.1 applied] or: he applies.

26.6 conduct] or: guidance.

26. 13-14 See 41.6-7, below.

26.14-15 Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, 10. 5 (453.2-7) (*MPP*, p. 108).

26.16 The word "Law," in its capitalized form, is used in this translation consistently and exclusively to render *tōrah* (= *sharī'a*). By his earlier contrast between nations whose governance or conduct is human and those that are

nonhuman (26.6), Averroes in effect identifies human governance with that of the virtuous city, or human Law with the philosopher's law. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Koran is being praised here for its conformity to the latter. For the superhuman part of the *sharī'a*, see 47.24-28, below.

26.19, 23 art of war] MSS: partial art. Reading *al-ḥarbiyyah* for a presumed *al-juz' iyyah* in the Arabic. Compare variant reading to Farabi, *Attainment*, 25.18, in *Alfarabi's Philosophy of Plato and Aristotle*, p. 154.

26.25-26 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 1. 1094a1-18; Farabi, *Attainment*, 24.9-26.19 (*MPP*, pp. 66-68).

26.27 There is no positive identification of what work of Farabi is being referred to here. Pines, p. 75, draws attention to Farabi's enumeration of perfect—i.e., self-sufficient—communities, of which one type encompasses the entire inhabited earth: *Virtuous City*, 53.8-19 (Dieterici tr., pp. 84 f.). See note to 46.20-21, below.

27.2-6 Compare Plato 435e–436a. The men of Egypt are there classed among those distinguished for their love of money. In *Attainment*, 38.14-17 (*MPP*, p. 76), Farabi repeats the report that philosophy in ancient times existed among the Chaldeans, moving then from Iraq to the Egyptians and thereafter to the Greeks, from whom the Syrians and finally the Arabs received it. See also Maimonides, *Yemen*, 8.15-16 (Cohen tr., p. iii), for the characterization of the Syrians, Persians, and Greeks as the most expert and learned of the nations; and *Astrology*, 351.13-20 (*MPP*, p. 230), on the follies of the Chaldeans and Egyptians, among others. Averroes is conspicuously silent about the Arabs. See the discussion in Muhsin Mahdi, *Ibn Khaldūn's Philosophy of History* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix Books, 1964), pp. 199-201.

27.9 The Jalāliqah or Jilliqliyyūn are the warlike and courageous inhabitants of Jilīayqiya, an area that is wider than that covered by Galicia in Spain, extending from the Duero to the Bay of Biscay and the Atlantic to Castilla in the East. See Abdurrahman Ali El-Hajji, "Christian States in Northern Spain during the Umayyad Period," *Islamic Quarterly*, 9 (1965): 47, n. 1.; also, his edition of al-Bakrī, *The Geography of al-Andalus and Europe* (Beirut, 1968), 71.2-3, and map opposite p. 64 (Mahdi).

27.10 This is not Averroes' last word. See 46.20-21, below.

27.13 Aristotle *Politics* 7. 7. 1327b23-24; Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, p. 20 (Gauthier tr., p. 18 and n. 4).

27.21-23 Farabi, *Political Regime*, 87.7-17 (*MPP*, p. 42); Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, 10.5 (453.6-9) (*MPP*, p. 108); Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, pp. 147, 153 (*MPP*, pp. 158, 160). See also Maimonides, *Guide*, II 36 (79b) (Pines tr., p. 372).

27.24 Paragraphing supplied.

29.17-29 Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 6.15-21, 15.9-16, 19.10-20.1 (*MPP*, pp. 169, 176, 179 f.); Maimonides, *Guide*, 133 (36b-37a) (Pines tr., pp. 70-72).

29.32 Farabi's *Political Regime* opens with a discussion that might suggest such a title for that work, though it was not known by that name. The quotation that Averroes reproduces a few lines below is drawn from Farabi's *Attainment*.

30.2 Farabi, *Political Regime*, 85.6-10, 14-17, 86.11-87.4 (*MPP*, pp. 40 f.); *Virtuous City*, 69.19-70.16 (Dieterici tr., pp. 110-112).

30.3 represent] Same root as "imitate" and "imitation," above.

30.6 second principles] The reference is to the causes or principles of the heavenly bodies.

30.6-13 Farabi, *Attainment*, 41.1-10 (*MPP*, pp. 77 f.).

30.26 our time] This phrase may include more than contemporaries; often it refers to our epoch, the time of universal, monotheistic religions, as distinguished from pagan times.

30.27 in themselves] MSS: associated (or: persisting) with Him. The emendation is made in the light of the fuller discussion in Averroes, *Exposition*, 113.13-15 (Mueller tr., p. 104). By this argument of the dialectical theologians, it would be impossible to blame anything done by men who are not living under the Law, since the praise or blame attached to deeds stems solely from the prescriptions of the Law.

30.28 Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 24.5-8 (*MPP*, p. 183). See also Maimonides, *Guide*, I 71, 73-76 (93b-98b, 104b-123a) (Pines tr., pp. 175-184, 194-231), for a systematic presentation and refutation of the arguments of the Kalāim.

30.30 Ashm'day] The chief of the demons. Steinschneider conjectures that Averroes had originally written Iblīs, "the *diábolos* of the Arabs" (*Hebr. Ūb.*, p. 225).

31.7 imitations of happiness] Compare the following passage (to 31.24) with Farabi, *Aphorisms*, 82.10-84.3, 34.6-35.5 (Dunlop tr., pp. 61 f., 33 f.).

31.11-12 Contrast Averroes, *Incoherence*, 585.3-6 (Van den Bergh tr., 1: 361): "... the doctrine of the beyond in our religion . . . is more conducive to virtuous actions than what is said in others. Thus to represent the beyond in material images is more appropriate than purely spiritual representation. . . ." Pines, p. 81, n. 35, suggests that this passage be considered in the light of the peculiar polemical purposes of the *Incoherence*.

31.22-24 Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 19.2-3 (*MPP*, p. 179).

31.24-25 On religion as representation or similitude, consider the larger context of Farabi's remarks quoted earlier by Averroes at 30.6-13. See Farabi, *Attainment*, 40.5-41.12, 44.2-13 (*MPP*, pp. 77 f., 79 f.). Just as there may be a variety of virtuous nations or cities, so may there be a variety of virtuous religions (Farabi, *Political Regime*, 85.14-86.10 [*MPP*, pp. 40 f.]; Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, pp. 136, 144 [*MPP*, pp. 153, 157]).

31.26-30 Some light is cast on this passage by the fuller discussion in Farabi's *Book of Religion* where he distinguishes between opinions and actions. (1) Opinions

may concern (a) theoretical matters—among which Farabi lists a description of death and the afterlife, and accounts of the happiness and misery attained by men in that afterlife; and (b) volitional things—descriptions of both good and bad rulers and their followers, their actions, and what they come to. (2) Actions comprise (a) what one does in speech wherein, among other things, rulers are praised or blamed; and (b) estimations of actions and transactions among people, and defining what is just in these cases (*Alfarabi's Book of Religion and Related Texts*, ed. Muhsin Mahdi [Beirut, 1968], 44.14-46.10).

32.17-22 Ibn Ṭufayl, *Ḥayy*, pp. 153 f. (*MPP*, pp. 160 f.); Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 22.8-23.8 (*MPP*, p. 182).

33.23 Literally: The statement concerning imitations is this very statement.

33.25-26 The distinction between imitations that consist in blame and those that consist in praise corresponds to the comedy and tragedy mentioned in Plato 395a. Consider Farabi's discussion: "In tragedy good things are mentioned, praiseworthy matters which are an example for others to emulate. . . . In comedy evil things are mentioned, personal satires, blameworthy characteristics, and reprehensible habits" (Arthur J. Arberry, "Fārābī's Canons of Poetry," *Rivista degli Studi Orientali*, 17 [1937]: 269.16-17, 21-22 [Arberry tr., pp. 275 f.]). The MS versions of this poet's name are corrupt, making his identification uncertain.

34.12 the sea] Following Plato 396b; MSS: song.

35.15 a sort of pipe] The MSS have "customs," probably because of a mistaking of *al-sivār* for *al-sabz* (i.e., *al-surnāy*), a small flute with a wide mouth. (In written Arabic, the difference between these two words is slight.) The instrument is mentioned and illustrated in Farabi's *Kitāb al-mūsīqā al-kabīr*, ed. Gh. A. Khashabah (Cairo, 1967), p. 787, n. 3, and illustration on p. 788 (Mahdi).

37.10-14 Avempace, *Governance*, 8.6-9.5 (*MPP*, p. 126).

38.1-2 Farabi, *Plato*, 19.3-7 (Mahdi tr., p. 64).

38.14-17 Compare Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, 10. 4 (447.12-18) (*MPP*, p. 104).

38.31 upright] Other MSS: expert.

39.18-19 Literally: and similarly they should tell of terrifying things.

39.24 Paragraphing supplied.

41.1 prophet] Plato 415c: oracle.

41.6-7 The virtuous city too has a *sharī'a* (see also 44.23), which men can be and are compelled to obey. But for Plato wisdom, unlike obedience, is not a product of compulsion (25. 17; 26.1-15). A Muslim believer in the war of civilization presupposes the coincidence of wisdom and the *sharī'a*: by being compelled to obey the Law, men are brought to genuine wisdom.

41.17 the mighty] *ha-taqīfīm*. This also implies irascible, merciless.

41.20 The following passage (to 42.2) should be compared with Plato 416b-417a for several discrepancies, among which are the absence from Averroes' text of Plato's explicit references to education, the provision against any locked doors, and

the requirement of common messes. Averroes furthermore converts Socrates' indirect speech into a direct address to the guardians.

42.11-12 Plato 417b: property-holding guardians fear the enemies within far more than those without. Averroes goes on to elaborate upon what is treated very briefly in the *Republic*.

42.19-23 Speaking emphatically in his own name, Averroes forbids the guardians to own property. This principle is extended to all classes of the city in 43.1-14 and reiterated in 60.7-12, and forms the basis of his just-completed condemnation of "these cities" in 41.17-24, 42.7-10.

43.6 Essentially, as distinguished from the accidental benefit, viz., money.

43.15-17 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. 5. 1133a19-b28.

43.24 make] MSS: take.

44.19 A reference to the conquest of Persia (636-42) by Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs under the command of the Caliph 'Umar.

45.1-3 Avempace, *Governance*, 6.2-6, 7.7-11 (*MPP*, pp. 1 24 f.).

45.11 ignorant cities] Averroes' characterization, taken over from Farabi and repeated in 52.13-14, 22. See *Political Regime*, 87.5, 87.18-102.13 (*MPP*, pp. 41, 42-53); and *Virtuous City*, 67.1-69.4 (Dieterici tr., pp. 106-109).

45.15-19 This goes beyond Plato 423a, as does the subsequent discussion.

46.1-4 See note to 25.2-8, above.

46.6-8 Presumably this criticism was made in Galen's paraphrase of the *Republic*, which has not come down to us.

46.17-19 In opposition to the view just presented of having a large number of virtuous communities of limited area, Averroes here suggests the possibility (and immediately hereafter the desirability) of having a limited number of virtuous communities, each of which might be coterminous with an entire climatic zone, perhaps even encompassing all of mankind. On the causes of the natural differences between nations, resulting in distinct national characters, see Farabi, *Political Regime*, 70.8-71.9 (*MPP*, pp. 32 f.).

46.19-20 This Tradition (*ḥadīth*) is used elsewhere by Averroes to point to the universal significance of Muhammad's mission (*Decisive Treatise*, 7.3-4, 17.9-11 [*MPP*, pp. 169, 178]; *Exposition*, 102.20 [Mueller tr., p. 95]). Our text here reads *ba'al ha-tōrah*, rather than *manīaḥ ha-tōrah*, which is also translated later as Lawgiver.

46.20-21 See Józef Bielawski (ed. and trans.), *Lettre d'Aristote à Alexandre sur la Politique envers les Cités*, Polskiej Akademii Nauk, Komitet Nauk o Kulturze Antycznej, Archiwum Filologiczne, no. 25 (Wrocław, 1970), 4.2, 4.5, 10.5 (Arabic text, pp. 33 f., 44; French tr., pp. 59, 60, 66). Compare Aristotle *Politics* 7. 4. 1326a5-b25. For the political necessity that might require the military conquest of one virtuous city by another, leading ultimately to the universal sway of a single law, see Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, 10.5 (453.10-454.2) (*MPP*, pp. 108 f.).

47.24-26 In addition to substituting prophecy for the Delphic Apollo of Plato 427b, Averroes supplies on his own the reasons for this nomos. Humility does not appear in the *Republic*.

47.26-28 Knowledge of these divine things comes through prophecy since these transcend ordinary human understanding. Though superhuman in this sense, these things are not peculiar to the Koran, but are to be found in every *sharī'a* and in every nomos.

48.19-23 Farabi, *Attainment*, 15.16-16.5, 16.15-17.9, 20.3-22.5, 26.11-19, 39.9-40.2 (*MPP*, pp. 61 f., 64 f., 67 f., 76 f.); *Political Regime*, 79.3-80.4 (*MPP*, pp. 36 f.).

48.25 the philosophers] Averroes' substitution for Plato 428e: the supervising and ruling part.

49.1-5 According to Plato 429b, a city is called courageous by virtue of the courage of that part which does its fighting for it. Similarly Averroes in this text (24.7-8, 49.16-21). Yet here a "multitude" is seen as being, in some sense, courageous; and all "natural people" are to receive some kind of education in music and gymnastic. Such terminology underlines, as it were, the qualified character of this courage, expressed by its designation as "political courage" in Plato 430c. True, unqualified courage goes beyond the city and, as such, is not to be expected from all "natural people."

49.30 man] MSS: part.

49.32 weaker than himself and licentious] Following Plato 431b. More literally, but less intelligibly: that he is more fully submissive in his soul and that he is irreversible.

50.6 unanimity] Following Plato 432a; MSS: the quickness.

50.15 the three powers] I.e., the three virtues.

50.21 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. 6-7. 1134a25-1135a14. The term "political justice" does not appear in the *Republic*.

50.26, 27 class] Plato's *eidos*. Rather than the usual *sūg*, *hakhanah* is used here.

51.10 *tebha' ha-habhanah*—calculating, in the sense of reasoning, deducing.

51.13 The faculties of the soul must be in the same relation to each other as are their analogues in the virtuous city.

51.17-18 cogitation . . . appetite] Plato 439d speaks of *logismos* and *alogiston*. Aristotle *De Anima* 3. g. 432a26 refers to *logon* and *alogon*. (Cf. *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 13. 1102a26-28: this is an exoteric distinction.) See also *De Anima* 3. 10. 433a9 fr.

51.21 thoughtlessly] Literally: without cogitation.

52.13-14 ignorant cities] Plato 444a-b speaks of lack of learning. See note to 45.11, above.

52.25-26 aristocracy] Consider Averroes' comments in his epitome of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, *Kitāb ʾilm mā ba'd al-ṭabī'a*: "In general, the case with the world is like

the case with the city of good [men] [or: the aristocratic city]. For even though it has many rulers, it ascends to a single rulership and aims at a single end; otherwise it would not be one [city]. But just as it is in this way that the city continues to exist, so is the case with the world. Hence the household cities (*al-mudun almanziliyya*) decay quickly, for the unity that they possess is in a way only accidental” (*Compendio de Metafísica*, ed. and Spanish trans. by Carlos Quirís Rodríguez [Madrid: Maestre, 1919], 4.39 [Arabic text, p. 145]; German trans. by S. Van den Bergh, *Die Epitome der Metaphysik des Averroes* [Leiden: Brill, 1924], p. 123). See note to 79.1-8, below.

53.23 This is the famous “City of Women” whose inhabitants were every bit as tough as the Jalāliqah (see note to 27.9, above). Idrīsī, *Nuzhah*, MS Bibliothèque Nationale (Paris), No. 2221, fol. 344a, says that it is an island in the Atlantic and can be reached from the city of Dāghūda (among others), of which the Daghūr (or Dajūr!) of MS A may be a variant. El-Hajji, in his edition of al-Bakrī, *Geography*, pp. 169-170, gives other references for the City of Women (Mahdi). Rosenthal, accepting emendations of Baneth and Levi della Vida, translates “inhabitants of deserts and frontier villages.” See Rosenthal, 1966 reprinting, p. 165, n. 3.

53.24 eminence] or: clarity, purity. *zkhūth* or *zakūth*.

54.11 necessary] I.e., in contradistinction to noble activities.

54.21 he said] A new paragraph begins here in MS A.

54.21 to desire copulation] Plato 458d does not single out women in this respect.

54.23 human] Plato 458d: holy.

54.26 adherents of the Laws] or: religionists.

55.1, 2 individual(s)] *prat*, rather than the usual *īsh*, is used here.

55.4, 7 excellent, prime] The same word as that translated as “virtuous.”

55.8 Plato 460e: A woman’s prime is from twenty to forty; a man’s from twenty-five to fifty-five.

55.24 *Deceptive Lottery*] According to Baneth, the Hebrew corresponds to *qur ‘at idhān*.

56.9 child . . . and parent] or: son . . . and father.

58.8 women] Plato 464e: relatives.

59.6-10 The reason given for indifference to the fate of soldiers held prisoner by the enemy is Averroes’ own. In leaping over from 468a to 469c–d, Averroes may be suggesting that soldiers are captured and armies defeated because they are diverted from the fighting by the prospect of battlefield looting. Such prisoners are not worth a moment’s thought.

59.16 angels] A near-quotation from Hesiod in Plato 469a is further altered by Averroes’ substituting “angels” for “demons.”

59.18 pray] Plato 469a: worship at the tombs as at those of demons.

60.4 The command to exterminate idolaters ought to be understood as an act required by “human opinion,” not as an expression of God’s vengefulness, according

to Maimonides, *Guide*, I 54 (66a) (Pines tr., pp. 126 f.). Consider also Averroes' remarks on extirpative war in his *Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, 1137b24: "And you can understand this from the laws laid down with respect to war in the Law of the Muslims because the command in it pertaining to war is very general to such a point that they destroy, root and branch, whoever differs with them. Now there are times in which peace is more to be preferred than war. However, since the Muslim multitude make this edict of war generally valid despite the impossibility of destroying their enemies completely, great damage has attained them on account of their ignorance of the intention of the Lawgiver, the blessings of God be upon him. It is therefore proper to say that peace is preferable at times to war." The Hebrew text and English translation appear in the review of Rosenthal by Lawrence V. Berman, *Oriens*, 20 (1968-1969): 439. This subject is treated with delicacy in Avicenna, *Metaphysics*, 10.5 (453.2-454.2) (*MPP*, pp. 108f.).

60.7-12 See note to 49.1-5, above.

The Second Treatise

Since this governance can only come into being if it is possible—and perchance happens—that the king is a philosopher, and since this also holds for 「its」 preservation after it has come into being, and since it was his intention (20) to speak of the natures of these [individuals] and the manner of their education, he began first by describing the philosopher. He said: He is the one who longs for knowledge of what is and inquiry into its nature apart from matter. This may be discerned, according to his opinion, in the statement concerning forms. You ought to know that the philosopher, according to the primary intention, is the one who has attained the theoretical sciences [by virtue of] the four conditions that have been enumerated in the book on (25) demonstration. One of those conditions is that he have the ability to discover them [sc., the theoretical sciences] and to teach them. There are two ways of teaching them: One of them is the way of teaching the elect few ; this is teaching by demonstrative arguments. The second is the teaching of (61.) the multitude; this is teaching | by persuasive and poetical arguments. It is evident that this will not be fulfilled in him unless he is wise in practical science and moreover has the cogitative virtue by which those things that have been explained in practical science are brought about in nations and cities, and has the great moral virtue by which the (5) governance of cities and justice are chosen. Hence, if the philosopher longs to reach his ultimate perfection, this will come to be if he has already attained both the theoretical and practical sciences and both the moral and cogitative virtues, and especially the greatest of them.

[The term] “king” initially indicates, in [its] primary intention, the one who rules in cities. It is evident that the art by which he controls the governance of cities will be (10) completed only if all these conditions are combined in him. The case of the Lawgiver is also like this. Although this word initially indicates one who has the cogitative virtue by which practical things are brought about in nations and cities, he has need of those [same] conditions. Hence these names are, as it were, synonymous—i.e., “philosopher,” (15) “king,” “Lawgiver”; and so also is “Imam,” since *imām* in Arabic means one who is followed in his actions. He who is followed in these actions by which he is a philosopher, is an Imam in the absolute sense. As to whether it should be made a condition that he be a prophet, why there is room here for 「penetrating」 investigation, 「and we shall investigate」 it in the first part

of this science, God willing. Perhaps if this were so, it would be with respect to what is preferable, (20) not out of necessity. As it has already been made clear what the philosopher is, and as it has already been made clear (485–487a) that only such people as these can be the ruler of this virtuous city and govern over it, we ought to mention the qualities that will be found in these chiefs by nature. They are the natural conditions in a king. One of them—and this is the most distinctive—is that he be disposed by nature to the study of the theoretical sciences. This will be if, by his natural disposition, he can recognize what is essential and (25) distinguish it from what is accidental. The second, that he be retentive, not forgetful. For it is impossible for anyone lacking these two qualities to learn anything. That is because he will not cease being always weary to the point that he abandons learning and reading. The third, that he love learning and choose it and have a wonderful longing for all (30) parts of science. For as he says, one who longs very much for a thing will want all of its kinds; for example, the lover of wine desires all [kinds of] wine, and similarly the lover of women. The fourth, that he love truth and hate falsehood. (62.) For he who loves knowledge of what is, | as such, is a lover of truth; and he who loves truth cannot be a lover of falsehood; hence he whose way this is, will not be a lover of falsehood. The fifth, that he despise the sensual desires. For when someone's desire fixes on something with the utmost intensity, his soul is deflected from the other desires. Similarly (5) with these, since they already incline with all their 「souls」 toward study. The sixth, that he not be a lover of money. For [love of] money is a desire, and desires are not becoming in these people. The seventh, that he be of enlarged thought. For one who yearns for knowledge of the whole and of all things that are and does not wish [his] knowledge of things to be limited to whatever is affirmed on the basis of unexamined opinion is [indeed] of very (10) enlarged thought. Hence there is no proportion whatever [of anything] to this cogitative soul. The eighth, that he be courageous. For one who has no courage will be unable to despise the nondemonstrative arguments on which he has grown up, and especially if he has grown up in these cities. The ninth, that he be so disposed that he moves on his own toward whatever he holds to be good and beautiful, such as justice and the other virtues. This is so if his appetitive soul (15) has firm faith in thought and cogitation.

To be added to these is that he be eloquent so that his tongue lead him [to express] whatever is in his 「thoughts」 while he is speculating. Moreover, he should be able to light quickly upon the middle term.

These, then, are the conditions of the soul that are stipulated for these people. As for the conditions of the body, why they are those very conditions that were stipulated for (20) the guardians with a view to the good and improvement of the physique. He is fit to rule over this city in whom these conditions have been combined from the outset of his being and who, in addition, chanced to grow up in

the kind of governance that he [sc., Plato] describes later on. On account of all this, the existence of people such as these is infrequent; and that is the cause of the difficulty [attending] this city's existence. Someone might say: If the existence of (25) this city can only come about if people such as these happen to exist, and their existing with these qualities [is contingent on] their having grown up in this city, why then there is no way in which this city can come into being. What we were laying down 'in speech' and had then thought to be possible is [now seen to be] impossible. The answer is that it is possible for 'individuals' to grow up with these natural qualities that we have attributed to them—developing, (30) moreover, so as to choose the general common *nomos* that (63.) not a single nation can help choosing; and besides, their particular Law would not be far from the human Laws; [if these conditions are fulfilled] wisdom would have been completed in their time. This is as matters are in this time of ours and in our Law. If it should happen that the likes of these come to rule for an infinite time, it is possible for this (5) city to come into being. When it became clear to him through argument that this city's existence necessitates that (487c–487e) those ruling over it be wise, he turned to investigate the cause on account of which these cities, presently existing, do not receive any advantage from philosophers and the wise. He said that this is for two causes. [a] One is because (10) these cities neither heed the bidding of the wise who are truly wise nor look to them [for anything]. He said, by way (488) of giving a simile: [The relation of] the wise to the citizens of these cities is like that of a pilot, expert in the science of navigation, who can find no one to learn it or to make use of navigation. The sailors assert that navigation is not something that can be taught; nor is it an art entitling its master to become ruler over the sailors. Rather, if someone says to them that this art can be taught, they 'will despise him' (15) and shun him. 'Later on' someone who holds this opinion of navigation comes to be pilot of the ship, either by coercing the sailors or by something else through which one comes to power. If the ship is ruled by people such as those, will they then not turn away from the leader who is truly a leader and sometimes [even] despise him? Just so is the situation of the wise in these cities among their citizens. For their rank (20) among them is that of physicians among the sick—[the (489a–489c) latter] not considering medicine to be the art of healing and hence not holding the physicians in esteem. If the physicians tell them 'that' they can be healed, they stone them [to death]. Hence the work of the medical art will not be perfected unless the sick are fully bound to and do submit to the physicians. For whoever is ill undoubtedly needs to go (25) to the physicians' doors, 'as he says'. Such is the situation of the wise among the citizens. This, then, is one cause why citizens today receive no advantage from the wise who are truly wise. [b] The second cause is the defectiveness of most of those giving themselves to wisdom, if they lack [even] one of those qualities that we said were conditions of the wise one who is truly wise. It

is rare that there is one in whom these qualities exist to perfection; and even when he is to be (491) (30) found it is with difficulty 「that this knowledge—i.e.,」 philosophy—is perfected in him. Those virtuous qualities are, (64.) of all things, what most hinder | many of those growing up in these cities from [pursuing] philosophy. The case here is like the case of many of the sick whose disease is aggravated by excellent food. Similarly, if the proper place and nutriment are not found for them, the seeds of the best plants will turn into the very worst of the bad kinds. Such is the (5) case with these virtuous natures when they grow up in these cities and are badly educated. Hence the causes of the great evils in these cities are none other than these 「individuals」. For the sluggish nature cannot be aroused to perform something great; similarly, the 「mean-」 spirited; while the intemperate is even further from this. From this class of humans (10) originate the sophists who rule over cities, blaming the beautiful things such as wisdom and the rest, and praising the base things and in general all the political evils laid down in cities. Their thought and their rulership over the cities: this indeed is the greatest of the causes for the loss of wisdom and the extinguishing of its light. In investigating such individuals as these, let it not be hidden from you that they constitute the larger portion [of the virtuous natures] in these cities. If, nonetheless, one of these natures in these cities is saved, and you said that it is God who singled him (492–493a) out through His 「eternal」 providence, you would have made (15) a correct statement. As for those given over to philosophy without these qualities having been completed in them, why the case with them is also evident. Not only does one receive no advantage from them in cities, but they are also the most harmful of things for wisdom. That is because for the most part they incline one way—toward the desires and toward base actions in general, like violence and oppression. For (20) they have no virtue in and of themselves that would restrain them from these actions; nor will they speak truly in the tales with which they frighten the citizens 「while bringing about these things」 [sc., violence and the like]. They will be a disgrace to wisdom and a cause of much harm to whichever of them is fit for it, as is the case in this time of ours. If it happens that a true philosopher grows up in these cities, (446d–497) he is in the position of a man who has come among perilous animals. He is not obliged to do harm along with them, but (25) neither is he sure in himself that those animals will not oppose him. Hence he turns to isolation and lives the life of a solitary. The best perfection is missing in him, for that can be attained by him only in this city that we have described in speech.

It has become evident from this statement what the nature of the philosopher is, and because of what we adjudge the name “philosopher” [to someone], and that there is no (65.) way of saving the cities unless | people such as these rule over them. With this the cause why it is difficult for this city to come into being has become evident, and [also] how it happens that this nature [sc., the philosophic

nature] is accidentally harmful. It is now fitting that we return to the manner of educating this particular kind—namely the ruling kind—in this city. There is no way of understanding (5) the correctness in their education and upbringing unless it is known what end this kind of humans strive for in their governance. We hold it to be indispensable that we know this first. [Only] then is it possible for us to speak of the details of that in which they are to be educated. For he who does not know the end necessarily cannot know what leads to it. Although this investigation would be 「more」 appropriate in the first part of this science, I deem it appropriate that I mention some of it here.

(10) We say: Since man is one of the natural beings there necessarily must be some end for the sake of which he exists. For every natural being has an end, as has been explained in physics—all the more so man, who is the most noble of them. Since the city is necessary for man's existence, he can attain this end only inasmuch as he is part of a city. It is evident that this end, inasmuch as it pertains to one (15) being, is necessarily one. [This will be] either [a] in kind—so that it belongs to each and every one of the people, as far as number is concerned, this being what we see of the end, which whether sufficiently or insufficiently, is one in number; or [b] in relationship—i.e., if many perfections are for the sake of one perfection and some of them for the sake of others—for this is one in that the many things by it are [made] one. If man is not of more than one kind, and if the (20) human perfections are manifold in this aspect of existence, and if it were possible that all of them be attained by all people, why it is evident that every one of the people would exist only for his own sake. Accordingly, it would be necessary that there would be only one rank of humans in a city. Perhaps this is impossible. If the attainment of all or most of them [sc., the human perfections] is possible for only some people, while nature limits the others to something different than the fulfillment of the perfections, it is evident that the (25) second kind of humans are lorded over and the first kind lord it. For their relationship to each other is identical with the relationship of those very perfections 「in」 the individual soul—i.e., that some of them are for the sake of others. The things that humans may possibly consider as the end are undoubtedly infinite, but of this we ourselves will only specify what is generally accepted in this time of ours.

We say: [a] [Some] humans 「assert」 that the end of man (30) is nothing more than preserving and protecting their bodies and preserving their senses. Their association is solely a 「necessity-」 association, and their end that they 「aim」 at is a “necessary” end. [b] Others assert that it is not appropriate (66.) for man to be limited in his existence to what is necessary; rather, he has an end that has something better in it than existence at the level of the necessary. This is in accord with what is the case with many of the natural beings. For an animal is given sight for the sake of what is preferable, not on account of necessity—contrary to the case

regarding the sense of touch, for it is impossible for an animal to exist (5) without this sense. The people who hold this opinion concerning the end of man are divided into parts: [1] [some] humans 'hold' that it is wealth; [2] [other] people hold that it is honor; [3] [still] others assert that it is pleasure. Those who hold that it is pleasure are divided into two parts: [a'] [some] humans assert that it is the delight of the senses (they are closer to unexamined opinion); and [b'] others think that it is the delight of the intelligible. [4] Others assert that the end of man is only that he lord it (10) over others and rule them, while acquiring all the goods of pleasure, wealth, honor, and whatever else they assert to be [desirable]. [5] What the Laws existing in this time of ours assert concerning this matter is [that the end of man is doing] what God (may He be exalted!) wills, but that the only 'way' of knowing this matter of what it is God wills of them is prophecy. And this [sc., what God wills], if you reflect on the Laws, is divided into abstract knowledge (15) alone—such as what our Law commands concerning knowledge of God (may He be exalted!)—and action—such as what it forewarns concerning the [moral] qualities. Its intention regarding this purpose [sc., action] is identical with the intention of philosophy in genus and purpose. That is why humans assert that these Laws only follow ancient wisdom. It is evident that, in the opinion of all these, the good, the bad, the useful, the harmful, the beautiful, and the base are something existing by nature, not by convention. For whatever leads to the end is good (20) and beautiful, and whatever hinders one from it is bad and base. This is clear from these Laws and particularly this Law of ours. Many of those of our region hold 'this opinion concerning this Law of ours'.

As for the people of our 'nation' known as Mutakallimūn, their Legal inquiry led them to [the position] that what God wills has no definite nature and merely turns on what the will—i.e., the will of God (may He be exalted!)—lays down for it. According to this, there is nothing beautiful or (25) base other than by fiat. Furthermore, there is no end of man other than by fiat. What brought them to this was their thinking of defending the attributes with which God (may He be exalted!) is described in the Law, to the effect that He is capable of doing whatever He wills, and that it is possible for the [divine] will to extend to all things, including particulars as well. Hence all things are possible. What happened to them happens often in Legal inquiry. That is, (30) God (may He be exalted!) is first described by [certain] attributes. Then one seeks to make what exists agree [with the teaching] without 'upsetting' whatever of those attributes has been laid down. But these [people] are distressed in [trying] to discover the explanation of this question if these things that they consider clearly evident in the Law (67.) are as they believe. As a result this leads them to an opinion close to sophistry, very far from the nature of man, and far from being the content of a Law. These, then, are the opinions of the multitude concerning the end of man, which is his happiness. The

realization of their absurdity is readily grasped. As for the opinions of the philosophers, we shall mention them when we come to investigate that wherein (5) they differ since their controversy is 「only」 over the rational part of the soul. We return to the subject under consideration and investigate the end that is truly the end after accepting what ought to be accepted from the physicist concerning this, for thereby we perceive the proper measure of what can be seen of this through this science.

We say that he who possesses this science joins with the physicist in inquiry concerning this object of search. For (10) physics considers this end in so far as it is a perfection for the body and compares it with the other perfections if there be more than one perfection for it. As for the human perfections, nothing 「of them」 exists by nature save the dispositions alone or the beginnings leading to their [sc., the perfections'] attainment. There is no sure sufficiency in nature that these completions will reach us in their perfection ; rather, they reach [us] only through will and (15) skillfulness. He who possesses this science also considers it from this aspect—i.e., from the aspect that its efficient cause is choice and will. This being so, I say that it has already been made clear in physics that man is composed of soul and body; and that the rank of the body relative to the soul is that of matter, and the rank of the soul relative to it is that of form; and that matter is for the sake of form, and the form is for the sake of the actions or the passions resulting from it [sc., the form]. This being so, man's perfection and end are to be found in the actions that necessarily result (20) from it [sc., the soul]. But it has been explained there that the actions pertaining to man are [of two kinds]: Either [a] they are common to 「him」 and to other natural beings, be they simple or compound ([these] common [actions] necessarily resulting from common forms); or [b] they are specifically his (these necessarily resulting from a specific form or forms). It was explained there that the thing that man has in common with the simple bodies is the faculty of inclination. (25) The inclination resulting from this faculty in this form is not a soul, nor do the actions resulting from it belong to the soul. As for what man has in common with the compound bodies, why it was explained there that it necessarily is a soul. These bodies are of two kinds: plants and animals. The plants have in common with him the nutritive, (30) vegetative, and generative soul. As for the animals, they have in common with him the faculties of sensation and locomotion. As for the appetitive [faculties], they have them in common with him in certain respects and are set apart (68.) from him in other respects. | As for what distinguishes man, it was made evident there that it is necessarily the 「rational」 faculty, and that this has two parts—practical reason and scientific reason. It was also made evident there that the rank of these common forms relative to the specific forms is that of matter relative to form; and that man is what he is only on account of his specific form since this is the way with every being. For it is through its specific form that it is what (5) it is,

and from it result the actions that are specific to it. This having been laid down, the good and bad in a thing exist in only one class of its actions. An example of this is that a melody's good [quality] only comes from striking a chord and its bad [quality] from this very action. [In the same way] the good and bad of a man's action are necessarily to be found only in the action specific 'to him'. This being so, a man's end and happiness [are attained] only if those of his (10) actions that are specific to him are realized by him in the utmost goodness and excellence. That is why it is said in the definition of happiness that it is an activity of the rational soul that is in accord with what is required by virtue. And since the parts of the rational soul—in accord with what has been explained there—are more than one, the virtues are of more than one kind and the 'human' perfections are of more than one perfection. For it has been explained there that it has two parts, practical reason and scientific reason. (15) Some perfections, accordingly, are theoretical and others practical. But since the appetitive part is one of the parts of the soul, it comes about that man is aroused by what inquiry requires of him and is connected with it. In this respect, too, it [sc., the appetitive part] is related to reason. There are, then, three perfections: theoretical virtues, moral virtues, and practical 'arts'. But the practical 'arts' are of two (20) kinds. One kind, in order to realize its actions in matter, needs nothing more than knowledge of the general rules of the art. The [other] kind additionally needs for the existence of its actions cogitation and thought about the general rules with which it is associated. For since this [takes place] with each and every individual affected by the art and according to the time, place, 'and the rest' connected with it, this part of reason necessarily differs from the other part, and its perfection is not [the other's] perfection. The perfections, (25) then, are four: theoretical virtues, practical 'arts', cogitative virtues, and moral virtues. It is already seen from this argument that the human perfections are more than one. But as we have said, if they are perfections of only one being, then of necessity some of them must be for the sake of others ; [and this] regardless of whether their existence is possible in all individual men or it is only possible for some [of these perfections to be found] in some and leaving aside the fact that it is evident that they are not possible in all individual (30) humans. Each [particular] kind of them is only possible in [some particular] class of people, except '—by God!—' for some of the moral virtues, which are common [to all], like moderation. 'Hence' it is obligatory that these classes of people be arranged in accord with the order of these kinds (69.) of moral virtues, | the meaner of them being for the sake of the more excellent, since the character of their order in a particular individual will be the same as their order in many individuals. This conforms with what the necessity of association brings about in human existence: [namely those] who excel in all the virtues. For if there were in every (5) individual the possibility of attaining all these

virtues—each and every one of them necessarily attaining them—each would be serving and served, lord and lorded over. Nature would have done something in vain since they all would have the disposition to be lords. This is impossible since of necessity a lord must have someone there who is lorded over.

If it were possible for these perfections to be combined in one man, this would be considered difficult if not miraculous. The usual situation is that each and every kind of (10) human 'is disposed' toward some particular one of these perfections. This is clear from investigation of individual humans. It has been explained what the human perfections and the virtues of the soul are; and it has been made clear as well that some of them are required for the sake of others, so that there will be a virtue among them for whose sake all these [other] virtues are, while it will not be for the sake of anything else, being rather the thing sought for itself and the rest being sought for it. This is man's ultimate perfection (15) and ultimate happiness. Hence it is fitting that we investigate it.

We say: It appears from the case of the practical arts that they were originally established only because of necessity due to 'the deficiency' that is incidental to man's existence. His existence would not be possible without them, just as the existence of many of the animals would not be possible but for their peculiarities and natural habits, such as the (20) hexagonal cell of the bee and the weaving of the spider. As for the theoretical part, it appears in physics from its character that its existence in man is not because of necessity but rather for the sake of what is preferable. Whatever exists for the sake of what is preferable is more choiceworthy than whatever exists because of necessity. Hence this part of reason—i.e., the practical—exists necessarily for the sake of the theoretical. This conforms with what can be seen of (25) its character. For it is evident that these arts only exist initially for the sake of their products, and their products for the sake of justice. Now by virtue of his acquiring these arts, a man is necessarily lorded over and subject, and 'someone else' is the lord. The lord will be lord by a disposition in him by [virtue of] which he is better than the one being lorded over. This being so, this disposition is nothing other than the part of reason called theoretical. For the manner in which this part of reason lords it over the 'other' (30) part—i.e., the practical—in the particular soul is identical with the manner in which one who is disposed to receive the theoretical sciences lords it [over anyone] whose natural disposition is sufficient for [only] the practical arts. Hence (70.) the likes of these serve 'by nature' and are lorded over 'by nature'. For the relationship of one of these two parts of the soul to the other part is 'necessarily' this relationship—i.e., the relation of the lord to the one being lorded over. It is possible to question this by saying: These practical arts have been laid down, all leading up to one ruling art—namely the art of governing cities. It also has been made (5) clear that the theoretical sciences are necessary for this art's existence. 'This being so, the

theoretical sciences¹ are only preparations with a view to action. Through them [sc., the theoretical sciences] a man benefits others. There is no difference between them [sc., the theoretical sciences] and the other, practical arts other than that [the practical arts] serve them in attaining their [sc., the theoretical sciences'] intention. And they [sc., the practical arts] grant them lordship in that they [sc., the theoretical sciences] prepare them [sc., the practical arts] with a view to their [sc., the theoretical sciences'] purpose. [Thus the theoretical sciences are] in the position of the other ruling arts with respect to (10) the arts that grant them lordship—such as the ruling art of agriculture with respect to the particular agricultural [arts] beneath it. Accordingly, the theoretical sciences and the practical arts belong to one genus and differ only in inferiority and excellence. This is the opinion asserted perhaps by many of the pretenders to philosophy of this time of ours from among those who direct [their] inquiry to those things—[their inquiry] being based on unexamined opinion without their considering them according to the natural order and the study [done by rules of] art.

(15) We say: That concerning which the theoretical sciences speculate, and particularly physics and metaphysics, are not practical things; nor has the will any effect upon their existence. This is self-evident to one who is trained in sciences such as these. This being so, and the subjects of these sciences being such that their being is not up to us, it is clear that they are not disposed toward action [by their] primary disposition and essentially. Through them a man (20) does not—as the primary intention—serve others. Rather their existence in man is with respect to what is preferable, for it would be absurd if their existence in man were null and in vain. This can be seen better from what we are about to say. It has already been made clear in first philosophy that being is of two kinds: sensible and intelligible. Intelligible being is the principle of sensible existence in (25) that it is its end, form, and efficient cause. Its [sc., the sensible's] existence in the intelligibles of the theoretical sciences belongs to the class of intelligible 「existence」. The purpose of man, inasmuch as he is a natural being, is that he ascend to that existence as much as it is in his nature to ascend. This being so, the relation of this 「human」 intelligible existence 「to the other things existing in man, be they soul or body, is the relation of intelligible existence」, simply, (30) to sensible existence. Similarly, in so far as it is acquired by the will, its relation to the other volitional things is the very (71.) same relation. | This being presupposed, its lordship over the volitional things consists in the primacy of intelligible existence over 「sensible」 existence, and in its giving the volitional beings their principles on which their existence depends—this by way of the intelligible existence giving the (5) sensible existence what it depends on. It has already been made clear that this is not by way of the intelligible's serving the sensible; rather it [sc., the sensible] is something that follows on it [sc., the intelligible] and is necessitated by it. This being so, the

theoretical sciences are indeed useful for action and necessary for action in the way in which it is said of intelligible existence that it is necessary for sensible existence. The primacy of this part over the other parts of the city resembles the primacy of intelligible existence over (10) sensible existence. It may be seen from this treatise that the practical arts—be they faculties, or ruling or ministerial arts—exist only because of the theoretical sciences. People have asserted 「an opinion」 concerning the existence of these practical arts that—upon my life!—is just the opposite of what these assert concerning the theoretical sciences. For they say that the intelligibles of these arts are not—according to the primary intention—for the sake of their products, but [rather] that their sole purpose is good and excellent (15) discernment; and that the actions and products resulting from them are something incidental. [This would be of] the order of what appears in the case of the movements of the heavenly bodies. Accordingly, the practical arts are the virtues [simply]. Even more is this thought of those practical arts that make use of reasoning. As for these positive qualities resulting from these arts, it is thought by those who (20) 「concentrate」 on a single art that that art encompasses knowledge of all things, as 「we see」 the physicians 「thinking」 of their art. But the truth is that the intelligibles of these 「arts」 were established at first only with a view to activity; if one perceives anything by them, it is by accident. If, therefore, the perceiving is put down as the end of the art, it [sc., the art] would belong to another genus. The term [“art”] applied to them would be said homonymously, just as happens to the term “music,” which is defined sometimes as the practical art and sometimes as the theoretical one.

(25) As for the cogitative virtues, it is evident from their case too that they are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles. For the existence of these virtues is mostly—「or」 the existence of the noblest of them [is universally]—for the sake of the arts; and the arts, as has been explained in this treatise, are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles. For it is evident that these cogitative virtues are divided as the arts (30) are divided. Just as there is an art 「unqualifiedly」 ruling over all the arts—namely the art of governing cities—so is there a ruling cogitative faculty—namely the faculty by which the actions of this [ruling] art are materialized. |

(72.) As for the moral virtues, it appears from their case too that they are for the sake of the theoretical intelligibles. And this is for several reasons: One of them, as has already been made clear in physics, is that appetite and desire are of two kinds: one stems from the imagination, and the other stems from cogitation and thought. The appetite that stems from the imagination is of necessity not specific to man, (5) being rather connected with the animal as animal. As for the appetite that stems from cogitation and thought, why it is specific to man; and the existence of appetite of this character is connected with man. The moral virtues are nothing other than that this part of us is aroused toward that which cogitation judges ought to come

into being, to (10) the extent that it judges and at the time that it judges. It is evident that this activity belongs to nothing other than the theoretical part of the soul. This being so, it is 「only」 this part that acquires virtue from the cogitative part. The cogitative part, then, is more truly elevated; it is 「more」 noble and more choiceworthy. Also many of the animals have a share in this [moral] part—such as the modesty to be found in the lion—but it is human only by virtue of thought (15) and cogitation, and whatever is the cause of something's being of a certain character possesses that character to a higher degree. It can also be seen now from the case of these virtues that through them a man serves others. For example, justice exists only because of [reciprocal] dealings, moderation because of pleasures that hinder noble actions, courage because of harmful things, and liberality because of wealth. But as for theoretical science, why it is 「clear」 from its (20) character that a man is not disposed toward it that he might serve others. Moreover, these virtues are more apt to be hylic than the theoretical sciences and more apt to be in need of the body for their continued existence—and not only of the body, but also of instruments and external things. Thus liberality has need of wealth so that, by means of it, it might perform acts of liberality; similarly the just performs acts of justice through them [sc., instruments]; (25) and the courageous has need of strength and help. But as for the theoretical sciences, they are of all things the strongest, the most free of matter, to the point that they are thought to be in a manner everlasting. It has already been made clear elsewhere that the more strongly separated something is from hyle, the more noble it is. But this kind 「of perfection—i.e.」, the moral, is laid down [in relation to] (30) theoretical perfection as a preparatory rank, without which the attainment of the end is impossible. Hence this perfection is thought to be the ultimate end because of its proximity to the ultimate end. It appears from this, then, that the human perfections are of four classes and that they are all for the sake of theoretical perfection. |

(73.) As to whether the moral virtues are for the sake of the practical arts or vice versa, or whether both cases exist together—i.e., that some arts are for the sake of the virtues and some virtues for the sake of the arts—why there is room in this for 「penetrating」 investigation. But it is clear that the ruling moral virtue of all these virtues must necessarily (5) be joined to the ruling cogitative faculty. If the ruling virtue's relation to the ruling cogitative faculty is as the relation of the cogitative faculty to the ruling art, why then it necessarily is for the sake of the ruling art. Just so is the case with those arts to which no kind of this virtue belongs. (10) For in accord with this relation, it—i.e., the practical arts—is only laid down as a preparatory rank. 「Though」 their [sc., the moral virtues'] acquisition is necessary for it [sc., the art], it is only so that the activity of the art may be more perfect and more praiseworthy. This is self-evident. But however the case may be here, both of them together are for the sake of the theoretical part. What we have

said concerning the analogies between these human perfections (15) is an agreed-upon thing among the Peripatetics. But as this theoretical part does not exist in us from the outset in its ultimate perfection and in actuality, its existence in us is only potential. It has been made clear in physics that everything that has potentiality in its existence or has potentiality mixed in its existence [can attain] its ultimate perfection only when it exists as complete actuality with no potentiality at all mixed with it. It is for us to bring into being and to perfect the perfection and actuality that are of this character (20) —i.e., it comes to pass through choice and will since there is no sufficiency in nature to bring it about. What then is this perfection that it is incumbent upon us to pursue and which is the end that we would realize in ourselves ? Is it the theoretical sciences, or another rank and another creation more noble than the theoretical sciences? If it is other than the theoretical sciences, is it something found in us or something that 「in its substance is outside ourselves?」

(25) We say: As for him who assumes that the theoretical sciences are everlasting and that they exist in us in actuality and that the humors have only submerged them since youth, why in this manner they are as if they stood still in potential existence. Either they are separate forms, as Plato assumes, or it is the Active Intellect or an intellect other than that and beneath it in rank. It is evident that [if this is assumed] human perfection is not itself acquired through the will (30) since it exists in its essence prior to the will. [Yet] will is connected with its definition inasmuch as it 「has a connection」 with the definition of the ultimate perfections. In this respect it is taken as a 「premise」 for the definition of the (74.) end. | If it be said that this is only something acquired by us by will—i.e., when we acquire of the other ultimate perfections whatever is in our nature to acquire—that perfection [nonetheless] would [still] reach us through that relationship by [virtue of] whose connection to us we are what we are. For it is known that if this acquisition is related to the will, it is only related in ways other than the (5) former ways since will is not connected with that by which we realize ourselves. Rather, will is connected with the existence of the relationship 「by which」 the Active Intellect achieves our perfection. As for him who asserts that the theoretical sciences are not everlasting but that they ate the ultimate perfection, why human perfection according to him would be what the will itself acquires. As for him who holds that 「the theoretical」 sciences are not everlasting and that the ultimate perfection is having a conception of (10) the separate intelligences, why it is evident that perfection according to him [would consist of] two kinds: a first and a final [perfection]. The first is what he himself acquires ; the second is what he acquires through conjunction [with the Active Intellect]. This needs to be investigated in [the study of the soul in] physics. We return to what we were about and 「go into each point」 of what Plato said about the way of educating this class of people.

We say that Plato compares the relation of this kind of (15) people, as regards their knowledge, to the rest of the multitude. (514) He says that the multitude resemble humans who have lived in a cave since childhood, never having left it. They turn to look carefully at what is in the cave without turning their faces to the mouth of the cave. At the cave's mouth there are images of the other kinds of beings, and at their backs 「a fire」, so that they see nothing of those images other than their shadow on the hollow of the cave. (515) (20) This being their situation, these grasp nothing of the knowledge of things other than the shadow of 「an image of」 beings falling on the hollow of that cave. They think that true beings are nothing more than those 「shadows」. As for the wise, why they are those who go out to the cave's mouth, into the sparkling light, and see things as they truly are in the sunlight. Just as a man who suddenly goes forth from a cave into the sunlight finds that his eyes are grown dim (156ab) (25) and that it is impossible for him to look at something, so is it impossible for this class of humans—i.e., those who are disposed to knowledge—that we rush them to inquiry in the sciences since they find it hard to abstract the intelligible and to look at it. The cunning device adopted with them is to lead them upward gradually step by step so as to look at things, first by means of the light of the stars and the moon, to the point that they are able to look at them in the presence of the sun. Just so ought the latter to be led upward gradually step by step, and we direct them [at first] to what (75.) is easiest for them to learn. | When he investigated which (521d–522c) science it is that they 「ought to」 begin [their] study with, it became clear to him that it was arithmetic. This is because from the outset they, with the guardians' children, had been growing up on music and gymnastic. Now it is clear that the intention in gymnastic is toward the body. But as for music, why the statements by which they transmitted this (5) to them are stories, and a story does not grant this faculty—i.e., that by which a man can take in the intelligibles of the theoretical sciences. This being so, this science ought necessarily to be of the class of the theoretical sciences and be the 「easiest」 of the mathematical studies. Of this description are the four mathematical sciences—arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music—except that it [sc., arithmetic] excels (10) in this respect—i.e., ease of study—owing to 「its greater」 freedom from matter. Arithmetic is then the easiest of them and that most 「common」 to all things. It is then followed by geometry, then astronomy, then music. It is clear from the character of these sciences that the initial need of the wise for mathematical sciences is mainly 「training」, for most of their intelligibles [sc., of the mathematical sciences] do not exist as nature intends [natural beings to exist]. Hence there (15) is to be found among them that which has no end. In general, their intelligibles are defective intelligibles since they are not conceived of in their particular objects but in what imitates them. Hence Plato divides the intelligibles

「of」 things into two parts. One of them he calls 「direct」 ; (533b–533d) these are the intelligibles of things that truly are. And the second [he calls thought]; these are the intelligibles of the appearances of existing things—and they are the mathematical sciences. For he asserts that the case with the intelligibles (20) is like the case with the sensibles. Just as with the sensibles 「there are」 sensibles that are perceived through their essences and sensibles that are perceived through their appearances (just as what is perceived of many of the sensibles is their 「reflection」 in a mirror), so is the case with the intelligibles. Since, as we have said, the insights of the mathematical sciences are infinite and their subjects also of an unknown [manner of] being, only he who possesses (25) First Philosophy investigates them. Plato asserts of them that they are not of the rank of the other theoretical sciences as regards human perfection. Hence he says of them that they are sciences whose beginnings are unknown and whose ends are unknown; and [only] what is between the beginnings and the ends is known. This being so, the mathematical sciences are not intended initially and essentially for human perfection, as is the case with physics and (30) metaphysics. Although they differ in this respect—and particularly in what these two sciences take from them [sc., the mathematical sciences] by way of principles for the investigation of the end (as when 「the」 divine science [sc., metaphysics] accepts the number of movements from astronomy)—this difference is not only with respect to their kinds, but also exists with respect to the parts of the particular (76.) science. | It is evident that the greater part of the advantage in them and of what is intended in them at the outset is only the training and preparation of the intellect for the study of those two ultimate sciences. We ourselves are unable to say that what is intended in these sciences—i.e., the mathematical sciences—is 「only」 action. [And this] notwithstanding that some of their students do 「somewhat」 (5) [engage in action]—as many of the multitude think concerning geometry and harmonics. For the things into which they inquire are common to natural matters and artificial matters. For example, when it is found that an equilateral triangle must necessarily have its three sides come out of the two centers of two equal circles and its two sides resting on the base meet at the point where the two circles intersect, (10) it is nothing peculiar to a triangle existing in wood or copper or in artificial things generally. It comprises [both] natural and artificial things. Furthermore, the individual objects presupposed by these sciences are to be found only in matter. If the inquiry of these sciences were into that in which they [sc., geometrical figures] exist, it would investigate their four causes—i.e., the matter, the form, the efficient cause, and the end. But it is evident from their case that they (15) investigate the formal cause alone. Hence, they [sc., mathematicians] need individual objects which are included in these sciences; while engaged in their work, [they need] knowledge supplementary to what is known by them from these [sc., mathematical sciences]. If someone wishes to construct an equilateral triangle

out of wood, it is not enough 「for him」 [to know] what Euclid said in the beginning of his book on the construction of the equilateral triangle, without joining to this the craft of carpentry. This (20) is entirely self-evident to one trained in these sciences. All this being as we have characterized it, the object in teaching this kind of humans the mathematical sciences is initially and essentially for the sake of training ; though there also is joined to this, as Plato says, knowledge of the necessary practices with which they practice them. Inasmuch as they (526*d*, 527*d*) are guardians, they 「also」 have need of the knowledge of (25) number and measurements for the array of people in battles, proper 「maneuvers」 , and the measurements for pitching camps. Similarly, knowledge of the seasons and months is also necessary, not only for navigators and those travelling in deserts, but also for generals. Practical music is necessary for them in that they are the ones who institute it in the city. This, then, is what Plato mentions that they begin by (30) studying. He asserts this thought only because the art of logic was nonexistent in his time. But as it 「now」 exists, it is proper that they begin their study with the art of logic; (77.) after that | going on 「to arithmetic, then」 to geometry, then to astronomy, then to music, then to optics, then to mechanics, then to physics, then to metaphysics. However, the ancients were divided over whether it was obligatory to (5) begin with the art of logic or with the art of mathematics. Some asserted that logic was instituted only so as to strengthen the intellect and preserve it from error—the necessity for this arising out of the profound sciences, like physics and metaphysics. As for the mathematical sciences, there is no need in them for logic owing to their easiness and their little entanglement with matter. Even if this were as they say and logic were not necessary for the learning of the (10) mathematical sciences, their learning—if it came after knowledge of it [sc., logic]—would undoubtedly be better. And since we seek only the best in the study [to be done by] this kind of humans, it is fitting that they begin with the art of logic.

As for the *nomos* that it behooves them to accept during [this period of] study, why Plato—as was said before— (537) asserts of these that they are to be brought up on music. When they reach sixteen or seventeen—and this is also after they have rejected those dispositions [the rejection of which] we have made a condition for them—they train in horsemanship (15) until they reach twenty. On reaching this, they go on to the learning of philosophy, according to this [aforementioned] order. Plato does not assert that they begin the study of science prior to those years because their thought is not yet settled nor have they perfected their 「cogitation」 . Also, once the [contribution of] imitation to those stories on (539*bc*) which they grew up has been made clear to them, they cannot be relied on not to ridicule them and proceed to refute them before the multitude and to shatter them 「with」 (20) objections. This is because their position, as Plato says, in relation to the stories and speeches on which they were (538*a*–538*c*) raised is the position of one who grows

up with whom he takes to be his father and mother, coming to know when he has grown strong and bestirred himself that he is a foundling to the two of them and that his father and mother are others. Do 「you」 not see that that earlier esteem of them would pass away from his soul to the point that it sometimes would lead him to mock them both? Similar is the case with this (25) kind of humans if they lay their hands on the sciences prior to that age. This is because, in their zeal and 「sharpness」, they will tear at the stories 「with argument」 just as a puppy tears at the garment of whoever is close by. You will make this clear [to yourself] for this happens frequently to the pretenders to philosophy of these cities. This is the most (78.) harmful of things in regard to them. | Thereafter they do not cease reading science until they reach 「thirty」 and have completed all its parts. When they reach thirty-five, they are charged with the governance of the army; this is for (540ab) about fifteen years. When they are fifty years old they are then fit for rulership in this city and to rule over it. When they are too weak to do this on account of age, they return— (5) as Plato says—to the Isles of the Blessed. 「By the “Isles of the Blessed” he means, according to what I think」, the inquiry concerning the form [idea] of the good in whose existence he believed. If there is someone who believes that there is a good for man that exists for itself, he will believe that the exercise of the other virtues hinders him from speculation on this. That is why, according to what I think, Plato asserts that at the end of their lives they isolate [themselves] for speculation 「upon」 that good.

(10) He said: It is fitting for the citizens in general to mark off certain days for them on which they recall their [sc., the (540b–540e) rulers'] virtues; they bring offerings on [those days], offer sacrifices, and in general wax in praise of them in the manner that country folk do this. (The same is the case with the upbringing of women who are disposed by nature to lordship. We 「ourselves」 have already said that the woman shares in common with the man all the work of the (15) citizens.) Plato asserts that their governance of the city is fitting and proper if from them 「this」 city is provided with more than one man [to serve in their stead].

When he finished this he resumed mentioning the manner by which to realize the possibility of the existence of this city in the best possible way. He had already said in what preceded that the emergence of this city is possible 「only if it happens」 that someone of this description among the wise is the son of a king or that rulership 「over these」 cities is fitting for him in other respects, such as excellence, numerous (20) relatives, honor, strength, and the rest. If this happens, then the manner of the emergence of this city is this: He (541a) [sc., the qualified ruler] attends to those in his city who are more than ten years old or thereabouts; they expel them and send them to the villages; they take their children and bring them up in those disciplines and qualities that we have described. In this way the

emergence of this city will (25) be quickest, easiest, and best. You ought 「to know」 that this manner mentioned by Plato is the best for its emergence.

Its emergence is possible in a manner other than this, but [only] over a long time. This is when virtuous kings come to [rule] these cities in a succession—one after another and for a long time—not ceasing to incline these cities gradually until the situation in them, by the end of time, comes to be (79.) the good governance. | Their [sc., these cities'] inclining will be of two kinds at once—i.e., in their actions and their deeds, and [in] their beliefs. This will be more or 「less」 easy, depending on the nomoi existing at any given time and on their [sc., the nomoi's] proximity to or distance from this city. In general, in this time their inclining to virtuous (5) deeds is more likely than their inclining to good beliefs. You can prove this from these cities. In general, one who has mastered the [several] parts of science and [understood] the manner of creating inclinations in them [sc., the cities] will have no difficulty in asserting that they are no better than the beliefs. The cities that are virtuous in deeds alone are those called aristocratic. It has been recounted that this city—i.e., the aristocratic—existed among the ancient Persians. These, then, are all the things Plato asserts concerning (10) the emergence of the virtuous city, its order, and the laying down of its nomoi. We have explained this with the utmost brevity possible for us. What yet remains for him of this part [of political science] is only what he says concerning the other unmixed, erring cities, how they may be recognized, how this city may turn into them, and how they turn into one another. As for the statement concerning the manner in which these cities emerge, and setting up an order for them whereby they may easily and in the best way attain the utmost folly, which they leave for an inheritance: (15) why it seems that knowledge of this is not necessary for one who possesses this science, just as it suffices for the physician to know enough about 「poisons」 so as to recognize their natures and know that it is proper to guard against them, without troubling to learn the manner in which they are made and compounded. So is it here with the philosopher as regards these other cities—i.e., the erring cities. It suffices him to recognize them and to know the evils that are (20) brought from them into the virtuous city. Hence what Plato intended with this was to make known the manner in which the virtuous city turns into them and they turn into one another, and the comparison and contrast between them, as well as what befalls them. We will cut off 「this」 treatise here and begin the third treatise of this part [of political science].

60.26 See 25. 14-33, above.

61.8-16 Farabi, *Attainment*, 41.17-43.19 (*MPP*, pp. 78 f.); *Virtuous City*, 59.11-13 (Dieterici tr., p. 94). Where Averroes has “Lawgiver,” he who lays down the Law, Farabi has “legislator,” he who lays down the nomoi.

61.17 penetrating investigation] Averroes' disinclination to commit himself here on this point suggests that one ought not simply to assume as necessarily divinely revealed that *sharī'a* brought by the Lawgiver mentioned a few lines above.

61.22 Compare the following account with Farabi's enumeration in *Attainment*, 44.15-45.9 (*MPP*, p. 80); and *Virtuous City*, 59.14-60.11 (Dieterici tr., pp. 94-96).

62.16 eloquent] Averroes has made this a leading theme in his *Decisive Treatise*. Plato's several enumerations of the qualities necessary in a philosopher or guardian or tyrant make no mention of eloquence. (Compare *Republic* 485a-487a, as well as 374e-376c, and *Laws* 709e-710c.) But this does appear in Farabi's enumeration in *Virtuous City*, 59.21, 59.5-6 (Dieterici tr., pp. 95, 94). See also Farabi, *Attainment*, 44.6-13 (*MPP*, pp. 79 f.); and Maimonides, *Guide*, I 34 (41a) (Pines tr., p. 78). The importance of rhetoric in the political science of the *falāsifa* is discussed briefly by Leo Strauss in "Quelques remarques sur la science politique de Maimonide et de Fârâbî," *Revue des Études Juives*, 100 (1936):37, additional note to p. 26, n. 3.

62.29-63.1 See 57.29 ("general nomos"), 47.27-28, and 26.16 ("human Laws"), above. Consider Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 5. 7. 1134b18-1135a5. Farabi concludes his summary of Book VII of Plato's *Laws* with these words: "Then he set out, after that, to explain that Traditions are of two classes: a class that pertains to the Law of each one of the legislators according to their need in their times and the states of their cities; and [the second] Traditions that do not change and do not alter, and they are natural. He spoke profusely in this connection, and introduced for that examples relating to kindred, ingratitude for favors, and the like" (*Plato's Laws*, 36.15-18). The general common nomos is something like a natural standard, a set of rules common to all times and places, without which any kind of lasting human association would be impossible. It does not aim high. Under certain special circumstances, under the guidance of qualified leaders, it is possible for men to go beyond this. They will then come close to the human Laws. The latter, however, can only be approximated and never made universal; they are the laws by which philosophers govern themselves. See Pines, pp. 70 f.; the lengthy analysis in Leo Strauss, *Persecution and the Art of Writing* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1952), pp. 95-141; and *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, s.v. "Natural Law."

63. 19-24 See also Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 22.21-23.1 (*MPP*, p. 182).

64.7-8 mean-spirited] Literally: the small-souled.

64.16-22 On philosophizing by those who are not ready for it, see Ibn Tufayl, *Ḥayy*, p. 1 55 (*MPP*, p. 161); and Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 5.19-22, 17.15-20, 18.7-10 (*MPP*, pp. 168, 178). Much of Farabi's discussion of the "weeds" in virtuous cities is apposite here (*Political Regime*, 104.7-107.19 [*MPP*, pp. 53-56]).

64.23-26 Avempace, *Governance*, 11.9-14, 78.6-12 (*MPP*, pp. 128, 132); Ibn Tufayl, *Ḥayy*, pp. 153 f. (*MPP*, pp. 1 60 f.); Maimonides, *Guide*, II 36 (79b) (Pines tr., p. 372).

64.28 In the ensuing discussion (64.28-74. 1), Averroes moves away from an exposition that relies in any obvious way on Plato's text. The corresponding passage in the *Republic* is 497b–511e, where among other things the discussion is of the ideas and the divided line.

65.13-14 Medigo (apparently reading *medīnī* rather than *ha-medīnah*) translates: But because man, from the necessity of his being, is political, that end comes to him inasmuch as he is part of a city.

65.23-26 Farabi, *Political Regime*, 74.3-75.3, 78.1-79.9, 83.11-84.9 (*MPP*, pp. 35 f., 39).

65.29-31 For the necessity-association or the indispensable association, see Farabi, *Political Regime*, 88.4-13 (*MPP*, pp. 42 f.); and *Virtuous City*, 62.4-6 (Dieterici tr., p. 98).

66.15 commands] MS A adds: us.

66.21 The reference is to the Mu'tazilites, who hold that the Law prescribes what is according to nature or reason.

66.22 our nation] MS A: our faith.

66.23 Legal inquiry] I.e., theorizing from the standpoint of the Law. See Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 1.7 (*MPP*, p. 165).

66.28 particulars as well] Other MSS: It extends only to particulars.

67.1 Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*, 23.19-24.13, 25.18-19 (*MPP*, pp. 183 f., 185); Maimonides, *Guide*, 171 (95ab, 97b), 73, tenth premise (112b-114b) (Pines tr., pp. 178 f., 182, 206-209). See 30.26-29, above.

67.4 The opinions of the philosophers are here distinguished from all of the foregoing—i.e., not only from the views of the dialectical theologians, but from all of the opinions catalogued since 65.29. From this standpoint, all of the foregoing opinions are “generally accepted,” *endoxa*, “opinions of the multitude.”

67.8 For the themes of the following excursus (continuing to 74.12), see Aristotle *Physics* 2. 1-2. 192b–194b, 8. 198b–1 99a, 3. 1. 200b-201b ; *De Anima* 2. 1-4. 412a-415b, 3. 5. 430a, 9-11. 432a-434a; *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 1. 1094a, 7. 1097a–1098a, 13. 1102a-1103a, 3. 2. 1111b-1112a, 6. 1-2. 1139ab, 10. 6-7. 1176a-1178a. “Physics,” as used here, refers broadly to natural science.

68.18 three perfections] See 22.9-11, above.

68.27 See 65.23-26, above.

70.23 Aristotle *Metaphysics* 7. 10. 1036a2-12, 8. 6. 1045a33-36.

70.29 I.e., in that it is its end, form, and efficient cause.

71.5-6 In a way the higher may serve the lower, but in fact it is not service. The sensible is posterior to the intelligible.

71.9 over sensible existence] MS A adds: or over existence simply.

71.17-18 See 68. 19-21, above, for the two kinds of practical arts.

71.25 The theme of this brief paragraph is developed at length in Farabi, *Attainment*, 20.3-29.7 (*MPP*, pp. 64-69).

72.13-14 The example of the lion is given by Avempace, *Governance*, 55.14 (Asin tr., p. 93).

72.21 hylic] I.e., material or grounded in matter.

72.24 Liberality thus needs wealth in two respects—as something to be overcome (72.18-19), and as an indispensable means.

73.5-7 See 70.3-4 and 71.30-32, above.

73.25-31 Farabi, *Political Regime*, 71.10-72.14, 79.9-11 (*MPP*, pp. 33 f., 36). See also Averroes' summary of Aristotle's *De Anima* (*Talkhīs kitāb al-naḥs*, ed. Aḥmad Fu'ād al-Ahwānī [Cairo, 1950], 66.9-10, 72.13-73.7).

74.11 Aristotle *Physics* 7. 3. 247b1 ff.

74.16-18 Missing here are the references in Plato 514a-515b to prison, prisoners, and chains.

74.23 cave's mouth] Other MSS: go out from that cave.

74.24 Plato 515c-516a speaks of the released prisoners being compelled to stand up and face the mouth of the cave and, despite their protests, being forcibly dragged into sunlight. Avempace too uses this simile in an excerpt preserved in Shemtob Falqēra, *Moreh ha-moreh* (Press burg, 1837; reprint ed., Jerusalem, 5721/1961), 132.12-23 (commentary to Maimonides, *Guide*, III 51) and discussed in Leo Strauss, *Philosophie und Gesetz* (Berlin: Schocken Verlag, 1935), p. 116. Lawrence V. Berman, "Ibn Bājjah and Maimonides" (Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 1959), p.5, n.4, corrects the scribal error by which authorship was attributed to Farabi.

75.1 In the ensuing discussion (75.1-77.13), Averroes again moves away from Plato's text. At a few points he alights, so to speak, on the *Republic*, omitting 516c-521b (what it behooves the philosopher to do in the Platonic city as contrasted with "these cities") and 531d-537a (dialectic).

75.7 this science] I.e., the introductory science by which the cave dwellers are gradually led to see in the light of day.

75.14 as nature intends] Farabi, *Attainment*, 10.2-5 (Mahdi tr., p. 19)

75.18 thought] MSS: knowledge. The reference is to Plato's *dianoia*.

76.5 common] I.e., in the sense of being in a border zone.

76.25 maneuvers] Literally: permutations.

77.1-3 Compare 75.9, 11-12, above.

78.1 thirty] Following Plato 539a and two MSS; other MSS: thirtyfive.

78.2 According to Plato 53ge the guardians have to be forced to go down again into the cave and compelled to take charge in the affairs of war.

78.15 one man] or: one individual.

78.22 they] The shift in this sentence from the singular to the plural subject corresponds to what is left open in Plato 540d : when the true philosophers, either one or more, come to power in a city. . . .

79.1-8 In a parallel passage in his paraphrase of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Averroes divides excellent dominion into (a) kingship, wherein both opinions and actions accord with what the theoretical sciences prescribe; and (b) the rule of the good, wherein only actions are virtuous. "This [latter governance] is known as the *imāmiyya*; it is said to have existed among the early Persians, according to Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī]'s account" (Averroes, *Rhetoric*, 137.7-138.4) (Mahdi). See also Avempace, *Governance*, 11.4-5 (*MPP*, p. 128). The sharp distinction between beliefs and deeds drawn here by Averroes further emphasizes the contrast between the virtuous city and "these cities." "In this time" virtuous deeds are easier to come by than virtuous beliefs.

79.7, 8 aristocratic] *ha-mekaheneth* = *imāmiyya* (Mahdi).

79.11, 26 unmixed] MSS: simple.

79.11, 18 erring cities] These cities are characterized as erring or mistaken by Glaucon in 544a. "Erring cities" is also a technical term as used by Farabi in *Political Regime*, 87.5, 104.3-6 (*MPP*, pp. 41 f., 53). In Farabi's usage (followed by Averroes), the nonvirtuous cities to be discussed in the third treatise are all "ignorant cities." See 52.22-23 and note to 45.11, above.

The Third Treatise

Having completed the discussion in this part of this kind [of governance], namely the discussion of the governance of (25) the virtuous cities, he turned to what remained for him of this science, namely the discussion of nonvirtuous governances. He makes known only their unmixed kinds, and how some turn into others, and the resemblance between them and the virtuous governance and between one another. He makes known which governance is most opposite 「to the (80.) virtuous governance; and makes known | which may be set down as being between these two governances—i.e., the virtuous [and that] which is most opposite」 to it—being of the rank of intermediaries between the extremes; and how these intermediaries are arranged with respect to the extremes, as is the case with the other opposites that have more than one intermediary between them and still are distinct. (5) An example of this is the color white. Black is its opposite. Between the one and the other there are intermediaries; these, however, are arranged—i.e., some are 「closer」 to white and some are closer to black. It is evident that if this is also the case with governance, the transformation of the two extremes that are as opposite to each other as can be will consist in their first turning into the intermediaries, and at that also according to the arrangement of the intermediaries. That is, they first turn into the closest of (10) the intermediaries, then into that which follows it, later into the one that follows it, 「untill」 it turns into the extreme that is most opposite [to it]. We shall explain this when we reach Plato's words concerning this. Similarly we shall compare the people who rule over each and every one of these governances, in respect of themselves and of the pleasures accruing to them from each and every governance and 「each and every guidance」.

(15) This, then, is the sum of the necessary statements that this part of Plato's statements comprehends. We ourselves shall explain each and every thing that he says in it.

We say that Plato asserts that the unmixed governances under which cities come into being are, in general, of five kinds. The first kind is the virtuous governance, the discussion of which has preceded. The second is the primacy of honor. The third is the primacy of the few, namely (20) rulership based on wealth; this is also

known as the primacy of the vile. The fourth is the primacy of the assembly of the 「multitude」. The fifth is the primacy of the tyrant. If you divide the virtuous primacy into the primacy of the king and the primacy of the good, then the primacies are six [in number]. If someone takes charge of this governance in whom five conditions are combined—namely wisdom, perfect understanding, good persuasion, good imagination, and (25) capability for war with no bodily impediment to his practicing martial acts—why he is the king simply and his governance is the truly royal governance. But if 「these」 qualities are only to be found separately in a group—so that one contributes to the end [of the city] through his wisdom, and the second [contributes] what leads to the end through his understanding, and the third has good persuasion in speech, and the fourth has good imagination, and (30) the fifth has capability for war—and they together help bring about and preserve this governance, why these are called select rulers and their rule is called the elevated and (81.) choice rule. | It also may happen that the ruler of this city is one who has not attained this rank—i.e., the rank of king—but is expert in the nomoi that the first one [sc., the founder] legislated and has good [powers of] conjecture by which to extrapolate from them what the first one did not make clear for each and every decree and for each and every judgment. Of this class of knowledge is that knowledge (5) called by us the art of jurisprudence. Besides this he is to have a capability for war. This one is called a king [who rules] according to the laws. It may happen that these two are not found in a single individual, the warrior being other than the judge. The two of them must [then] necessarily share in lordship, as was the case with many of the Muslim kings. We hold that there is here yet 「another」 kind of governance. That is the governance of the pleasure-seeker; (10) that is the governance the end of whose citizens is pleasure alone. If you join to this governance the necessity-governance, then the kinds of governance are eight. As for the virtuous governance, the discussion of it has been completed.

As for the timocratic governance and the timocratic cities, they are the cities that help their citizens to draw near to (15) honor and to attain it. Honor, in truth, is only between man and man, when he thinks there is some perfection in the other and subordinates his soul to him. There is here yet another kind of honor performed without subordinating the soul of the honorer to the honored. But here the honor is balanced with another honor or money or advantage. This honor consists only in equality, or else they are strict and particular about equality as much as is possible—i.e., the honor of the market-place.

As for the first kind of honor, it does not consist in (20) providing an abundance of things for which honor is obligatory. This kind of honor is that which is more fitting for timocratic cities to aim at. Hence ranks are arranged in them so that they resemble the virtuous city in this respect. The difference between the two of them is that the honors in the virtuous city are only something incidental to the virtues and

the fitting things that are truly fitting things, not that the honor is intended for itself; rather it is a shadow (25) associated with the virtue. As for the timocratic cities, why in them honor is intended for itself. It also is arranged by them in accord with what is suitable—according to what unexamined opinion holds to be suitable. These are among the fitting things according to them : wealth, pedigree, whatever brings about the causes of pleasure, dice-playing, and attaining most of the necessities; [also] since a man is able, through his wealth, to supply himself with all his needs, that (30) he be useful to others with respect to these things. It seems that the things that ought to be most deserving of honor are the love of violence and domination and that a man forever be lord, not be lorded over, and be served, not serve. For (82.) these are already thought to be the primary virtue necessarily leading to honor. And these are recognized among humans as the great-souled, and especially when there is joined to these the capability 「for」 victory and, in general, for doing harm and for helping. The capability consists of the improvement of the faculties of body and soul and of (5) the external means. Individuals of this description are those who are lords in cities such as these. Their rank in honor accords with their rank in these fitting things. Whoever is not enabled by the honor from them to be a total lord, has a partial lordship—lording it over in one respect and being lorded over in another. Hence it is told of al-Manṣūr Ibn Abī ‘Āmir that he used to go out to assemblages and (10) weddings and used to say: “Let whoever holds himself to be prince of the faithful command me 「to humble myself」 before them. By my soul! I shall be honored by them, for he does not honor the soul who does not humble and abase it.” In this governance they take precious garments for kings, such as cloaks of byssus and purple, and seat [them] upon golden thrones. For all these, according to unexamined opinion, are [signs of] perfections and knowledge. The most fitting of these for lordship is he through whom all these desired things are assembled together and who is able to (15) allot them equitably among them and to preserve them. This is the justice that exists in this city. It seems that this city is the 「choicest」 of the nonvirtuous cities. This is because it aims at the virtues that are virtues according to unexamined opinion and [at what], according to unexamined opinion, are beautiful actions. Hence the likes of these seek out actions by which a good memory may be left of them so that they might be honored in their life and in their death. This kind of association is the timocratic association. It is (20) rarely found in a simple nation; hence the existence of such a city as this is difficult. But you yourself know that this kind of governance 「was」 of frequently found among us.

As for the governance of the vile, they are rulers whose citizens care for wealth, riches, and the acquisition of this in excess of need, not for the sake of 「receiving」 through avarice anything for themselves other than them [sc., wealth (25) and riches]. Property is of two kinds: property by nature, and property by convention.

Natural property is what is sought to supply the lack that befalls a man when he exists without it. These are food, clothing, places wherein a man may dwell or make room for himself by owning them, tools that serve for these things, and materials out of which these things [are made]. As for the property that is by convention, (83.) that is dinars and dirhams and what stands in their place. These do not supply a natural lack in man and hence will not be [found] in all cities. It is "only" the need for the "provision of" a medium [of exchange] that leads to them in all activities in cities. Hence dinars and dirhams are an appropriate sign for any money whatever if it happens to be (5) supplied by one who knows the conventional [equivalents]. "It is a sign" of the proper [purchasing] power and the initial appraisal of all things and a measure for them. This is why it is thought to be identical with wealth and the most fitting of things to be accumulated and acquired. That is because it is potentially all things valuable, besides being easily transferable. The ruler of these [people] is the wealthiest and most powerful among them. If, joined to this, he has the capability of governing them well in that he acquires wealth for them and preserves it for them always, (10) why then he is suitable for being the lord over this city. Wealth is obtained first from all the necessary things, such as agriculture, grazing, and hunting; later on, from trading, hiring, and the rest. This is the association based on wealth and the purpose that this association has in view. This lordship is known as the lordship of the few because in their (15) seeking to acquire "property" it necessarily follows that they will be few and that the majority in this city be the poor, as will appear later on.

As for the democratic association, it is the association in which everyone in it is unrestrained. He does what his heart desires and moves toward whichever of the pleasing things his soul leads him. Hence there will emerge in this city the totality of things that exist separately in those [other] cities. (20) So there will be among them people who are lovers of honor, and humans who love the possession of property, and humans who love tyranny. Nor is it farfetched that there be among them one who has the virtues and is moved by them. Hence all the arts and "dispositions" emerge in this city, and it is so disposed that from it may emerge the virtuous city and every one of the other cities. It seems that there is no lordship here other than by the will of those who accept (25) being lorded over on account of the primary laws. For it is also thought concerning this city that it is not fitting that all things be permitted every man in it, for thereby it would come to their killing and "robbing" one another, since this too is one of the desires fixed in the nature of many humans. Hence there is no doubt that the primary laws are observed by people, namely [those regulating] the sites chosen by the citizens on their first coming to that city and also the food (84.) found there. After that there are the secondary laws concerning commerce, and similarly also tertiary laws concerning [moral] dispositions and what resembles them. It is evident that in this city the

household is the primary intention and the city is only for its sake. Hence it is entirely domestic, contrary to what is 「the case with」 the virtuous (5) city. Every man, if he so wills, may have all goods in private. If so, most of these cities existing today are democratic, and the individual who truly lords it over them is the one who has the capability of so governing that every man attains his desire and preserves it. This city is the one of which most of the multitude hold that it is the city to be admired, for every man asserts on the basis of unexamined (10) opinion that he deserves to be free. It seems that this city is the first among the cities that grow out of the necessity-cities; for once humans attain the necessary, they are aroused toward their desires, and this city [sc., the democratic city, then] necessarily comes into being. The association in these cities is necessarily only accidentally an association since 「they do not aim at」 a single end in their association, and the lordship in them is lordship 「only」 by chance. The associations of many of the Muslim kings today (15) are only associations that are entirely domestic. All that remains in them of the nomos is the nomos that preserves the primary laws for them. It is evident that all property in this city is domestic. Hence they 「sometimes」 need to bring forth 「from the household」 some of the acquired surplus in it and transfer it to whichever of them fights. Herein originate tributes and imposts. Men are of two classes: a class designated the multitude, and a class designated the (20) mighty—as was the case with the people in 「persia」 and as is the case in many of these cities of ours. Among these the multitude are plundered by the mighty, and the mighty go so far in seizing their property that this occasionally leads them to tyranny, just as this comes about in this time of ours and in this city of ours. For the most part, love of property grows upon the multitude only when the primary nomoi among them are acquisitive. When every one fights for the (25) city, he is not obliged to draw off any of his wealth for fighting. This will occur 「only」 as long as humans hold fast to that which was laid down for them—the nomos of the citizens of the necessity-cities—and especially if their livelihoods depend on hunting or robbery. But when different desires arise in them and grow to extremes, it is impossible for them as a whole to fight and their kings need to impose (30) 「taxes」 upon them. If, along with this, it should happen that these rulers do not equitably divide the property seized (85.) from them | and lord it over them, why this is the hardest of things for the multitude. They will then try to shake off the rulers, and the lord will try to tyrannize over them. Hence this city is most opposite to the tyrannical city. What initially was designated as civic property in this nation is by now truly domestic—i.e., for the sake of the households of (5) the lords among them. Hence the aristocratic part among them is by now entirely tyrannical. This, then, is the situation of the democratic city and the matters related to it.

As for the truly tyrannical cities, they are the cities through the association and efforts of whose citizens the completion of a single aim is intended, namely the aim

of the tyrant to attain the end he has set for himself. This may be only the desire for tyrannizing, or the desire for honor, (10) or the desire for wealth, or 「the desire for」 pleasure, or the combination of them. It is evident that the likes of these [things] are not sought for any end for which they are intended other than serving the tyrant and giving expression to his will. Hence they resemble slaves; indeed they are truly slaves. This association is the most opposite to the virtuous association 「because in the virtuous association it is intended only that every one of the citizens receive as much of happiness as it is in his nature to be (15) raised to. Hence the intention of the virtuous royal arts」 is only the advantage of the civic body, just as is the case with the other arts. An example of this is the art of medicine: its intention is the healing of the sick, not the attainment of the physician's private intention. Similarly, the navigator's intention is the saving of the ship's crew, not the saving of himself alone—as is the case with the tyrant's intention. For he aims at his own private intention. He does not grant them (20) any advancement, but 「only」 grants them necessary things to the extent that they serve him utterly, as is done with slaves. It is evident that this city is of the utmost injustice since not one of the practical arts has as its intention solely the completion of the intention of the arts. This is selfevident. The governance of the household of the citizens of this city and the other arts and crafts existing in it aim (25) solely at the perfection of a single intention and solely at the life of a single household, without anyone having an intention of his own. So also with the virtuous city: the households and other kinds of people in it also only aim, in their intention, 「at」 the good of one [kind] of people, namely the lords, who in this respect resemble the tyrannical city. But the difference between them is this: notwithstanding (30) that the other kinds of people in each of these two [cities] aim only at the completion of a single intention alone, in the virtuous city this is only so that every one of its kinds may have an intention sought by it for itself, in that this is (86.) its happiness. | When it is added that this intention is for the sake of those who are kings over them, then the intentions of the citizens are for the sake of their [sc., the lords'] intentions. Hence each one of the two kinds—i.e., that of the lord and that of the multitude—helps its fellow in the virtuous city attain happiness. That is, the multitude serve the lords in that whereby the intention of wisdom is fulfilled in them [sc., the lords]; and the lords serve the multitude in (5) that which brings them to their happiness—if such as this can be called service. It would be more proper that it be called governance or guidance. Such is not the case in the tyrannical city, for in it and as regards the multitude, the lords seek no intention other than their private intention. Therein is the similarity between aristocratic cities and tyrannical cities. The aristocratic parts existing in these (10) cities 「often」 turn into tyrannical ones, and give the lie to the aristocratic intention—as is the case with the aristocratic parts found in cities existing in this time of ours. The tyrant

necessarily has helpers among them, and consequently tyrannizes over the citizens. It may, however, happen that these helpers and mighty ones are not accorded advancement by tyrannical lordship; this city is tyrannical in its entirety. It may indeed happen that they have some (15) superiority from tyrannical lordship, their varying [status] in this lordship corresponding to the extremity of their tyranny and their violence. This kind of tyranny exists most frequently, particularly at the beginning of a tyranny. This city tyrannizes over its kind—I mean that the mighty in it, together with the king, tyrannize over the multitude. Indeed, it may happen that the citizens as a whole help to tyrannize the other nations, not to tyrannize one another. Their rank would then correspond to their rank in capability (20) for tyrannizing and in the soundness of their plans for saving and preserving them[selves]. Their first lord will be whichever of them is most advanced in these things. These, then, are the tyrannical cities and their kinds.

As for the cities based on pleasure, they are the ones whose citizens, through their association, aim at the attainment of sensual pleasure such as eating, drinking, copulation, and the others. Similarly the necessity-cities are those whose citizens, through their association, aim at the (25) attainment of the necessary things. That through which they attain the necessary things are either agriculture or hunting or robbery. Agriculture is of them all [the most] natural to man for the attainment of the necessary. This much of a notion of these cities as is here [presented] will suffice according to the intention of this science in its primary purpose. These governances are varied and many in accord (30) with the varying states of the soul. Hence they must necessarily 「point」 to the states of the soul; and the cause of their being of this number is nothing other than that [this is] the (87.) number of the states of the soul. | The spirited part is that which loves honor; when it goes too far it becomes tyrannical. As for the love of pleasure and wealth, this necessarily belongs to the desiring part. As for the democratic city and the cause of its coming into being, why it is the variety in the states of the soul and the appetite that is fixed in the nature of each and every man with regard to each and (5) every one of these states. If the parts of the soul are severed from one another and the baser of them is not for the sake of the nobler—as many humans may possibly assert—then the human association is the association of the free. Similarly, if the parts of the soul are for the sake of the spirited part, then the human association is the timocratic or tyrannical association. Hence, too, if the desiring soul is the leading one, then it is the association based on wealth or the (10) hedonistic one. As for the virtuous association, it has already been made clear in physics and in this science 「as well that the case is quite the opposite of all this and」 that the lordship over the parts of the soul belongs only to the rational part. Hence the virtuous city is the city over which this part rules.

This having been made clear concerning the ends of these cities, it is fitting that we proceed to each and every thing that Plato says about the transformation of these cities into (15) one another and the comparison between them. He first begins by comparing these cities in pairs, thereafter comparing the two people who rule over the two of them. Finally he compares them all together, since the case is clearer in governances than it is in states [of the soul]. Just as justice is clearer in a city than it is in the 「particular」 soul, so it appears to be with wrongdoing. We resume and (20) we say: Although this city—i.e., the virtuous one—once it exists, 「does not easily」 perish, it undoubtedly does perish (546) necessarily since everything that comes into being perishes, as has been explained in physics and becomes clear through investigation. As to whence corruption enters into it, why it is clear that it enters into it from the class that rules over it when there arise in it [sc., the ruling class] confusion, corruption, and the mixture of the golden and silver [classes]. So that when the lords in this city do not attend (25) to the selection of like [individuals] for copulation in the manner that he said, there are born to them children who do not resemble 「them」. If these are not transferred from the class of guardians but remain guardians, the bad ones among them will constantly shun those things on which they have been raised and despise music and choose gymnastic, [thereby] strengthening the spirited part in them and the desiring part. When this kind of humans arises in the class of lords and is mixed with the virtuous kind, then each (547) one of them pulls his fellow to what resembles him. The (30) bronze and iron kind will be zealous to acquire and possess property, while the other kind will be zealous for those (88.) primary virtues. | If the pulling between them is prolonged, they settle on something intermediate between the virtuous governance and the governance in which property is accumulated. They [sc., the bronze and iron kinds who are now part of the guardian class] take possession of land, houses, and chattels for themselves in particular. They give the [gold and silver] guardians as much of this as is needed to sustain them, turning them by this act from free friends into slaves who are lorded over because of their [sc., the (5) bronze and iron rulers'] might in war and their love of training and honor. It is evident that this governance is like something in the middle between the governance based on wealth, namely the lordship of the few, and the virtuous lordship. For in the respect in which this class among them that fights for them does not wish anything of the acquisition of property or of the other arts, it resembles the virtuous city. But in the respect that the lords in it are not those virtuous ones whom we have defined—those tending (10) toward lordship being rather those who are spirited and have a capability for victory—it is likewise not virtuous. Hence this governance is a mixture of good and bad. Now (548c) this lordship is the first lordship that Plato 「asserts」 the virtuous city is transformed into because preference for honor, violence, and love of lording-it-over prevail over the souls of the virtuous more than

the other desires. That is why those who are skilled in debate say that [what begins (15) as] the lordship of friends ends up as the love of honor. Furthermore, this is the first thing to be chosen after wisdom, according to unexamined opinion, since honor is a shadow that accompanies it. It is, as it were, the closest thing into which the virtuous are transformed. It is not often that there are to be found those who are free of it [sc., love of honor] because of prolonged [association] with it and love of being remembered. If one's love of honor goes to the point of tyrannizing, then he withdraws himself from such cities as these, which have the virtuous kind of lordship, (20) no less [surely] than if the bad class accept the lordship of a tyrant or if one of this description grows up among them. This, then, is what Plato asserts concerning the initial transformation of the virtuous governance. He holds similarly concerning the transformation of the individual who resembles the virtuous governance, namely the philosopher, into the individual who resembles the timocratic association, namely he whose happiness consists in honor.

He said and characterized this individual—he means the one whose happiness consists in honor—as being an individual (548d–549e) (25) who prefers gymnastic, loves hunting, rejects music, loves lordship and tyranny, and does not base his claim to lordship on what he says or suggests but rather on his strength in war.

He said: He who is of this character will undoubtedly despise money as long as he is a youth, but as he grows older there is born 「in him」 with the passing days a love of money. 「This is because」 his nature is not a complete nature. In the end, he participates in the money-lover's nature since he already has been abandoned by the best (30) guardian to the extent that he removes himself from (89.) listening to the musical arguments. If the soul bends | to them [sc., the musical arguments] from its beginning, it persists all its life in preferring virtue. This, then, is the character of the individual whose happiness consists in honor. But how does this individual grow out of the virtuous one ? This will be when this young fellow happens to be the son of a virtuous individual who grew up in a city (5) without a good governance. He [sc., the father] flees from the honors and lordships established therein and from whoever in general conducts it at some level. He removes himself from all things, as happens to the virtuous who come forth in nonvirtuous cities. This being so, and this being the situation of the father of this young fellow, the first thing that happens to him is that he hears from his mother that she is discontented with her husband—i.e., his parent—because 「he is not one of the lords; because of this she lacks standing among its citizens; moreover, she has a (10) hard life because」 he also does not wish to accumulate wealth or to seek it. Hence she repeatedly tells her son, “You have a father who has not the nature of a man and is very lax,” and the rest of what women customarily censure men with. The same holds for the servant of this young fellow and his friend and in general whoever gives heed to his bidding from among the inhabitants of his household. When [one of the latter] sees the parent of

this one set upon by "someone" who oppresses him or hits him, he commands (15) [that individual's] son (while he is yet a young fellow) to take revenge on whoever oppressed his father and inflict twice as much of the oppression upon him [when he grows up]; and in general, in all his actions, to be more like a man "in his appearance and in" his courage than his parent. This being so, there is "further" joined to him in this city the opinion of its citizens calling one who minds his own (550ab) business a fool and a madman and a defective and a simpleton, while those who attend to those who are not of their way of life and meddle into what are not their affairs (20) are honored and praised and called mighty. In such a lad, the virtuous nature that his father nurtured in him, namely the cogitative soul, draws him on together with the desiring and spirited nature that "these" people do not cease nurturing in him. From this he turns to something intermediate between excess love of the desires and love of virtue. He thrusts the lordship in himself to the middle part, namely love of honor, since this part of the soul, as we have said repeatedly, is of all the parts that which is closest to the (25) part leading to virtue. He necessarily turns into an individual who loves honor "and acts haughtily". This, then, is the character of the youth who is among those whose happiness consists in honor, and the character of his transformation from the virtuous nature. He resembles the character of the timocratic city and its transformation from the virtuous city. You may understand what Plato says concerning the transformation of the virtuous governance into the timocratic governance and of the virtuous individual into the timocratic individual from the case of the (30) governance of the Arabs in early times, for they used to imitate the virtuous governance. Then they were transformed into timocrats in the days of Mu'āwiya. So seems to be the case in the governance now existing in these islands.

After this he investigates which governance this timocratic (90.) city might possibly be transformed into | and into which of the other people who rule over cities this timocratic individual "might possibly" be transformed. He says that this governance—i.e., the timocratic—is for the most part (550c–550e) transformed into the lordship of the few. This lordship, as (5) we have said, is lordship of the rich; the poor have no share whatever in lordship among them. The transformation of the timocratic into this governance occurs only because, over time, they come to see the utility in dinars and dirhams and prefer the useful to the beautiful. They withdraw from virtue by another evil stage within the timocratic city "and accord dinars and dirhams a shameful honor. It is possible to observe that which Plato speaks of when we investigate (10) the timocratic cities" and how they are transformed. This lordship is a vile, despicable, and contemptible lordship; it is of little stability, perishing through some little thing that comes upon it from without or within. The first error in it is that they do not award lordship to him who has the (551) capacity to maintain it. Rather they only look out that he be sufficiently

wealthy alone. In this they are in the position of one who chooses that the pilot of the ship be whoever (15) among the ship's company is most avaricious; and they do not heed the captain who is truly a captain 「regarding the rule of the ship, on account of his being poor」. Whoever does this has already undoubtedly prepared the ship for destruction. So is the case with the city. Further, this city is not a single city, but rather two cities—the city of the poor and the city of the rich. For if they accumulate property and are niggardly with it, they will remain non-poor.(20) An evil affecting this city is that they are [rendered] utterly incapable for war because the situation compels them to [adopt] one of two [courses]. [a] They may employ many fighters, but 「this」 is impossible for them because of fear of them. (Hence he says of their lordship that it is the lordship of the few.) Also, they are stingy with their property, so in this respect too it is impossible for them to employ many mighty ones. [b] If they themselves are the (25) fighters or some few of them, then when they wage war they will flee. You can make this clear from the case of most easeful nations when poor nations make war with them. Of necessity there must be an error in this lordship of the sort he did not leave off censuring in what preceded, [namely] that one is occupied with many things, such as farming and accumulating wealth.

He said: The generation of this kind of lords in this (552) (30) governance is the greatest of the evils that come upon them. That is because they never cease turning the governance toward whatever is advantageous for them, particularly in the acquisition of wealth. Undoubtedly it will be one of the (91.) nomoi laid down in this city | that it is not proper that aristocrats rule over them or theirs, and that every man may give away all his wealth, and nomoi similar to these. This (5) being so, the poor in this city increase of necessity just as increase the drones born in a beehive who eat but do not gather honey. Just as the drones are the greatest disease for the beehive, so is the case in this city. This being so, where there are poor in the city so are there necessarily robbers, plunderers, and bad people. Hence such cities as these have (10) in them many kinds of evil. This, then, is the wrongdoing and the error that beset this city. For the most part, the timocratic city is devoid of this; hence that city is closer to the virtuous city, and the distance of this [sc., the oligarchic city] from it is proportionate to the error that befalls it.

After having made clear how the timocratic city is transformed into this city, and how many kinds of error befall it, and what kind of governance it has, it is proper that we (15) also consider the individual who resembles it, in which city he is and out of what he is transformed. We say: When the one for whom happiness consists in honor has a son and (553) successor, it may possibly happen later on that he 「grows poor」 and that everything that he owned passes away. Moreover, he is drawn toward some one of the lordships, such as governance of the army and the like, and there are lawsuits against him owing to people who 「bring him up」 to

judgment and render him contemptible. When something (20) like this or resembling it happens to him, dying will be more bearable for him than the poverty that has beset him. Love of honor is expelled from the soul of whoever prefers the acquisition of wealth, and for this he sends forth all the desires. Such is the transformation of the timocratic individual into the oligarchic one. He undoubtedly resembles the governance based on wealth, just as the individual whom we characterized as being one whose happiness consists in honor also resembles that [timocratic] governance. (25) This individual undoubtedly is avaricious and niggardly; he finds it sufficient that civic desires are [limited (554a, 554e) to] the necessary things, but he does not do this out of any virtue in him. He only abandons these desires for another desire that is greater in him, namely the love of wealth. Hence, if the likes of these are denied others' property 'but' do not refrain from unnecessary desires, there will be rapid ruin and destruction, as we have said, on account of the (30) niggardliness in them. In general, the transformation of the timocratic individual into the hedonistic individual is something evident, whether he takes his pleasure in wealth or (92.) the other remaining pleasures. So seems | to be the case with the timocratic city and the hedonistic city; this is because the 'city' based on wealth and the hedonistic one are of a single class. We often see kings being corrupted 'to' the likes of these. An example in this time is the kingdom of (5) people known as the Almoravids. At first they imitated the governance based on the nomos; this was under the first one of them. 'Then they changed under his son into the timocratic, though there also was mixed in him the love of wealth'. Then it changed under his grandson into the hedonistic with all the kinds of things of the hedonists; and it perished in his days. This was because the governance that opposed it at that time resembled the governance based on the nomos. This, then, is the statement on the change of the timocratic individual into the oligarchic individual. (10) The difference between their two ranks is clear, for the oligarchic is baser than the timocratic. So is the case with the city of them both. Now we ought to consider into which city this city can possibly be changed out of itself.

We say that he says that it changes into the democratic city. Similarly, he also explains further that the oligarchic (555b–555d) individual changes into the individual resembling this city. (15) As for the mode by which the city based on wealth is changed into this city, it is this : Since lordship in the city of the few is assured only by the possession of property alone, their nomoi that they lay down necessarily [include] a nomos that helps them in this intention. Hence the first thing they lay down as a principle of the nomos is that it be permitted any one of the youths who so wishes to spend whatever he wishes of his wealth on whatever desire he wishes. For thereby it comes about that they [sc., the money-grubbers (20)] draw off all their wealth. This is why it is impossible for people in this lordship to combine with the honoring of wealth and its acquisition, the laying-down of nomoi

regarding moderation, [even] when because of necessity they have to propose them and especially at the end when they lay down *nomoi* such as these. When they forsake people and their desires, they forsake not a few to go to poverty, but many—and these not only the undistinguished, but [also] those of nobility and courage. (25) When such as these come forth in this city and multiply in it, they necessarily anger the avaricious and niggardly, whom they envy and blame for being the cause that placed them in poverty and contempt. Similarly, they lay down many *nomoi* in this city.

He said : They make their souls idle and put them at ease (556*b*–556*e*) since they do not attend to things other than the accumulation of wealth.

He said : When many people of this kind of poverty are (30) associated together and there come forth among them such drones 「as are born」 in beehives, and they compare themselves with the rich in battles and in the other civic affairs that are imposed upon them by the necessity of association, (93.) they find themselves | mightier than they in everything. And they despise them and assert that they became wealthy only because of their [sc., the poor's] shame and disgrace. The situation of this city is then like the 「situation」 of a shattered and sickly body. Just as a body of this character falls ill from the slightest external cause, so is the case with this city. If there is some city opposing it—and particularly (5) a democratic one—then such drones as these who come forth, help them against them [sc., the rich] and agree to plunder the rich and seize their wealth and drive them from the city or enslave them. Just as it is also possible for a body to take leave of its own being and change, so is it possible that this city change from its being into the democratic city. This comes about when the poor that are in it conspire against the rich and ransack their property and kill them (10) or drive them from the city. You can explain this by [referring to] the niggardliness and avarice [displayed] toward the poor in these cities on [the part of] the rich. When this is so and the likes of these—the free-born poor—rule over the city, every one of them does what is right in (557*a*–557*c*) his eyes. Lordship among them is held by some kind of chance. Every kind of human is undoubtedly to be found in this city, and no 「one」 has any rank at all. Their *nomos* is an equal *nomos*—i.e., there is no superior among them. (15) Hence this city—i.e., the democratic one—resembles a many-colored woven garment. Just as this kind of garment is considered by women and youths to be good because of the variety of its colors, so seems to be the thought about this city according to unexamined opinion. But in truth it is not so. Unless strengthened by virtue or honor, it perishes rapidly, as is the case with democratic cities existing in this (20) time of ours and in that which preceded [it]. Out of this city will come forth the virtuous city and the other kinds of these cities because they exist in it potentially since all the states of the soul exist in 「this city」. So it seems that the first cities to grow up by nature are the necessity-cities; then the democratic cities

follow them; then every one of these cities branches off from them. Hence, as Plato says, the wise ought to attend to such cities as these [sc., the democratic ones] (25) and choose from among them the good kinds that accord with the virtuous association 「untill」 they bring it forth. This is analogous to a man who wishes to set up a store in which he sells everything and who chooses from it that (557*de*) which pleases him.

He said : Since in this city no one is compelled to undertake any of the 「useful」 civic matters 「such as」 wars, peace, and the rest, it easily comes to ruin. Hence it is that we see people such as these who deserve being put to death (558) (30) dwelling among them as though [no one cared or saw, stalking the land like a hero].

He said : Moreover, they do not praise the things that we ourselves were praising when we were attending to 「the virtuous city」, nor do they adhere to any of those actions. | (94.) This, then, is the extent of the error in this city and its remoteness from the virtuous city, even though it might be thought of this governance, according to unexamined opinion, that it is a hedonistic governance. This, then, is the statement concerning the transformation of the city based on wealth into the democratic one, and the extent of the error that befalls it in comparison to the virtuous city and the timocratic city.

(5) We ought also to consider the individual resembling it and out of what he changes. We say that the individual who resembles this lordship also only changes from being a citizen of the lordship of the few in the [same] manner as this city changes from it [sc., the oligarchic city]. It may happen that a son is born to that individual who is a citizen of the lordship of the few, and, for want of education in the lordship of the few and because of the increase of idlers that come forth there, he does not leave off bending his son (10) toward his governance. [Meanwhile] those without bend him [sc., the son] toward absolute freedom and aim at this kind of desires. As time passes he necessarily changes to unqualified freedom in all his desires, not limiting [himself] to the necessary desires with which his father would have him be satisfied. Rather he will move to the unnecessary desires. (By “necessary desires” I mean those that are constituted in us and which we need for life, such as the desire for water and food with respect to this preserving the (15) humors of our bodies 「by transmitting to our bodies」 a replacement for that which pours out of 「them」.) Now if this youth turns to some such condition, he will from day (561) to day become more subjected to his desires that come into his mind. At one time he drinks wine till he is drunk; at another time he drinks water till his temperament cools; at another time he takes gymnastic with those who engage in gymnastic; at another time his conduct is like the conduct of those who engage in philosophy; and at other times he is (20) slothful and too relaxed for any activity. In general, there is neither order nor measure in his conduct. Yet this conduct is called sweet and free, though in truth it is the remotest of things from human conduct. For inasmuch as

man has some single end, his activity necessarily only [corresponds] to some single governance. This youth being L then of this disposition, he necessarily resembles the democratic city. We presuppose that this is so and that the comparison between him and these people whom we have (25) enumerated is like the comparison between the cities. We ought to consider which city this city—i.e., the democratic one—changes into and what is its potentiality, and into which individual this individual turns, and what is his rank and measure and happiness.

He said that the democratic cities mostly change into (30) tyranny and the tyrannical cities. The case of the change (562*ab* of the democratic city into the tyrannical one is like the case of the change of the lordship of the few into the democratic lordship. The cause of this is of one class : for just as the cause of the change of the lordship of the few into the (95.) democratic lordship is nothing | other than excess in the end that they aim at, namely the acquisition of wealth (for this is the cause of so many democratic people coming forth in that city, they being those whom we likened to drones existing in beehives), so the cause of the change of democratic lordship into the tyrannical lordship is only excess in (5) quest of freedom and the limitless 「increase」 of it. For (563*e*–564*d*) whatever is done in excess goes beyond its measure and is changed into the opposite. This occurs not only in voluntary things but also in natural things. The quest for excess in

「freedom」 is the cause of there coming forth in it drones 「resembling」 the drones that come forth in the lordship of the few, save that here it [sc., the cause] is more extensive (10) and more frequent. That is because the lords in that city— i.e., the city of the few—do not praise such as these who come forth among them—i.e., idlers full of desires—but rather destroy and fight them. Hence its change is to something intermediate between the city based on wealth and the tyrannical city, and this is the democratic city. Such men as these as come forth among them are the honored and praised ones whom they set up as lords for (562*d*–563*d*) (15) them, and [these] rule 「over」 them. For it is the way of this lordship that when freedom overflows in it they are stirred up in their households and dwellings and in all the classes to be found among them to the point that fathers and sons, masters and slaves, men and women, are placed on an equal footing among them. And they nullify the law in order that nothing have lordship over them. In general, nothing is choiceworthy among them save absolute freedom and that a man control whatever he wants as he wants. Of necessity, (20) then, the coming-forth of that bad class of drones will (564*b*–564*e*) increase among them just as 「the production of humors」 increases in shattered bodies— 「i.e.,」 phlegm, and the red and the black [bile]—to the point that this city, with such a class as this coming forth in it, turns necessarily into a tyranny. Hence it is fitting that statesmen guard against the coming-forth in cities of such a class as this even more than the physician's precautions against the production of bad humors in bodies. When they detect that something of them (25)

comes forth in cities, they [must] tear them out by their roots and cast them out of the city just as the physician does with the two biles and the phlegm. This is even more fitting for the statesman. This class of humans—i.e., those who control everything that they desire—does not come into being [alone] in this city. It is found, rather, that, as Plato says, three classes of humans emerge in it. Their coming-forth in it is the most helpful of things for its changing into (30) tyranny. As for the first class among them, that is the class of drones whom we have characterized, those who abandon [themselves] to all their desires. This class, as we have said, (96.) are the honored and praised lords in this city. | There is also a class that grows in this city that is abhorred in it, namely that which loves money alone. The coming-forth of this class in this city is as honey for these drones who eat it with great speed. As for the third class, they are the people who keep to their own affairs or have no affairs, [and] they are not wealthy. The moneyed kind, however, is persecuted in (565 (5) this city; and these two classes combine to plunder 「and rob them」 of their property, except that the first class does this by way of desire and licentiousness, while the second does this 「only」 because of the advancement they intend for themselves by means of [the others'] property. That advancement corresponds to the extent that those who seize lordship of the association in this city find it possible to plunder these of their property and to divide it among the populace.

He said : The propertied are necessarily wronged by these; and there arise here contentions and acts of violence (10) and robberies. It is the way of the populace to turn over 「their affairs」 to the one who is greatest in that class—i.e., of the people who give rein to their desires—and they sustain him and make him great. Such an individual as this does not cease adding gradually to [this] change and to excess in freedom to the point that they enslave the majority of the citizens and become thorough tyrants. The beginning of the transformation of this one who 「comes」 to tyrannical (15) lordship from democratic lordship is this: When he begins this lordship he commits tyrannical acts to the point that he finally turns into a thorough tyrant. For on finding the populace at the outset submissive to him in harming whomever he wishes to harm and punishing him with something detestable, and in destroying whomever he wishes to destroy, he thus does not cease 「to bring」 one kind of people into tyranny over another kind. And this, as we have said, is so that the [different] kinds existing in this city (566) be made evident, and particularly the moneyed kind, which (20) are the most hated of things in this city. He does not cease doing this continuously until he becomes the enemy of most of the citizens and hates them. Then, either they conspire against him and kill him, or he rules over them and tyrannizes them all and becomes a tyrant. (You yourself can understand this clearly from this democratic lordship that exists in our time for it often changes into tyranny. An example of this is the lordship existing in this land of (25) ours—

i.e., Córdoba—after 500 [A.H. = 1106]. It was almost completely democratic; then the situation turned after 540 [= 1145] into a tyranny.)

As to how his rise comes about through these actions, and what his governance comes to in the end, and the extent of what befalls the city through him by way of injury and evil, and the misfortune that befalls him himself, why that will be made clear through speech and investigation. Plato (30) says that it is characteristic of this individual that he subdue all humans and arouse them to hold fast to the *nomos* so (97.) that it might be thought that he is not tyrannizing, and that he intends the guidance and direction of the citizens [with a view] to dividing property and goods among them, and that he has no other intention than the care of the association and the improvement of the city. When he has made peace with the enemies without by setting things right with some and 「overcoming」 others, he turns to his city where he continually stirs up wars among them. This is so that he might control the property of its citizens and (5) seize it. For he holds that once he has plundered them of their wealth they will be unable to shake him off, and they (567) will be preoccupied with themselves and with seeking their daily bread, as happened to the people of our district with the individual known as Ibn Ghāniya. If it also comes into his mind to be frightened of people in the populace on account of their having much wealth and substantial possessions and power, he cunningly devises their destruction by turning them over to their enemies. Similarly, he 「hates」 whatever human is of this description among his peers and (10) whom he has made into his henchmen. When 「he」 does these actions, the greatest thing is [his] hatred of the citizens. That is why he makes use of his energy to recognize these—i.e., men of might, courage, and greatness—among them. He plots against them until he purges the city 「of them」. This purge is the opposite of the purge by which the physicians purge bodies and the wise [purge] the virtuous cities; for these extract the worst and cast it out, while this one does the opposite. That is why the tyrant is obliged to (15) be in one of two conditions : either not to live, or to dwell with evil and sinful people who hate him. This is one thing in which, according to him, the tyrant takes delight. Undoubtedly, as long as he engages in these actions and his enmity toward his citizens grows, he will have need of more numerous henchmen so that he may be more protected and secure. This can only be provided for him if he engages evil foreigners, to the exclusion of the citizens; he draws them (20) 「from every」 place 「if」 he gives them pay. These are his trusted friends, and he destroys those predecessors who set him up as ruler of the association. If the tyrant finds nothing (568*de*) with which to feed this army and camp, the situation will compel him—should there be any wealth in the city in one of the temples—to order that it be taken out. Similarly, he conspires against the property of the association that set (25) him up as one of the 「democratic」 rulers. As this activity of his against the association increases, they see that this 「is the opposite of what they intended」 in

handing over the lordship to him, since they only intended by this that he (569) guard [them] from the rich and the gentlemen and other citizens once he possessed dominion and power, so that they might exist under his governance and the governance of his servants. Hence the association of the distressed 「then」 seek (30) to drive him out of their city, and he is compelled to enslave them and to take [their] arms from them. The condition of (98.) the association with him is 「like」 what is said | in the metaphor of the torch burning over coals in the fire, for the association flees from some [sort of] servitude in handing over the lordship to him and falls [thereby] into an [even] harsher servitude. All these actions of the tyrants are manifest in this time of ours not only through argument but also through sense and evidence. We have spoken of the (5) manner in which the democratic city changes into the tyrannical city, and what is the condition of the citizens in a tyranny, and the extent of their distress.

Now we ought to consider 「also」 the individual who resembles this city, and how he changes from the individual (571) who is one of the democratic rulers, and whether his way of life in grief and lack of happiness resembles the governance of the city that is being tyrannized. We say that since Plato defined this individual as being, according to him, the individual filled with unnecessary desires, he began by first (10) making known what these desires are. Then, after that, he turns to describe the manner in which the tyrannical individual is changed from an individual who exercises democratic rule, and the extent of his grief and lack of happiness, and [shows] that in this he resembles [the city] that is being tyrannized. He said that the unnecessary desires are those that are aroused and brought into motion in sleep : i.e., the bestial part, when the cogitative part that rules over this part is asleep. 「For」 it is the way of the bestial 「part」 during sleep, when released from the rule of the (15) cogitative part and from every 「thought」, that it holds at that moment 「that nothing will frighten it off」 from seizing what it desires when it awakens. When this part is brought low by the nomoi [and] the better [desires], much of it is nullified; and if some remnant of it remains, it is weak. But if a man attends to this part [sc., the bestial part], his condition in sleep does not resemble that of that first one. Rather, this one's cogitative part in sleep is just as it is in waking so that he entertains no thought [hostile] to the (572) (20) nomoi. Hence this resembles 「the two」 [kinds of] people, the bestial and the divine. When it became clear to him what the unnecessary desires are, he turned to investigate what this individual—i.e., the tyrant—changes out of, and said : We have already said of the democratic individual, whom we mentioned in the preceding, that he is a young fellow who grew up with a disposition to choose none of the unnecessary desires apart from the accumulation of wealth. Since this young fellow grew up among people filled with (25) 「un」 necessary desires, and his nature was better than their nature, and his father was drawing him toward his way of life and they toward its

opposite, he turns into something intermediary between those two kinds and takes from each one of them what to his mind is equitable. His way of life is neither the way of life of one who has no freedom nor the way of life of one who transgresses the nomos, and he is transformed from being one belonging to the lordship of the few to turn into one of the populace.

(30) He said : All this being as we have characterized it, let it be presupposed now that when one of this description (99.) reaches | old age, he has a son who has grown up with his disposition. Also let it be presupposed that those things that happened to his parent happened to him—i.e., through people whose way it is to draw 「him」 to that which has [hostility] to the nomos—and that they lead him to utter freedom. [Presuppose too] that his father, contrary to what was the case with himself, has already attended in some way to the birth of these desires [in the son], as also do his (5) servants and his relatives. He undoubtedly changes toward excess in these desires more intently than did his father because he has no one drawing him toward the other extreme and because he finds no people to force him and to oppose him. Rather he finds people who act cunningly toward him regarding whatever it is that he loves. This one [love] they place over all the desires, and it rules over them. They [sc., the desires] make it [sc., the love] into what (10) corresponds to one of the greatest drones in the hive. 「For (573) when he encounters the unnecessary desires」 such as drunkenness from wines and incense and perfumed oils, and in general all the delights [to be found] in [such] gatherings, they depart from him and are utterly removed from him. These drones are to be seen among them [sc., the unnecessary desires], and they hinder him to the point that his mind is unbalanced and his excitement is intensified. Then the demons seize him ; and his confusion is intensified, and he is beside himself 「if there remains in him」 some remnant of [his earlier] life after all that has befallen 「him」 on (15) account of these desires. As this is the situation of the tyrant—i.e., the situation of one who takes no notice, neither little nor much, of the noblest of his parts, namely reason—the situation of the tyrant resembles the situation of the deranged and of the drunk, and his intellect resembles his; and hence his status and position are similar to those of the deranged and the drunk. Hence, unbalanced ones such as these wish not merely for dominion over people, but over angels too if this were only possible for them. This, then, is (20) the character of the tyrannical individual and the manner by which he changes from the individual who is a democratic ruler. He only comes to such a condition as this after all these things have befallen him [owing to his] nature and way of life. When he completed this, he undertook to consider the manner of this one's life and lordship. And he said : This individual has gatherings based on the pleasures, among which are bazaars, baths, and promenades, and in general whatever causes love to dwell and arouses [erotic] desire, which [in turn] overpowers him and guides the parts (25) of his soul just as

the captain guides the ship. As this is the situation of this individual, other desires will not cease being aroused alongside these desires, just as 'the shoot' sprouts 'at the side' of the tree. He will have need of great expenditures; and if he has wealth, he spends it immediately. Thus he soon has need of [further] expenditures, and thereafter there arises for him the need to borrow from (30) others. Along with all this, his desire forces him to what is beyond his capability, and particularly the erotic and amatory desire, which are the guides of the rest of his (100.) desires. | In general, he does not leave off the subject of his desires, as Plato says, like one who indulges himself in raising pigeons. Hence, only one of two things is possible for him: either he draws toward himself whatever he wishes from whatever place, or he feels pain as a woman feels pain during her menstrual period or as an invalid in pain. If his parents have something [left], he does not find what they (574) gave him to be sufficient, and he asks it of them. If they (5) refuse, he takes it from them, either by deception or by theft or by force. If they still hinder him in this, he attends to tyrannizing over them or killing them, as we see this happening to many humans in these cities. This, then, is the situation of one to whom a tyrannical child is born, who finally comes to tyrannize his parent. His desires further lead him to plunder houses of assembly and temples and (10) wayfarers. In general, those desires do not cease, but go on increasing 'in him' forever; they are intensified by the dominion of [erotic] desire and love to the point that he feels troubled. When he is relieved of the good 'opinions' held by him from the period of his youth—at which time his parent was raising him and he [sc., the son] was one of the democrats—it reaches the point that his waking becomes, as Plato says, like his condition when asleep. He denies himself nothing, and nothing frightens him. When (15) the likes of these drones multiply in democratic cities, they (575a–575d) recognize that they [are a multitude]. They, with the help also of the foolish populace, take the mightiest and strongest of them in tyranny and deliver the lordship to him; and he tyrannizes over them. Just as he formerly ruined father and mother, so does he now ruin 'the city' of his father and forefather. If these drones are few in the city and if the virtuous among them [sc., the citizens] rebuke them, then the mightiest of them take to leaving the city and stand on the roads robbing men of their lives and wealth.

(20) He said : It is the way with the tyrant's might that he does (576) not mark any of the citizens with love or affection that is genuine or mutual. All this being as we have characterized it, why then the governance of the tyrant is the governance of utmost injustice since it is most contrary to that which we previously defined to be the right one. It is this that is of the utmost evil and ruination, just as what preceded (25) concerning the king is of the utmost goodness and excellence. Since the situation as among cities is like the situation as among individuals, there is, therefore, no one more happy than the virtuous king and no one more wretched than the tyrant. This comparison between each one of them—i.e., the comparison

of city to city and individual to individual—is, however, clearer in [the case of] the city. This being so, if we ourselves accept that the relation of city to city is [the (30) same as] the relation of individual to individual, then this comparison between the two of them—i.e., between the (101.) two people—becomes clear. | Hence the accidents and properties characteristic of this city ought to be reflected upon, and we must judge the tyrant in the light of them. It is clear that this city is in extreme slavery and very far removed from freedom. Similarly, the soul of the tyrant is (577c–577e) filled with slavery and devoid of freedom; for the base part (5) rules over it, while the parts that are of utmost fitness are enslaved. When a city is enslaved, either it does not bring about what it wishes or else brings about only little of it; hence they are full of sighing, sorrow, and mourning. As for those filled with tyranny, it is also clear from their situation (578a) that they are impoverished. Similarly, the tyrannical soul is impoverished, not sated.

He said : And just as this city is in utmost fear, so is the (10) tyrant. And just as there is not to be found in any city more mourning and weeping than in this city, so is the case with the tyrant's soul, which is filled with persistent desires and unfulfilled loves. This, then, is what Plato said in comparing these cities and these people. But since he found this comparison, which we have described, between the virtuous city and the tyrannical one clearer than that between the two people ruling over them, he wished to make the case (15) of the tyrant manifest through a clear example. [He does] all this on account of the renown of 'tyrannical' lordship in his time, and the poems in praise of them, and their assertion that it is the lordship of the free. I have seen many among the poets and those who grow up in these cities who prefer this lordship. They hold that it is the ultimate end and that there is excellence in the tyrannical soul, and they hold fast to [this] lordship. He resumed and said that it is clear that the relation of the tyrant to those over whom he (578de) (20) tyrannizes is the relation of the master to the slave. If we presuppose that there is a rich individual who has many slaves and who does them no good at all, this can only be because the nonslave citizens among the people of his homeland are twice the number of the slaves. Now if we presuppose that such an individual as this, and his children, wives, and property, are in a certain region of the earth where there is none other than slaves with him and where, in general, he is in a situation in which it would be impossible for someone without freedom to help him, why then owing to his slaves he necessarily reaches [a state] of great (25) 'fear' for his wives, property, children, and himself. The situation compels him to deliver up his slaves or [at least] (579) some of them. Although there is no obligation 'to do this', he accumulates many things for them and withholds them from himself so as to bind them [to him]. He will be in one of two conditions: either great strength accrues to him, or he comes to lose any importance. If, moreover, God were to place people 'around him' who hold that there is no necessity that one have lordship over

another, would not the heart of this individual grow faint and would he not be (102.) among them 「as though he were」 under detention ? | This is necessarily the situation of the tyrant : he is detained among a class such as this, filled with hunger and fear. Moreover, he has great hunger 「within」 himself and cannot rule himself. Hence he cannot go wherever he wishes nor look at whatever he wishes, but rather 「only」 lives the life of a woman. One of the worst dispositions of such an (5) individual is that he is unable to restrain and overcome himself, yet he attempts to lead other people at some level. It is as if a man who is sick in all his bodily dispositions, as much as he reckons on curing what [ails] him, leaves off curing his body and [instead] improves his property as far as is possible for him and takes to healing [other] people's bodies in accord with his notions. On account of all this, the tyrant is the most enslaved of people and has no device (10) by which to put an end to his desires, but rather is forever in continual sorrow and mourning. The soul of one who is of this description is an impoverished soul; hence he is envious, violent, and friendless. These states having existed in him prior to his lordship, they are even more necessary after [he assumes] the lordship. Without any doubt, he is of necessity troubled and unlucky, for he who rides chance and (580a–580c accident often comes to lose any importance. All this, as we have said 「more than once」, is clear and may be discerned (15) through argument as well as through the sense[s]. From the sum of this argument have been made evident the order [of succession] of these cities, the happiness and misfortune in them, the order of those ruling over them, and that the happiest of them is the king just as the most unfortunate of them is the tyrant. This, then, is what Plato holds concerning the change of these cities and of the people in them one into another.

One might object and say that if the case is as he thought, (20) namely that there is among these cities 「what」 resembles 「two opposites—the two being」 the virtuous city and the tyrannical one—and that there is among them what resembles an intermediary between the extremes, then it does not necessarily follow that the change of cities proceeds according to [this] order. This exists only in natural things, for it is the way with nature to bring about opposites via intermediaries. As for these things, they are completely voluntary. And [since] all these natures—i.e., the natures we have described—are to be found in all these cities, it is (25) possible for any city among them to change into any other. We say that what Plato said 「undoubtedly」 is not necessary, but 「it is」 [this way] as a rule. The cause of this is that the governance that is laid down has an effect by transferring certain states [of the soul] to whoever grow up in it, even if these are opposite to what is fixed in the nature of those who are being disposed toward those states. It is possible thereby for the majority of people to excel in the human virtues. (30) This is only rarely impossible. This has already been made clear in the first part of this science, for it was stated there that the way of attaining the practical virtues is habitude, just

as the way of attaining the theoretical sciences is study. | (103.) This being so, man's transformation from one state to another is consequent upon the transformation of the laws and 'is arranged according to their order'. Since the *nomoi*, and especially in the virtuous city, are not suddenly transformed—and this too is because of the habits and excellent states to which they accustom its members and with which (5) they grow up—but rather are only transformed gradually and to what is proximate [to them, it follows that] the transformation in habits and dispositions necessarily changes according to that order, to the point that when the laws are utterly corrupted, the states [of the soul] existing there will be utterly base. You can make this clear from what—after forty years—has come about among us in the habits and states of those possessing lordship and status. Because the (10) timocratic governance under which they grew up has been undone, they have come by these base things that they now have. Only he among them who is virtuous according to the Legal prescriptions remains in an excellent state. This is rare among them. When Plato completed this he wished also to compare the pleasures occurring to each one of these because this belongs to the completion of the comparison between them. With this he completes his discourse concerning (15) the necessary parts of this science, and this is what we ourselves had in mind to explain.

'He began and he said:' Since the states of the soul are comprised within three classes, so too are the kinds of cities. (580d–581) The first kind is that which loves wisdom; the second is that which loves mastery—if in moderation, then it is honor [-loving], and if in excess it is victory[-loving]; and the third, the appetitive one, is 'that which' loves gain. The kinds of pleasures are necessarily [also] three, [one] for each of these, since it is clear from the character of the pleasures (20) that they are an appendant shadow.

Plato began by using a dialectical argument to explain which of these pleasures is most worthy of choice. For 'he said' that every one of the adherents of these three pleasures is found to choose only the pleasure incidental to his way of life. Thereafter he laid down a well-known topic from among those mentioned in 'Book II of the' *Topics*, namely (25) the Book of Dialectic. He said that what the man of wisdom and knowledge chooses is most worthy of choice. And he reinforced this topic by saying that the man of wisdom 'and knowledge' is he who has two instruments by him whereby (582) things are arranged in order, namely experience and reasoning. To the man of wisdom alone does it befall that he arranges these three pleasures in order through experience and reasoning. As for experience, that is because he has tasted those pleasures from the time of his youth; but these others (104.) do not | taste at all the delight of wisdom. As for the man of wisdom being the one for whom it is possible to proceed through argument and reasoning, why this is self-evident. For we see that the multitude remember the pleasures 'only' at

(583cd) the time when their opposites are joined to them, 「so that」 when they are ill they say that health is the most pleasant (5) of things, 「and in time of poverty they say that wealth is the most pleasant of things」. But things pleasant do not require, as such, being preceded by an opposite. An example of this is vision, and so on. Indeed, the noblest of pleasures are those that are other than of this character and hence exist more fully. Plato elaborated upon this intention—i.e., the ignorance of whoever would be the equal of the wise in judging the pleasures, and the capability of the wise to do (10) this. Yet with all this, the argument does not rise to being demonstrative; so we leave it and take up what he says of this later on, which does appear to be demonstrative for he made use therein of another argument, and this is it.

He said : Just as hunger and thirst are an emptying of the body and an emptiness that befalls it, so are ignorance and (585) absence of knowledge an emptying of the soul and an emptiness for it. This being so, there are two people who are filled—i.e., he who takes food and he who acquires knowledge. But the true fullness is only through the thing (15) that has the noblest existence, namely that which [participates] most in being and most in truth. Things 「only」 excel in this matter according to their proximity to, or remoteness from, the eternal things, which truly exist and endure permanently. This being so, the thing whereby the souls are filled [participates] more in truth than the thing that fills the body since the soul is closer to the eternal things than (20) is the body, especially if the apprehension of their form is an eternal apprehension. Now if, in general, fullness in what one apprehends is pleasant, whatever 「he apprehends of what」 is essentially nobler and [participates] more in truth and is more enduring, is necessarily a more choiceworthy pleasure. Such is the case of the pleasure of the intellect relative to the other pleasures. For 「those」 pleasures perish rapidly because opposites are mixed in with them, while the pleasure of the intellect has no opposite. Thus either it (25) is eternal, or it perishes owing to a change that comes over it. And this argument—upon my life!—is a demonstrative argument.

Furthermore, he also said : As for most of the pleasures of the intellect, they become better as the intellect performs them. Whatever is the cause of something's being in the best condition is itself more choiceworthy. This being so, it is the judge who attains all the pleasures to the greatest extent possible. And this—upon my life! —is the truth, except for the statement wherein 「he said」 that whatever is the cause (30) of something's being of the best character is itself better. That is [merely] a generally accepted argument, although (105.) he does not explain it. | Galen, in his ignorance of logical methods, thinks that these are all demonstrative arguments. But of these arguments comparing these pleasures, the only demonstrative argument is that argument alone which precedes this one.

This, then—may God preserve your honor and prolong your days!—is the sum of the scientific arguments necessary (5) for this part of [political] science as are contained in these arguments attributable to Plato. We have explained them as briefly as we possibly could on account of the troubles of the time. This was only attainable for us because of your helping us to understand them and because of the boon of your ‘sharing’ in all that we have longed for of these sciences and your helping us toward them with the most complete kind of help. You are the cause not only of this good being bestowed upon, and transferring to us, but also (10) of whatever human goods we have acquired, which God (may He be exalted!) has bestowed upon us for your sake. May God preserve your honor!

What the tenth treatise encompasses is not necessary for this science. For at its beginning he explains that the art of poetry has neither the purpose nor the knowledge from which true knowledge comes about. This matter has already been completely explained elsewhere. Then he mentions thereafter a rhetorical or dialectical argument by which he (15) explains that the soul ‘does not’ die. Then there is a story after that in which he describes the bliss and delight that await the souls of the happy and the just, and what awaits the souls of the tormented. We have ‘made it known more than once’ that these stories are of no account, for the virtues that come about from them are not true virtues. If one calls them virtues, it is [only] homonymously. They belong to the remote imitations. This has already preceded in [the discussion of] the genus of imitations. It is this that has brought us to an untruth such as this. It is not something (20) necessary to a man’s becoming virtuous, nor will it be better and easier for a man to become virtuous through it. For we see here many people who, in adhering to their *nomoi* and their Laws, albeit devoid of these stories, are not less well off than those possessing [these] stories. In general, there is in these stories that over which the ancients had already disputed; and Plato was troubled thereby. ‘What they’ (25) [sc., these stories] are is clear from ‘his discourse’ at the beginning of this book. As for the first treatise of this book, they are entirely dialectical arguments; there is no demonstration in them other than by accident. Similarly with the opening of the second; hence we do not explain anything of what is in it. May God help you with that which you are presently undertaking; and, in His will and holiness, may He remove the obstacles.

The treatise is completed, and with its completion the explanation is completed. Praise be to God!

79.24-25 In admitting a plurality of virtuous cities, Averroes tacitly rejects the notion of a single universal society based on the one true religious Law. See 97.13, below, and 57.6 and note to 31.24-25, above. For Farabi, too, there can be more

than one virtuous city (*Political Regime*, 102.3, 104.7 [*MPP*, pp. 51, 53]; *Plato*, 20.12 [Mahdi tr., p. 65]; *Virtuous City*, 70.9 [Dieterici tr., p. III]).

80.17 unmixed] MSS : simple.

80.21 primacy of the good] See 52.24-26, above.

80.23 conditions are combined] The following account (to 81.5) closely parallels Farabi's discussion of the "first chief" and his surrogates in *Aphorisms*, 66.3-67. 10 (Dunlop tr., pp. 50 f.). See also *Virtuous City*, 60.11-61.6, 9-11 (Dieterici tr., pp. 96 f.), for the discussion of the conditions for the "second chief."

80.24, 29 war] *ha-shqē ydah*—watchfulness, assiduity. This translation assumes along with Rosenthal that the Hebrew translator mistook the meaning of *jihād*.

81.4 jurisprudence] The knowledge that is possessed by the secondrank ruler is *fiqh*. Averroes makes explicit what is implicit in the parallel passage in Farabi's *Aphorisms*. See also Farabi, *Enumeration*, 107.5-14 (*MPP*, p. 27), for the relative standing of jurisprudence; and Plato *Statesman* 301a–b.

81.6-7 Compare Farabi, *Virtuous City*, 61.7-9 (Dieterici tr., p. 97), where Farabi attributes wisdom to the one ruler and the remaining qualities to the co-ruler. Averroes' joint rulers appear to be below that rank.

81.13 Averroes' account of timocracy, which continues to 82.20, closely resembles Farabi's in *Political Regime*, 89.14-94.4 (*MPP*, pp. 43-46). See also *Virtuous City*, 62.10-14 (Dieterici tr., p. 99).

82.22 Averroes' account, which continues to 83.15, elaborates upon Farabi's discussion of the vile city in *Political Regime*, 88.14-89.6 (*MPP*, p. 43). See also *Virtuous City*, 62.6-8 (Dieterici tr., p. 98).

83.2 all cities] See 43.13-31, above.

83.2-3 medium of exchange] *v ūlam ha-šōrekha ha-mēbhi' ēlēyhem bemedīnōth bekhal ha-ma'asīm* (v) *ēšel hōša'ath ha-emša' ī*. Perhaps, following other MSS : leads to them in acquisitive [or : democratic] cities.

83.4 supplied] MSS : loved.

83.8-12 Compare the parallel passage in Farabi, *Political Regime*, 89.4-6 (*MPP*, p. 43). "Necessary things" corresponds to Farabi's "methods employed to obtain the bare necessities." Averroes here omits the fourth in Farabi's enumeration : robbery.

83.16 On democracy see Farabi, *Political Regime*, 99.7-101.5 (*MPP*, pp. 50 f.); and *Virtuous City*, 62.16-18 (Dieterici tr., p. 99).

84.3-4 Avempace, *Governance*, 6.2-6 (*MPP*, pp. 124 f.).

84.10 the necessity-cities] or : the indispensable cities. See Farabi, *Political Regime*, 88.4-13 (*MPP*, pp. 42 f.); and *Virtuous City*, 62.4-6 (Dieterici tr., p. 98). See 86.24-27, below.

84.12 do not aim at] MS A : since it is impossible [to have].

84.12-15 See note to 52.25-26, above.

84.13 by chance] Farabi, *Political Regime*, 101.9-10 (*MPP*, p. 51): for here no one has a better claim than anyone else to a position of authority.

84.19 mighty] *taqīfīm*. See note to 41.17, above.

84.20 Persia] Plato *Laws* 3. 6g7c-6g8a.

85.5 aristocratic] *kohanī* = *imāmī*. See note to 79.1-8, above.

85.7 tyrannical cities] or: despotic cities. See Farabi, *Political Regime*, 94.5-99.6 (*MPP*, pp. 46-50); and *Virtuous City*, 62.14-16 (Dieterici tr., P. 99).

85.12-14 Farabi defines political science as the knowledge of the things by which the citizens may thus attain happiness (Attainment, 16.4-5 [*MPP*, p. 61]). That Averroes should then go on, as he does in the next sentence, to speak of virtuous royal arts is not surprising in the light of Plato *Statesman* 259a-b, 305c-e, and Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 2. 1094a26-b10.

85.15 civic body] The reference is to those people who participate in the affairs of the city, political humans, as distinguished from gods and subpolitical beings.

85.15-18 Plato 342d-e, 346e.

86.8-10 aristocratic] *kohanī* = *imāmī*. See note to 79.1-8, above. See also Averroes' discussion (63.27-64.22) of the deleterious effects of these cities upon virtuous natures and the political consequences of the deterioration of those individuals.

86.15 varying] or: manifold.

86.22 Farabi's "base city." See *Political Regime*, 89.7-13, 102.12-103.13 (*MPP*, pp. 43, 52 f.); and *Virtuous City*, 62.8-10 (Dieterici tr., pp. 98 f.).

86.24-27 See 83.10-12 and note to 84.10, above.

87.11 rational part] Plato 586e; Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 10. 7. 1177a12-18.

87.21 physics] Aristotle *Physics* 5. 2. 226a6-8.

87.30 Or : to acquire property and be master over them.

88.14-15 One sees dimly here a play on words in the original : what begins as the lordship of lovers ends up as the love of lordship.

89.15 Following Plato 549e.

89.28-31 Averroes points to two latter-day cases that come close to illustrating Plato's account of the transformation of the virtuous governance. The first concerns the regime of the Arabs under Muhammad and his immediate successors, the first four caliphs (632-661), here described as an "imitation" of the virtuous governance. In the accession of the caliph Mu'āwiya in 661 and the establishment of the Umayyad dynasty, Averroes sees a transformation of the imitation. The second case refers to the Almohad dynasty, under whose rule of Morocco and Andalus Averroes lived the greater part of his life. See 92.4-8, below.

89.32 Paragraphing supplied.

90.4 See 82.22-83.15, above.

90.15 ship] MSS: city.

90.30-91.2 Averroes' addition to, or substitution for, Plato 552a-b.

91.3-4 increase of necessity] Other MSS add : and remain as thorns and pricks in the eyes of the rich, who are few in number. Such plagues as these in this city resemble the drones. . . . (The phrase “thorns and pricks in the eyes” combines expressions found in Num. 33:55 and Josh. 23:13.)

91.13 Paragraphing supplied.

91.22 oligarchic] Literally : moneyed.

91.28 them] MSS: him.

92.1-2 See 81.9-10, above.

92.4 Almoravids] Correcting the Hebrew mistranslation. The Almoravids were the dynasty that preceded the Almohads (see note to 89.28-31, above).

92.4-8 What began as an “imitation” of the governance based on the nomos under the conqueror Yūsuf Ibn Tāshfīn (1061-1107) was twice transformed by the time his grandson reigned forty years later. The latter’s overthrow was effected by ‘Abd al-Mu’min, the founder of the Almohad dynasty, whose governance “at that time resembled” the governance based on the nomos. In the absence of further evidence, the governance based on the nomos cannot simply be equated with the governance based on the Law. Averroes would have had no difficulty whatever in expressing that if such had been his intention. The model for the imitation or resemblance, the standard by which these regimes are being judged, is not the Koran, but rather that which the Koran itself incorporates and imitates. See note to 62.29-63.1, above.

93.12-13 chance] I.e., lordship is not attained because of some particular merit. See 84.13, above, and note thereto. See also Averroes, *Rhetoric*, 136.11-12.

93.21-23 Averroes’ addition.

93.30 Following Plato 558a. MSS have instead a near-quotation from Isa. 43:10: they are those before whom there was no God formed.

94.1-4 Averroes’ summary.

94.5 Paragraphing supplied.

95.23 statesmen] Plato 564C : legislator.

96.4 and] Following Plato 565a; MSS : except that.

96.12 change and . . . freedom] The change consists in depriving the propertied of their political and economic importance. The freedom is not for the citizens generally, but for the leader himself and for his fellow drones.

96.24-26 See 92.4-8, above.

97.7 One of a family that were prominent opponents of the Almohad dynasty and leaders in the attempted restoration of Almoravid rule in North Africa.

97.7-8 Plato 567a : if he suspects certain men of having free thoughts and not putting up with his ruling.

97.15-16 Plato 567d : either dwell with the ordinary many, even though hated by them, or cease to live.

97.21 Averroes passes over, for the moment, the digression in Plato 568a–c wherein the tragic poets are attacked for their praise of tyranny. See 101.15-18, below.

97.25 MS A: they see that this is the way in which they went astray.

97.26-27 the gentlemen] Literally: the virtuous and the good.

98.1 I.e., that in seeking to avoid the discomfort of the torch's smoke, men have been exposed to the greater hazard of being burned in the fire.

98.6 Paragraphing supplied.

98.16 Following Plato 571b; MSS : by the better nomoi.

98.19 hostile] Following Plato 572b. The MSS read : near to the nomoi. The MSS may reflect an earlier mistranslation of the Greek prefix *para* as “near” or “beside,” which was taken over by Averroes.

98.27 no freedom] Plato 572d: illiberal.

99.3 hostility] Following Plato 572e; MSS : nearness. See note to 98.19, above.

99.11 they depart] The referent is ambiguous. Averroes seems to be referring to any vestiges of moderation in the young fellow.

99.19 angels] Plato 573C: gods.

99.27 Averroes' elaboration. Plato 573d speaks of desires sprouting up beside the soul.

100.1-2 Averroes' elaboration. Plato 573e speaks of a crowded nestful of intense desires raising a clamor.

100.12-13 democrats] or: he was one of the democratic rulers. Plato 574e: there was a democratic regime in him.

100.15 Following Plato 575c to fill a lacuna in the Hebrew text.

101.15-18 Averroes picks up the theme of Plato 568a-c, which he passed over at 97.21.

101.16 grow up] Other MSS: many of the poets who grow up.

101.24 great fear] Following Plato 578e, one MS, and Mantinus; other MSS: great calamity.

102.9-10 Or: no device for the longing of his desires.

102.11 friendless] Plato 580a: envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, and a host and nurse for all vice; and, thanks to all this, unlucky in the extreme.

102.13 unlucky] The following clause is Averroes' addition, as is the subsequent sentence.

102.15 argument] or: from the contents of this treatise. Averroes omits Plato's repetition of the five types of cities and men.

102.19 Paragraphing supplied.

102.23 voluntary] See discussion of voluntary intelligibles and the deliberative faculty in Farabi, *Attainment*, 17.17-28.4 (*MPP*, pp. 62-68).

102.26 as a rule] The earlier discussion of the transformation regimes was cast in terms of possibilities and likelihoods, rather than inexorable necessities. See

89.32-90.4, 92.12, 93.6-8, 93.18-21, above.

102.28 It is possible thereby] I.e., by transferring certain states the soul to the inhabitants (given the virtuous city or excellent laws).

102.30-31 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 2. 1. 1103a14-b25.

103.8-12 “Forty years” appears to refer to the period beginning with the establishment of the present (i.e., Almohad) rule ca. 1146. The decay in that regime has already been alluded to by Averroes in 89.31 and 92.7-8, above.

103.17, 18 moderation, excess] Averroes’ additions.

104.4-5 Averroes adds the example of poverty and wealth. See Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1. 4. 1095a24 f.

104.6 vision] Plato 584b: the pleasures of smells in particular.

104.23-28 Plato *Philebus* 52b, 55a, 59C, 64d-65a.

104.28 Or: it [sc., the intellect] is the judge who understands all the pleasures in the best possible way.

105.4 Rosenthal, p. 300, tentatively identifies the addressee as the Almohad ruler, Abū Ya‘qūb Yūsuf (reigned 1163-1184). Teicher (p. 193), conjectures that the addressee is, rather, Abū Ya‘qūb’s son and successor, Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb al-Manṣūr (reigned 1184-1198/99). The date of this work’s composition is not known.

105.11 Paragraphing supplied.

105.16-17 not true virtues] Consider 31.7-25, above.

105.25 And with this Averroes excuses himself from giving an account of Plato’s theory of the immortality of the soul. Farabi, too, ends his summary of Plato’s *Laws* with Book IX.

105.28-29 Paragraphing supplied. Teicher ascribes these lines to a copyist.

Appendixes

APPENDIX I

Translator's Colophon

Averroes' explanation of the scientific arguments found in Plato's *Republic* is completed ; this is the beginning of the second part of political science. Its translation was completed on 22 Kislev 5081 (after the Creation) [= 24 November 1320] in the city of Uzès. I, Samuel ben Judah ben Meshullam ben Isaac ben Solomon, Barbevaire, of Marseilles, translated it.¹ When I was translating it there had not come into my hands Averroes' explanation of the philosopher Aristotle's *Ethics*, which is the first part of this volitional science, but only the Philosopher's statements themselves. I was unable to translate them owing to their profundity and their difficulty. I applied myself to this and strove mightily until there came into my hands the explanation of that part by the afore mentioned scholar, Averroes, [written] in distinct, clear language as is his fine way in all of his explanations. I aroused myself to translate it ; and God, honored in His mercifulness, approved of my doing so as a good thing so that the translation of the explanations of the whole of political science was completed. Then I went over the whole of my translation of this science and corrected the errors as best I could. The work of careful examination and improvement was completed on 26 Elul of that year [= 20 September 1321] in the chateau at Beaucaire, [where I was] confined and abandoned with more of our brethren, and shut up in one of its fortifications called the Redoubt. It is not impossible, but rather possible, even certain, that he who considers this translation of mine of the two parts of this science will be in doubt concerning some of its passages because of my poor translation owing to my inadequate grasp of the Arabic language. But—by the worship !—I hereby expect and trust that those errors will be excused for their paucity ; they are not far off from what is customarily [encountered] in the translation of other books ascribable to one or another of the translators who came before me. Perhaps hereafter, by decree of heaven, one of the select few who are expert in both languages will be emboldened and aroused with firm heart and fresh spirit to remove and clear out my mistakes and errors so that the translation of this science be perfected. I, out of my love for it and diligence in it, thought of and imagined going even further by improving this translation together with Christian scholars ; and especially the first

part of it, for the statements of the Philosopher on that part are to be found among them as well as interpretation of them by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī. By the Law and the testimony!² As I had imagined [it], so would it have been, had not the cause alluded to, concerning the long and harsh imprisonment that occurred to us at this time, hindered me from [doing] this. If God prolongs my life and brings me out—a prisoner from the dungeon, out of the prison-house³—and offers me the briefest leisure, I will attempt this. I will go further in inquiry and research, from the beginning of the science to its end, in orderly fashion, until the translation is brought to the most perfect state. Hence, until this is accomplished, let him who studies this science not blame me on coming to passages where there are mistakes and errors. For there is no man who never fails,⁴ nor is there a craftsman who does not err in his work on rare occasions. All the more, then, with practitioners of the craft of translation, which is burdensome and difficult work. For the craftsman in it needs to be expert in both of the languages—i.e., that from which he translates and that into which he translates—and be a scholar, not only of the science or art that he is translating, but of all or most generally known sciences as well, since all the sciences and arts are intertwined with one another, for the one is always being compared to the others. The early translators who came before us had already drawn attention to this or something like it in their apologies for their translations. Not with standing the great perplexities, confusions, and injuries that have befallen our people and that for a long time have come continuously one after another—the latest [of these misfortunes] being the most calamitous—whatever of this art has come our way at the present time is excellent. Let us praise God (may He be exalted !) and give Him great thanks for having helped us in this. In general, I say : You men of speculation, oh community of believers in the truth ! May His way be accomplished ! Give credit to whomever it is due ! For to this very day, nothing at all of this science has been translated or has come down to us, neither from the Philosopher nor from others, except for whatever of this is to be found in the *Book of the Principles of the Beings*⁵ by Abū Naṣr al-Fārābī, which has fallen into the hands of many of the people of our nation. This has only some of the second part of this science ; there is nothing in it of the first part. I myself was emboldened to begin to show the honor of this science’s glorious majesty⁶ and to bring it forth in our language. Even if the good that exists in it is slight owing to my shortcomings, here is the treatise as a start. Even if it is slight, it is potentially great.⁷ However that may be, sleepers, awake from the deep sleep of slothfulness and the ignorance that is devoid of any positive quality ; [it is that] which leads and brings down [the ignorant] into the nethermost pit [and] which passes by and loses complete happiness.⁸ Awake, ye who are drunk with troubles ; rejoice greatly.⁹ Take hold of this fair portion that God has allotted you. Hear, ye deaf, what these two divine kings have spoken ; look, ye blind, and see the light that is bright in the skies.¹⁰

Surely seek counsel ; who created all these exalted wonders, elevated beyond all praise? Look into the vision ; behold, your reward is with you and your recompense before you.¹¹

The translator said: I had resolved to improve the translation of this science together with Christian scholars but was unable to do so owing to the force of the expulsions and imprisonments that befell us from this people, which banishes us. We were a proverb and a taunt among them ; they made us like the dust in threshing.¹² Yet I was scrupulous in inquiry concerning it ; and wherever I was in doubt I always consulted the book of the Philosopher and, as best I could, made what was crooked straight. This is how I conducted myself with respect to the *Ethics*, but in the case of the *Republic* I had no other book. Nonetheless, I am sure that my errors in it are few and that he who looks into this after me will make amends for me and judge me with an inclination in my favor, as befits the sect of those who philosophize, seekers of the true reality of knowledge in beings.¹³

This revision was completed in the month of Tammuz, 5082 [= June/July 1322]. Praised be the Creator who helped me, and may He be exalted forever! Amen.

Blessed be He who giveth power to the faint; and to him that hath no might He increaseth strength.¹⁴

Be strong!

Copyist's Colophon

The name of the thinker who translated this book—i.e., Aristotle's *Ethics* and the Platonic *Republic*—is Rabbi Samuel ben Judah ben Meshullam ben Isaac ben Solomon of Marseilles. It was he who translated it into the holy tongue and made many apologies of various kinds for the confusion in translation attending most of the *Ethics* and many parts of the Platonic *Republic*. It appears that this young fellow was expert in the holy tongue, but he was not perfected in forming a translation and [in] knowledge of the language from which he was translating. The honor due to him remains ; and in any event we ought to praise him and acknowledge his industriousness in striving to provide us with a translation of this art, whether in respect of the goodness that is already in this book as it stands, or in respect of its being an incitement to set right its deficiency and give a proper shape to the whole of it (though the work involved is considerable). In any event, since we in our misery are mingled with the nations, we need to make use of their instruments whenever we happen to have any undertaking in common with them—until there

comes He who purifies and refines silver,¹⁵ in His mercy raising a poor and needy people out of the dust.

I, Moses ben Rabbi Isaac (may his soul be in Eden!) Rieti, wrote [this copy of] this book, not with standing the deficiency in its translation, while seventy years old in my mortal life, which is the year 5217 [= 1457]. Not even this shall be wanting for my children, along with the rest of the books that I wrote and caused to be written and bought for them as I was free to do so, in addition to what my father and teacher (peace be on him!) wrote. May they find grace, good understanding in the eyes of God and man!¹⁶

Selah!

¹ There is an account of Samuel ben Judah's life and works by Lawrence V. Berman, in Alexander Altmann (ed.), *Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies*, Philip W. Lown Institute of Advanced Judaic Studies, Brandeis University, Studies and Texts, vol. 4 (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 289-303. Berman's translations of these two colophons appear on pp. 307-311 and p. 311, n. 36. In translating I follow the Hebrew text of Samuel's colophon as published in E. I. J. Rosenthal (ed. and trans.), *Averroes' Commentary on Plato's "Republic"* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1956, 1966, 1969), pp. 106-107; by permission of Cambridge University Press. The copyist's colophon is that of MS A.

² Cf. Isa. 8:20.

³ Cf. Isa. 42:7.

⁴ Cf. I Kings 8:46 and II Chron. 6:36.

⁵ *The Political Regime*.

⁶ Cf. Esther 1:4.

⁷ Steinschneider: "so scheint er gross im Verhältnis zur Fähigkeit des Autors" (*Hebr. Üb.*, p. 223).

⁸ Cf. Provo 19:15 and Ps. 55:24.

⁹ Cf. Joel 1:5 and Isa. 61:10.

¹⁰ Cf. Isa. 42:18 and Job 37:21.

¹¹ Cf. Dan. 9:23 and Isa. 40:10.

¹² Cf. Jer. 24:9 and II Kings 13:7.

¹³ Or (emending *amitūth* to *immūth*) : seekers after the verification of knowledge in existing things.

¹⁴ Cf. Isa. 40:29.

¹⁵ Cf. Mal. 3:3.

¹⁶ Cf. Provo 3:4 and 13:15.

APPENDIX II

Notes to the Hebrew Text

In publishing the Hebrew text, Rosenthal chose not to produce a complete *apparatus criticus*, listing instead only those variants that he judged to be significant. I have compared his listing of variants only with MS A. I have here added to that list of variants by and large only in those cases where I follow MS A and where the unlisted variant results in a difference that is expressible in English. Such added readings are marked with an asterisk.

Also listed here are emendations of the Hebrew text, whether made by me or adopted by me from others, all of whom are identified by surname. Of the latter class of emendations, twenty appear in Rosenthal's *apparatus*.

Excerpts and paraphrastic renderings of this text occur in Joseph ben Shemtoḥ's *Kebhod Elohim* (Ferrara, 1555). (Norman Golb drew my attention to the existence of such parallel passages and kindly lent me his copy of the work.) I note the following: 4a, 21-25 (*Kebhod Elohim*) = 65.9-14 (Rosenthal); 5a, 7-13, 15-18 = 67.8-15, 16-20; 5a, 25-5b, 10 = 67.20-68. 11; 6a, 10-17, 22-24, 28-31 = 68. 15-25, 69. 12-14, 20-23; 6a, 32-6b, 1 = 71.25-28; 6b, 3-5 = 69.28-31; 6b, 6-7a, 3 = 72.1-32; 18b, 25-19a, 11 = 104. 12-28. The variants from our text are on the whole slight.

22.18 human perfection] MS A: *beshlēmūth ha-enūshī* (sing.).*

28.17 love] Emending *ha-sin'ah*—hatred—to *ha-ahabhah*, following Caspi, Medigo, and Mantinus.

- 28.29 compared] Emending *dimyōnō* to *damīnū* (Rabin, cited in Rosenthal).
- 29.5 turning] Transposing *vyashūbhū bazeh* (Teicher).
- 30.7 divine acts] Reading *ha-pe'ulōth*, with MS *A* and Farabi, rather than *ha-mūskalōth*.*
- 31.1 certain] Assuming an original *yushaqqu* misread by the Hebrew translator as *yūshiqu* (Baneth, cited in Rosenthal).
- 31.6 closely] *bedaquth* (5 MSS). MS *A*: *bedatōth*—in religions (laws).
- 32.12 the righteous] Assuming an original *ṣālīhūn* or *ṣulaḥā'* carried over into Hebrew as *ha-maṣliḥīm* (Vajda, cited in Rosenthal).
- 33.12 looks] Emending *vha-tmūrah*—and transformation—to *vha-tmūnah* (Rosenthal).
- 33.18 looks] Emending *betmūrah* to *betmūnah* (Rosenthal).
- 34.19 illustrious] Emending *sipūrēy* to *sefūnēy* or *safūn* (Mahdi). This is in accord with Mantinus.
- 35.28 the beautiful] MS *A*: *ha-tōbh*—the good.*
- 36.16 soft] Emending *ha-rabīm*—many—to *ha-rakhīm* (Rosenthal).
- 37.18 benefit] Emending *vha-hanaḥah* to *vha-hana'ah* (Mahdi).
- 37.26 a defect] Suppressing *qabhū'a*—chronic (Teicher).
- 37.27 come to grief] Emending MSS readings *vyibhshar* and *vyikhshar* to *vyikhshal* (Teicher).
- 39.8 most disciplined] Emending *vha-mūsar* to *vha-myūsar* (Teicher).
- 39.23 the dead] Emending *ha-mūtah*—death—to *ha-mētīm* (Rabin, cited in Rosenthal).
- 41.25 need] Emending *derekh*—way—to *ṣōrekh* (Rosenthal).
- 42.12 with them] Emending *mēhem*—from them—to 'imam.
- 44.3 citizens] MS *A*: *ba'alēy ha-medīnah*, rather than *ba'alēy ha-medīnōth*.*
- 44.27 loot] Emending *ha-klal* to *ha-shalal* (Rosenthal).
- 45.4 for the body] Assuming an original *min qibal* mistranslated as *miqōdem*—prior to (Berman).
- 45.18 become costly] Reading *she-yīqrū*, with MS *A*, rather than *she-yigrū*.*
- 46.19 Lawgiver] Emending *ba'alēy* to *ba'al* (Vajda, cited in Rosenthal).
- 46.28 over them] Reading *'alēyhem*, with MS *A*, rather than *ēlēyhem*.*
- 53.22 deserts] Emending *al-barbari* to *ha-barārī* (Baneth, cited in Rosenthal).

- 53.28 of the animals] Suppressing the conjunction in *ubeba'alēy hayyim* (Teicher, cited in Rosenthal).
- 54.22 them] Reading *lahen* (fem.), with MS *A*, rather than *lahem* (masc.).*
- 55.21 in fact] Emending *be'ašmam* to *be'ešem* (Teicher, cited in Rosenthal).
- 56.12-13 since] Assuming an original *idh* misread by the Hebrew translator as *wa-in* and translated as *af 'al pī*—even though.
- 59.12 and kiss him] Emending *vyehargēhū*—and kill him—to *vyehabkēhū* (Teicher).
- 61.15 followed] Assuming an original *yu'tammu* misread by the Hebrew translator as *yu'tamanu*—trusted (Kraus, cited in Rosenthal).
- 64.5 badly] Assuming an original *sū'* misread by the Hebrew translator as *sawā'*—just (Mahdi).
- 64.11 thought] Emending *sibatham*—their cause—to *sbharatham* (Rosenthal).
- 65.7 necessarily] *hekhrah mah = darūatan mā*, rather than *darūata mā*—does not know the necessity in that which leads to it (Mahdi).
- 65.27 infinite] Adding *biltī* (Strauss).
- 66.10 acquiring] Assuming an original *yattakhidhu* misread by the Hebrew translator *yattahidu*—to unite (Mahdi).
- 68.11 required by virtue] Following the reading: *lnefesh ha-medabereth kfi asher thayybhēhū ha-ma'alah*. This variant or elaboration appears in the quotation of this passage by Joseph ben Shemtob, *Kebhod Elohim*, p. 5b.
- 69.25 justice] Reading *ha-shivūy*, with MS *A*, rather than *ha-shinūy*.*
- 69.26 necessarily] MS *A*: *behekhrah*.*
- 70.11 genus] Assuming an original *jins* misread by the Hebrew translator as *juz'*—part (Mahdi).
- 72.32 theoretical perfection] The quotation in Joseph ben Shemtob's *Kebhod Elohim*, p. 7a, continues: and that this is man's ultimate perfection and his end.
- 75.24 unknown] Emending *mūskalēy*—known—to *mūskalēy*, following Mantinus (Strauss).
- 76.27 generals] Assuming an original *quwwād* (Rabin, cited in Rosenthal).

- 78.6 he believed] Vocalizing a presumed *ya'taqidu* instead of *yu'taqadu* (Mahdi).
- 78.15 is provided with] MS *A*: *hayah yamšī' mēhem*.^{*} This is in accord with Plato 540b.
- 78.22 expel them] Emending *vyaš'ū mēhem* to *vyōšī'ūm* (Rosenthal).
- 80.29 speech] Assuming an original *bi'l-qawl* misread by the Hebrew translator as *bi'l-f'l*—in deed (Mahdi).
- 82.6 Whoever] Emending *mimī* to *ūmī* (Teicher, cited in Rosenthal).
- 84.12 Note. MS *A*: *lo' yitakēn*.^{*}
- 87.20 it] Suppressing the conjunction in *vshehī'* (Rabin, cited in Rosenthal).
- 88.3 in particular] Assuming *sgulah* is a translation of *khāṣṣatan* (Pines).
- 89.8 he is not] Emending *shehū'*—that he is—to *sheēynō* (Rabin, cited in Rosenthal).
- 90.13 to him who has the capacity] MS *A*: *lmī shebō sēfeq*.^{*}
- 91.5 just as increase] MS *A*: *kmō sheyirbū*.^{*}
- 92.11 with the city] Emending *bemadrēgath*—the rank of—to *bemedī-nath* (Strauss).
- 92.28 since . . . things] MS *A*: *aḥar shehēm lo' yashgihū bidbharīm*.^{*}
- 93.12 held] Emending *mithhazēq* to *mūhazaq*.
- 95.28 in it] MS *A*: *bah*.^{*}
- 96.27 comes to] Reading *she'ēlav*, with MS *A*, rather than *she'alav*.^{*}
- 97.23 one of the . . . rulers] MS *A*: *miba'alēy ha-adōnūth*.^{*}
- 98.1 over] Reading *'al*, with MS *A*, rather than *min*.^{*}
- 98.15 nothing] Emending *shesham*—that something is there—to *sheshūm*.
- 98.23 who grew up] MS *A*: *ṣamah*.^{*}
- 100.2 for him] MS *A*: *lō*.^{*}
- 100.22-23 since . . . defined] MS *A*: *aḥar shehī' betakhlīth ha-hefekh lzeh asher gadarnūhū*.^{*}
- 101.26 obligation] Emending *ta'anah*—claim—to *to'an*.
so as] Emending *vyiqshoram* to *lyiqshoram*.
- 103.3 are] Reading *shehayū*, with MS *A*, rather than *shehū'*.^{*}
- 103.17 mastery] Assuming an original *ghalaba* misread by the Hebrew translator as *ghāya*—end (Mahdi).
- 103.25 He said that] Suppressing *ela'*.

APPENDIX III

Short Titles and Editions Cited

This list is limited to Arabic and Hebrew texts and their translations that are cited in abbreviated form in the footnotes. Where there is a translation, it is listed immediately after the original-language work. P indicates that the translation is not of the entire work, but only of a part.

A vempacc, *Governance*

Ibn Bājjah, *Tadbīr al-mutawahhid*, *El Régimen del Solitario*, ed. and Spanish trans. by Miguel Asín Palacios (Madrid-Granada : Escuelas de Estudios Árabes, 1946).

The Governance of the Solitary, trans. Lawrence Berman, in *MPP*, pp. 122-133 (P).

Averroes, *Decisive Treatise*

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Glossary

A note of caution: a glossary is not a table of simple equivalents. A term's many associations and meanings in a given language often are not carried over to another tongue.

Following each English term listed below are: (1) the manuscript's Hebrew term or terms being rendered thereby; (2) in brackets, the Arabic term or terms Averroes presumably used; and (3) where appropriate, and also in brackets, the corresponding Greek term in the *Republic*.

Active intellect *śēkhel pō'el* ['*aql fa*"]

Affective *hipa'alūthī* [*inifi'ālī*]

Appetite (*see also* Desire) *hith'ōrerūth* [*shahwa*] [*epitlrymia*]

Argument (*see also* Speech and Statement) *ma'amar* [*kalām; qawl*] [*logos*]

Aristocracy *ro'shiyūth ha-ṭōbhīm; tigbōreth ba'al ha-ma'alah* [*ri'āsa imāmiyya*]

Art; Craft *mal'akhah* [*sinā'a*] [*technē*]

Bringer of nomos; Legislator *manīaḥ nīmūs* [*wādi' al-nāmūs*] [*nomothetēs*]

Chief *ro'sh* [*ra'īs*] [*archōn*]

Coercion *mī'ūs* [*ikrāh*]

Cogitation *maḥshabhah* [*fikr*] [*logismos*]

Compulsion *hekhrah* [*qasr*]

Courage *amīsūth; gebhūrah* [*murū'a; iqdām*] [*andreia*]

Craftsman; Artisan *ūman* [*sāni'*] [*dēmiourgos*]

Democracy *medīnah qehaliyyith; medīnah qibūsīth; ro'shiyūth qibūs hamōniyy*
[*madīna jimā'iyya*]

Demonstrative *mofthī* [*burhānī*]

Desire (*see also* Appetite) *ta'avah; teshūqah* [*shawq*] [*epithymia*]

Dialectical *nišūḥī* (*jadālī*)

Disease (*see also* Illnesses and Sickness) *ḥōlī* [*marad*]

Disposition *tekhūnah; hakhanah* [hay'a; isti'dād] [ēthos]
Domestic *bē(y)tī* [manzilī] [oikeios]
Elect few *yehīdīm sgulōth* [khawāšš]
End of man *takhlīth enūshūth; takhlīth ha-adam* [ghāya insāniyya]
Enlarged thought *gedōl ha-maḥshabhah* [kabir al-nafs] [megaloprepeia]
Equality *shivūy* [musāwāt] [isotēs]
Erotic desire *ḥēsheq* [ʾishq] [erōs]
Erring cities *medīnōth tō'ōth* [mudun ḍālla]
Fable (with connotation of riddle or parable) *ḥīdah* [laghz] [ainigma]
Final cause *takhlīth* [ghāya]
Free; Free-born *benēy ḥōrīn* [aḥrār] [eleutheroi]
Generally accepted opinions *mefūrsamōth* [mashhūrāt]
God *ha-ēl* [allāh] [theos]
Governance *hanhagah* [tadbīr]
Guidance *hayysharah* [irshād]
Habit *qinyan* [malaka]
Habitude *minhag* [minhāj]
Happiness *hašlahah* [sa'āda] [eudaimonia]
Hedonistic *ta'anūgī* [khissa]
Human beings; Humans *benēy adam* [nās] [anthrōpoi]
Human Laws *tōrōth enūshiyōth* [sharā'ī' insāniyya]
Humors *lēyḥōth* [akhlāt]
Ignorant cities *medīnōth sekhalōth* [mudun jāhaliyya]
Illnesses (see also Disease and Sickness) *ḥala'īm* [amrād]
Imagination *dimyōn* [khayāl] [eikasias]
Imitation *ḥiqūy* [ḥikāya] [mimēsis]
Immortality *hisha'arūth* [baqā']
Individual *īsh* [shakhš]
Inquiry *ʾiyyūn* [naẓar]
Intellect *śekhēl* [ʾaql] [nous]
Intelligible *mūskāl* [ma'qūl] [noēton]
Investigation *ḥaqīrah* [faḥš; istiḳṣā'a] [zētēsis]

Judge *shōfēt*; *dayyan* [*qādī*; *ḥākim*] [*dikastēs*]
 Jurisprudence *mishpat* [*fiqh*]
 Justice *shivūy* [*‘adl*] [*dikaioσynē*]
 Law *tōrah* [*sharī’a*]
 Lawgiver *ba’al ha-tōrah*; *manīaḥ ha-tōrah* [*shāri’*; *wāḍī’ al-sharī’a*]
 Legal inquiry *‘iyyūn tōriyy* [*naẓar shar’*]
 Liberality *nedībhūth* [*karam*; *jūd*] [*eleutheria*]
 Lordship *adnūth* [*ghalaba*]
 Love (being well-disposed toward someone or something) *ahabhah* [*maḥabba*]
 Man (= male) *īsh* [*rajul*; *mar’*] [*anēr*]
 Man *adam* [*insān*]
 Men; People *anashīm* [*qawm*]
 Moderation *yir’ath ḥēṭ’* (literally, sin-fearing) [*qasd*] [*sōphrosynē*]
 Money (see also Property and Wealth) *mamōn*; *ma’ōth* [*al-dirham wa al-dīnār*]
 [*chrēma*]
 Moral virtues *ma’alōth midothiyōth* [*faḍā’il khulqiyya*]
 Multitude *hamōn* [*jumhūr*] [*hoi polloi*; *to plēthos*]
 Natural disposition *yeśrah* [*jabala*] [*ēthos*]
 Necessity-cities *medīnōth hekhrēḥiyōth* [*mudun ḍarūriyya*]
 Oligarchy *medīnah mamōniyyith*; *śarūth mamōniyy*; *ro’shiyūth ha-anashīm ha-me’aṭīm*; *ro’shiyūth ha-anashīm*; *ha-me’aṭīm ro’shiyūth ha-paḥūth*; *hanhagath ba’alēy ha-peḥūthūth* [*madīnat al-nadhāla*]
 Opinion *da’ath* [*ra’y*] [*doxa*]
 Perfection *shlēmūth* [*kamāl*]
 Persuasive *sipūqī* [*iqnā’*]
 Pleasure (*‘arēbhūth*; *ta’anūg* [*ladhdha*] [*hēdonē*]
 Populace *qahal* [*‘amma*] [*dēmos*]
 Practical *ma’aśī* [*‘amalī*]
 Pretenders to philosophy *mithpalsefīm* [*tafalsuf*]
 Primacy *ro’shiyūth* [*ri’āsa*] [*archē*]
 Property *memōnōth* [*tharwa*] [*ousia*]
 Prophet *nabhī’* [*nabī*]
 Reason *śēkkel*; *midbar*; *dibūr* [*‘aql*] [*nous*; *logos*]

Reasoning *heqēsh* [*qiyās*]
Rhetorical *halaṣī* [*balāghī*; *khaṭābī*]
Rulership *śarūth*; *ri'shōnūth* [*ri'āsa*] [*archē*]
Science *ḥakhmah* [*'ilm*] [*epistēmē*]
Scientific *mada'ī* [*'ilmī*]
Self-control *amīṭath ha-da'ath* (literally, true opinion) [*dabṭ al-nafs*] [*enkrateia*]
Sickness (see also Disease and Illnesses) *maḥalah* [*marad*]
Solitary, a *mith'ahēd* [*mutawahhid*]
Sophistic *haṭ'a'ī* [*mughālīṭī*; *mūhim*]
Soul *nefesh* [*nafs*] [*psychē*]
Speech (see also Argument and Statement) *ma'amar* [*kalām*; *qawl*] [*logos*]
Spiritedness *ka'as* [*ghaḍab*] [*thymos*]
Statement (see also Argument and Speech) *ma'amar* [*kalām*; *qawl*] [*logos*]
Statesman *ba'al hanhagah* [*siyāsī*; *śāḥib al-siyāsa*]
Story *sipūr* [*mathal*] [*mythos*]
Teaching *limūd* [*ta'līm*]
Theoretical *'iyyūnī* [*naẓarī*]
Thought *sebharah* [*fikra*] [*dianoia*]
Timocracy *medīnah ba'alath ha-kabhōd*; *medīnah ha-kebhōdiyyith*; *ro'shryūth ha-kabhōd*; *hanhagah ba'alath ha-kabhōd*; *hanhagah ha-kebhōdiyyith*; *qibūs ba'al ha-kabhōd*; *qibūs ha-kebhōdiyy* [*madīnat al-karāma*]
Tyranny *medīnath ha-nisūah*; *nisūah* [*madīnat al-taghallub*]
Unexamined opinion *tehlath ha-da'ath* [*bādi' al-ra'y*]
Vice *pehūthūth* [*radhīla*] [*kakia*]
Virtue *ma'alah* [*faḍīlah*] [*aretē*]
Wealth (see also Money and Property) *mamōn* [*tharwa*; *yasār*] [*ploutos*]
Wisdom *ḥakhmah* [*ḥikma*] [*sophia*]